From Outlays to Outcomes:
Getting Development from Development Expenditures

Conference Report

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From Outlays to Outcomes:
Getting Development from Development Expenditures

On August 25th 2009, Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research and Centre for Development Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research organized a conference entitled: *"From Outlays to Outcomes: Getting Development from Development Expenditures".*

The conference aimed to create a meaningful dialogue on the processes and mechanisms for strengthening transparency and accountability in the implementation of social sector programs in India by drawing together eminent policy-makers, practitioners, civil society activists and academics, in a day-long meeting.

Deliberations at the conference emphasized three key issues:

1. *Getting the design right:* Strengthening planning, institutional arrangements and processes for monitoring and tracking funds*.*
2. *Monitoring outcomes*: Identifying tools and processes to ensure that outcomes are tracked regularly, and that progress on outcomes is disseminated widely.
3. *Using Information Technology (IT):* Harnessing the potential of IT to track fund flows and monitor processes and program implementation.

The conference provided a forum for key stakeholders – policy-makers, practitioners, civil society and academics – to exchange ideas, draw lessons from experience, and identify solutions to what is perhaps the greatest challenge faced by the government: ensuring accountability in the money spent.

This report offers a brief summary of the day's proceedings, highlighting the key points that were debated and discussed.

Welcome and Context Setting

The conference opened with a welcome address and overview given jointly by Jessica Wallack, Director of the Centre for Development Finance and Yamini Aiyar, Director of the Accountability Initiative. The session laid down the contours of the debate by identifying key gaps and challenges in the current framework for implementation of social sector programmes in India. It was emphasized that prevalent accountability failures lay at the heart of the inability to deliver outcomes despite a massive increase in social sector expenditures by the government. These failures have created an overall environment in service delivery that is focused on inputs, with few incentives to measure quality and deliver on outcomes.

There are many factors that have contributed to these failures, including: 1) Poor planning: focus on inputs rather than outcomes; unrealistic targets; top-down planning with limited attention to varied local needs; and limited citizen participation 2) Poor implementation: the involvement of multiple levels of government with overlapping roles and responsibilities and varied capacity in program implementation; poor expenditure management leading to unpredictable fund flows, and finally, 3) Weak monitoring and oversight: limited information on implementation processes; poor incentives within the system to track progress; and limited oversight by citizens.

The session argued that solutions need to be identified within a framework that enables accountability at multiple levels – both accountability of the state to citizens, as well as accountability within the state apparatus. Such a framework would need to have the following elements: clearly defined goals that are focused on outcomes not inputs, locally developed operational plans aggregated at the district, clearly defined roles and responsibilities at each level of jurisdiction, improved monitoring and oversight through the use of information technology (IT), and finally, strong, vibrant mechanisms for greater monitoring and oversight by the citizens.

The opening session also emphasized that Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) - being the largest and arguably most politically salient mechanism for social sector expenditures – would be the focal point for the day's deliberations. However, that the lessons and solutions identified would be equally relevant for social sector programs implemented at the state level.

Keynote Address

The opening session was followed by the keynote address delivered by Abhijit Sen, member of the Planning Commission, and Professor of Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Following up on the overview session, the keynote address focused on challenges and possible solutions to the implementation of CSS. Professor Sen identified some of the main weaknesses in CSS, including: unrealistic objectives, a top-heavy, centralized delivery structure and strict guidelines that hinder implementation. Design failures apart, he also identified some significant weaknesses in the current framework for monitoring and evaluation. First, there are no clearly defined criteria for evaluation, and second, the responsibility for evaluation is bundled together with the responsibility for implementation and assigned to the same Ministry or Department. This compromises the objectivity of evaluations. In order to remedy this, he recommended a system of independent evaluators. However, he stressed that independent evaluations would not be effective unless additional institutional reforms are undertaken in the delivery structure. These include: laying down realistic, clearly defined objectives for schemes along with the prioritization of, and clarity about, the objectives that the schemes are to be evaluated on. Targets known to implementing authorities should be the same as those known to the evaluators. In other words, a scheme should have its own benchmarks, and evaluations should then be carried out accordingly by

independent evaluators. Finally, he   emphasized the importance of working with a large, continuously updated real-time database in order to make sure that the schemes meet the needs on the ground.

The keynote address was followed by a brief audience interaction. The discussion questioned the functionality and usefulness of CSS, and there were questions about why new schemes were introduced repeatedly despite the proven inefficiency of the older schemes. In his response, Professor Sen emphasized that schemes also need to be viewed in the context of their political realities and compulsions. He stressed the importance of bringing realism to the debate on accountability, and to focus on reforming the current system rather than wishing it away.

Session 1: Promises made and promises to keep - Are the institutions and processes in place?

This session focused on identifying problems and solutions to the current implementation design, and institutional arrangements and processes for social sector programs. Professor Nirvikar Singh of University of California, Santa Cruz, moderated the session.

Presentation 1: Institutional Design- Lessons from Experience

The first presentation focused on weaknesses in the current institutional structure of Centrally Sponsored Schemes, and on potential solutions. It was delivered by Jay Chaudhuri from the Centre for Development Finance. He began with a brief discussion of the dismal state of development outcomes in social sectors, and the current institutional gaps in CSS. He reiterated Professor Sen's points that overlapping roles across levels of the administration and each level's differing frameworks and incentive structures create problems for coherence in the schemes. This has resulted in blurring lines of accountability within each level of government. A second problem is that there is a huge variance in efficiency of implementation and program delivery. In order to asses process failure properly, he stressed that we need more information and data to understand exactly how and where important processes are failing. Processes related to fund flow, proposal preparation, fund sanction, program placement etc, all affect CSS implementation, and these are relatively under-documented.

The presentation offered a potential solution: to focus on process evaluation. Process evaluation can quickly highlight the extent to which a program is operating as planned. It is also important in the sense that it can improve accountability and outcomes in CCS by unbundling roles and responsibilities, and by solving the complexity of the institutional framework, and assisting in bringing order to public institutions. One example of information for process evaluation, which could be collected at a relatively low cost, is administrative data. This data can be drawn upon to pin point responsibility at the right level of government, and ensure corrective action or structural reforms. He cited examples of recent schemes such

as NREGA and PMGSY that capture information and data on the processes, to highlight the importance of using the right kind of data for process evaluation, which can help indicate where things are going wrong in a scheme. He recommended process-oriented design and an IT-driven approach in order to maximize efficiency of process as well as program delivery.

Presentation 2: Expenditure Management- Design Problems and Solutions

The next presentation focused on public finance management – a crucial element of the implementation process. Anit Mukherjee from the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy delivered this presentation. He focused on an analysis of expenditures in Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), the Central government's flagship elementary education scheme, to illustrate problems with the current framework for public expenditure management. Using data for SSA 2007-08 from 6 major states in India, the presentation highlighted the large variance that exists between planned allocations, fund release and real expenditures. These gaps are a consequence of three major weaknesses in public expenditure management: (1) weak planning capacity, (2) irregular fund flow, and (3) low absorptive capacity. With regard to planning, he argued that the greatest problem lies in the fact that current systems for planning encourage a top-down process that is not reflective of local needs, realities and capacity. This is despite the fact that most CSS now mandate that planning should be bottom up. In practice, it is often the case that the district is the lowest level at which plans are made where it should ideally be the habitation or the school.

Next he focused on fund-flow problems. Drawing on evidence from a recently concluded study of fund-flows in SSA in Nalanda, Bihar, conducted as a part of the PAISA project (a joint program run by Accountability Initiative, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, and ASER Centre), he demonstrated the sluggish flow of funds through the system which results in delays in the utilization of school grants. These delays in fund-flow result in a last minute rush to spend funds. Moreover, funds available rarely match specific needs, and as a result schools are not able to absorb these funds. He concluded the presentation by offering a range of possible solutions. First, he argued for a financing structure with untied grants, so that schools could spend on items that are actually needed, rather than what is provided in the national level guidelines. Second, he called for a revision of the structure of SSA planning to ensure that local level plans better reflect local priorities. Third, to address problems of absorptive capacity, he suggested greater flexibility to state governments in determining expenditure norms

Presentation 3: From Spectators to Participants - Strengthening Local Accountability

The third presentation focused on the role of citizens in planning, implementation and monitoring of service delivery programs. The presentation was made by Yamini Aiyar, Director of Accountability Initiative. She began by arguing that recent efforts by the government to open up spaces for public participation, such as giving greater role to local governments and community groups in the planning, implementation and monitoring of service delivery programs, and the avenues opened up by the Right to Information Act (RTI), are underutilized. The presentation focused on the main bottlenecks to local participation, and recommended solutions. Indifference, opportunity costs, collusion and co-option by vested interests were identified as some of the main challenges to participation. Moreover, the current institutional design for CSS actually hinders participation. Tied and delayed funds, limited resources and capacity at the local level, and limited efforts to build capacity and integrate local plans with the district and state level planning processes were identified as some of the key institutional blocks to real participation. Crucially the absence of grievance redressal mechanisms at the local level hinders participation.

The presentation also focused on solutions. First, she suggested institutional reforms such as improving capacity and planning at local government level by implementing the guidelines developed by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, and giving untied grants in order to ensure greater flexibility on the ground. She also emphasized the importance of access to information to citizens in order to enable their participation. To this end, she recommended the use of IT to strengthen RTI and improve access to easy-to-understand, real-time information for citizens, in order to mobilize them for participation. A final hurdle to effective participation is a sense of helplessness and powerlessness that people feel when dealing with the government system. Drawing on the experience of conducting social audits in Andhra Pradesh, she argued that regular feedback and real-time grievance redressal is extremely important in building people's trust in the system, and serves to encourage people to participate in monitoring program delivery and demand their rights. The presentation concluded by highlighting a few concerns with this new focus on participation. First, from facilitation, feedback and grievance redressal, participation is meaningful only when an activist government pursues it. But why should a government pursue participation? What are its incentives? Second, civil society has to work closely with government to facilitate participation. Does this mean we need to re-conceptualize civil society and its role? Third, institutionalized participation works, but how do we prevent co-option and its reduction to rhetoric and ritual? And last, are we over romanticizing participation? Is participation a means of the state off-loading its responsibilities?

The audience discussion that followed revolved around the themes of data collection and participation. The moderator argued that in spite of the availability of copious amounts of data in India, it is usually not presented in the form that is amenable to use for analysis. Therefore, he stressed on the urgent need to improve

the quality of data. In the discussion on participation, the importance of access to information as a necessary condition for participation was reiterated. As was the importance of an institutional design that created incentives for participation.

Session 2: Moving towards outcomes - Lessons from best practice

This session drew on current experience with outcomes monitoring to draw lessons and to debate the possibility of institutionalizing outcomes-monitoring in the current CSS design. Dr. Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, the Managing Trustee and Research Director of India Development Foundation moderated the session.

Presentation 1: ASER Experience - 2005 to Now

The first presentation showcased the experience of ASER (Annual Survey of Education Report) in monitoring learning outcomes amongst primary school children across rural India. Dr. Rukmini Banerji, Director of the ASER Centre made this presentation. She began by setting the context in which ASER was developed. ASER evolved out of the recognition that at every level of the education system - from parents to teachers to the macro policy environment - elementary education is dominated by a concern with inputs (enrollments, infrastructure, availability of teachers, materials) and not with learning outcomes. ASER is a citizens' effort to address this gap. The presentation highlighted some of the key aspects of ASER. It is a citizen-led household survey that focuses on measuring learning levels (of basic reading and mathematics) of children in the age group of 3-16, and covers some 7,00,000 children across over 500 districts every year. The survey is facilitated by Pratham, one of India's leading NGOs working on primary education, and conducted by over 25,000 volunteers from local NGOs, academic institutions and other walks of life. The first ASER was conducted in 2005. To give the audience a sense of the kind of data that ASER collects, the presentation highlighted some of the findings from ASER 2008. According to the report, only 56.2% of the children studying in Standard Five could read a Standard Two level text. There are inter-state variations. For instance, Himachal Pradesh leads the country in learning levels: 75.7% children in Standard Five can read a Standard Two text book. On the other hand, Tamil Nadu falls way behind with only 28.4% children in Standard Five being able to read a Standard Two text book.

The presentation concluded with a brief discussion on the impact that ASER has had in pushing the government to focus on outcomes. One important consequence of ASER has been that the Government of India has revised its Annual Work Plan (AWP) guidelines to include a component of "learning enhancement". Accordingly, "each district can spend up to 2% of the district allocations on learning outcomes". Also, many states are beginning to use ASER-like tools in their own assessments of learning outcomes. This points to the importance of citizen-led evaluations of outcomes in social sector programs, and to the role that civil society can play in pushing the government to focus on outcomes.

Presentation 2: Outcomes and Performance Budgeting

The next presentation examined Government of India's experience with outcomes and performance budgeting, and identified steps to strengthen these initiatives. Mr. Niranjan Pant, Director General (Performance Audit), Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) gave this presentation. He began by recounting that performance budgeting in India was not a new thing, and that there has been a history of a push towards this since the early days of our republic, just as there have been such efforts in countries like the US and in the OECD region. But the difference is that while in theory we produced a lot of guidelines and reports, there was little action on the ground to support their adoption. In the US, infrastructural and institutional reforms followed in support of the movement towards performance budgeting. He cited instances like the Inspector General Act of 1978, the Chief Financial Officer Act of the early 90s, and the Office of Management and Budget, which were all institutional features introduced in the US to ensure that resources and powers were in place to make performance budgeting and management meaningful. In India, on the other hand, the scores of reports and guidelines are hardly ever supported by such reforms.

He then made several recommendations to improve the state of play in performance budgeting in India. For one, he pointed out that the Ministry of Finance could do with some basic infrastructural reforms by setting up a division dedicated to performance management and reporting. Similarly, financial management needs to be taken much more seriously in other Ministries, which currently have what are called as financial 'advisors' doing the job. The Parliamentary Standing Committees, which are entrusted with making sure that the contents of these performance reports are followed up on, rarely take notice of them. And here he saw a role of opinion leaders from the civil society, like Centre for Policy Research, to build public pressure for these processes to be institutionalized. In sum, he reiterated that there needs to be a restructuring of the bodies that are producing these performance reports, and efforts to make them accountable for it. He concluded by emphasizing the role of IT in facilitating these changes.

Presentation 3: Moderator's Comments

The moderator's comments focused on the complexities of outcomes monitoring. Dr. Gangopadhyay argued that much of the debate on accountability is lost in the question of who should be held accountable. Therefore, it is necessary to identify actors responsible in each stage of the design and implementation of schemes. He further emphasized the importance of real-time data in order to make evidence-based policy decisions, and reiterated the need for independent evaluators in order to ensure effective monitoring.

Questions from the audience revolved around the practical steps that could be taken to effect the changes suggested by both the speakers. There was a discussion around

the question of how to strengthen the Standing Committees in Parliament. In response, Niranjan Pant suggested that the reports of the Standing Committees should be made available in the public domain, and that the Executive Committees should be held accountable for taking action on the reports.

Another question, addressed to Rukmini Banerjee, raised the issue of the challenges faced in incorporating findings from field experience at the national level. In response, she pointed out that in India the challenges lay not so much at the central, but at the lower levels of governance. She identified several problems with accountability at the local level, including a lack of a sense of ownership and a sense of powerlessness amongst citizens.

Session 3: Information Technology - The magic bullet?

This session examined the possible role that information technology can play in enabling accountability. Shri R. Sridharan, the Joint Secretary (State Plans) and Advisor to Planning Commission moderated this session.

Presentation 1: Prioritizing and Targeting

Dr. Jessica Wallack, Director of the Centre for Development Finance made a presentation entitled **Prioritization: IT, its Promise and its Limits,** which focused on how IT can help in aggregating and managing the information required for prioritizing expenditures. The presentation complemented the conference's overall focus on monitoring outcomes by focusing instead on the *ex ante* choices that must be made in order to define and rank the outcomes that are most important to achieve.

Dr. Wallack presented two broad approaches: firstly, prioritization by diagnosis (prioritization from above), in which the use of IT in data management and analysis makes the data easier to compare, analyze, and distill to identify gaps between existing services or infrastructure outcomes and those desired. The second approach was prioritization by preference aggregation (prioritization from below), in which IT can be useful in lowering costs for more frequent and more specific goals, as well as capturing the intensity of preferences. IT can also enable new information flows such as e-governance, through which citizens can participate in the process of prioritization.

She concluded the presentation with two recommendations to help the process of prioritization: first, the simplification of paperwork and reporting across schemes to enable supply-demand matching. Second, the integration of copious government data with data that comes in through citizen perspectives and the strengthening of administrative data.

Presentation 2: Designing e-Governance

Jaideep Kalia from the eGovernments Foundation made a presentation on **Designing e-governance**. The main takeaway from the presentation was that in spite of the proven success of IT in urban local bodies, it still remains an underutilized tool. He stressed the importance of good IT design in order to make it easy to use.

Presentation 3: Accountability for Outcomes - NREGA Experience in AP

The third presentation focused on lessons from best practice within the government. Mr. B. Rajashekhar, Director of the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency, Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) made this presentation. He highlighted GoAP's experience with developing a Management Information System (MIS) for the NREGA, and the role that this has played in facilitating social audits in the state. The presentation began by recounting that the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and the RTI Act had set the tenor of commitment to transparency and accountability in the state, and put the onus of providing information on it. He then explained how the use of MIS for NREGA by the GoAP fostered accountability in the state. The software is used to carry out and record all transactions undertaken in NREGA. The MIS can be used to track relevant information, including work done and the wages paid, down to the household level. In this way, IT has ensured the proactive disclosure of information. This data collected by the MIS is verified across the state through systematically conducted social audits. These social audits are conducted in every village where an NREGA work has been completed. The audit is conducted over a ten-day period by literate youth who are chosen and trained for the purpose. Following this village-wise social audit, public hearings are held at the Mandal (block) level. At every public hearing findings from the village-level audit are read out, the public testify, and officials respond. These findings are then used by the government to take corrective action. Using the Andhra experience as an example, the presentation concluded that social audits, facilitated by IT are powerful tools to ensure public accountability in the implementation of laws and policies. It was also reported that the Andhra social audit process would soon be replicated in all the states in India.

Presentation 4: Expenditure Governance and Information Technology – Assessing India's Situation and Potential

The final presentation focused on international experiences with implementing IT solutions, and situating India's experience and potential in this context. Professor Nirvikar Singh from the University of California, Santa Cruz, made this presentation. He began by setting the context for the importance of IT-based solutions in India. Strong institutions for budget management at the central level give way to progressively weaker institutions at the lower levels, till they are almost non-existent at the rural local level. It is in this context that IT can play a role by improving the efficiency of internal government processes, and enhancing

transparency, accountability and responsiveness, which in turn can alter the citizen-government interface. He cited some successful examples of the use of IT in India, such as the Railway Reservation System. He also used international examples to draw lessons that India can use in its future applications of IT. These included the importance of stating objectives clearly; choosing the right scale and scope for projects such that one project does not try to address too many issues at the same time; the benefits of building up to a national-level implementation from the state level, as well as down to the local level; the need to address all value chain components; introducing IT into the internal workings of the lower levels of government, and training people and giving them incentives to work with IT. He emphasized the importance of prioritizing and addressing problems in manageable portions, of external monitoring, and of the integration of IT with non-IT mechanisms in order to strengthen accountability.

The moderator's concluding comments reiterated the advantages and efficiency of working with IT. He highlighted the importance of planning and implementing IT solutions carefully, as well as the need to bring IT out into the public domain, and to break the inertia. He concluded that though IT is not the 'magic bullet', it could play a major role in facilitating accountability, and help in the proactive disclosure of information.

Panel Discussion

The evening panel discussion was entitled '**Practitioner perspectives: Roundtable on solutions that should be scaled'**. The panelists included policy-makers, practitioners, civil society activists and academics. Anil Padmanabhan from *Mint* moderated this session.

Nikhil Dey from the *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan* opened the discussion by highlighting the links between access to information and accountability. His remarks focused specifically on the challenges in the implementation of the Right to Information Act (RTI) and the NREGA. He argued that RTI is central to accountability because it allows the citizens to choose the information they want to access and understand i.e. citizens, not the government, decide where there is a need for transparency. However, he stressed that the greatest challenge to RTI is in ensuring that information available is meaningful and relevant to people's lives, especially given that there is such an information overload as a result of the RTI. To address this challenge, we need to identify the nerve centre of information i.e. key information that can address the blocks in the implementation of schemes, and push the system forward. For example, in the case of the NREGA, information on the entitlements for labourers, on the procedures in place for obtaining these entitlements, and on mechanisms for appeal and redressal in the event that the systems fail – is critical. Moreover, information has to be made available in a form comprehensible to the labourers in order for them to be able to act to translate their rights into reality.

Indira Rajaraman, member of the 13th Finance Commission spoke of the regulatory environment, laws and procedures, and the importance of monitoring their implementation for creating an accountable system. She argued that laws such as the RTI need to be closely monitored to assess their implementation and effectiveness. And efforts need to be made to push the system to implement these laws properly in order for them to be meaningful. She noted that one of the unintended consequences of RTI has been that it has led to a conscious effort by some organs of the government to withhold some information. For instance, minutes of several government meetings are less exhaustive today, than they previously used to be. She also argued that there is an overemphasis in India on passing new laws, while ignoring pre-existing ones. She suggested that restructuring of some of the existing processes, like the CAG Audits which look at the totality of programs in India, can have a greater impact on improving accountability, as they are hard-wired into the system. For instance, revising the law (passed in 1971) under which the CAG's Office operates, to ensure that documents are delivered to it within a specified period of time, could help it to produce audits on time and thus help it function far more efficiently.

N.K. Singh, Member of Parliament, spoke of institutional impediments to accountability. He pointed to several systemic flaws in the operation of public finance, in particular the fact that new schemes are introduced with every new government without adequate consideration of the availability of resources, and of the effectiveness of the systems in place. This has resulted in the proliferation of schemes, each operating in its own silo, with overlapping goals. As a result, mechanisms for social sector expenditures have little coherence. The solution, he argued, lay in converging the schemes with similar goals under broad common heads - health, education, employment, food etc. He also called for the need to clearly define goals and objectives of schemes so that there is minimal overlap. Drawing on his experience as a parliamentarian, he highlighted some of the institutional failures in the Parliament that have weakened the ability of the political sphere to hold the Executive to account. Parliamentary Standing Committees, for instance, are weak because their recommendations are not binding on the Executive. Moreover, Parliamentarians do not have access to independent research, and are thus dependent on the Executive for accessing information needed to make decisions and recommendations. He also called for better parliamentary oversight into government appropriations, and *ex ante* engagement with major government initiatives like the 5-year plans.

Sandeep Dikshit, Member of Parliament, spoke about the difficulties Parliamentarians face in holding the Executive to account. He argued that systemic failures have meant that Parliamentarians often end up playing the role of the implementers of government schemes in their day-to-day engagements with their constituency, and less as legislators and monitors.   And further, that the bureaucratic system is a powerful lobby that often creates hurdles for Parliamentarians. He pointed out that the ability of the members of Parliamentary

Standing Committees in bringing about qualitative changes in certain Bills tabled in the Parliament is entirely dependent on their own level of commitment to the cause of the Bill, as there is no in-built legislative mechanism which incentivizes members to scrutinize and push for meaningful and effective changes in Bills. Even if certain members have high levels of commitment, their recommendations are only advisory and ultimately in the hands of bureaucrats to take effect. He also argued that Parliamentarians lack staff and research support which are necessary tools for their effective performance.

Dr. Lant Pritchett of Harvard University argued that the first step towards accountability in governance in India is an honest recognition among citizens and policy makers that there might be some areas where a modest re-alignment and tweaking of existing systems could help improve outcomes, but then there are many other areas where the system is completely broken - where the government's administrative apparatus is in such a state of rot that it is simply not reliable enough to carry out even the best laid plans. Pouring additional government resources into such failed areas can only be counter-productive. What was needed was to alert ourselves to these areas, and acknowledge that the existing systems have failed, and gear ourselves to fundamentally rethink how we go about building a new system in its place. He said that this might require a fresh start - a fundamental 'game change'. And he concluded that this will only come about through sustained pressure from the citizens, a movement for accountability.

Appendix

From Outlays to Outcomes:

Getting Development from Development Expenditure
Presentations at the Conference

Centre for Development Finance, IFMR
Accountability Initiative, CPR
August 25, 2009

Setting the Context:
The contours of the debate

Accountability Initiative, CPR
Centre for Development Finance, IFMR

Goals of the Conference

- To bring together academic and practitioners to explore new approaches and exchange ideas about public expenditure reforms.
- To share and draw lessons from experiences – national and international
- To identify a research agenda to generate innovative, actionable solutions for improving returns from public expenditure.
- To discuss and advocate a shift toward outcomes-based development programs.

Conference Structure

Session 1: Getting the design right
  - Planning, institutional arrangements, fund flows, processes

Session 2: Outcomes – measuring and achievement
  - Tools to ensure that outcomes are tracked regularly, and progress on outcomes is disseminated widely

Session 3: The Role of IT
  - IT for identifying priorities, tracking fund flows, monitoring progress and program

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Contours of the Debate

The great Indian paradox

India Shining

➢ **Booming economy**

➢**Increase in social sector allocations (6.27% of GDP)**

➢**Competitive elections, high voter turn out amongst the poorest**

Bharat Drowning

➢**Deteriorating Public Sector**

➢**Decrease in HDI ranking: 126 2006 to 132 2008**

➢**Little political will to improve implementation**

The problem
Systemic failures of accountability for outcomes

*I am convinced that the government, at every level, is today not adequately **equipped and attuned** to deal with this challenge and meet the aspirations of the people. To be able to do so, we require the reform of government and of public institutions ... No objective in this development agenda can be met if we do not reform the instrument in our hand with which we have to work, namely the government and public institutions.*

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, June 24, 2004

"If the Indian state has a weakness, it is this: most of the institutions and rules—courts, bureaucracies, police—are so riddled with perverse incentive structures that accountability is almost impossible."

Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 2003

Two Dimensions of the Solution

- Focus on outcomes
  - Inputs and outlays are easier to track but hardly guarantors of outcomes.
- Enable Accountability
  - Between citizen and state
 - Within state – between politicians and bureaucrats, within public sector entities.
  - Mechanism: Improved information access: RTI, Information technology
- These are hardly new. But time to move.

Making Change Happen
Understanding challenges, identifying solutions

Typical gaps in service delivery

Planning
Input focused, unrealistic targets, limited data, top-down planning, little space for citizens participation

Implementation
Multiple jurisdictions, Overlapping roles and responsibilities, unpredictable fund flows, varied capacity

Monitoring & Oversight
No transparency, weak oversight institutions, no incentives, weak citizens monitoring

Accountability for inputs and money spent

No measure of service quality and outcomes

Accountability for Outcomes (1)

Possible Solutions

Challenge #1 Setting Goals and Targets
- Identifying outcomes oriented goals
- Developing quantifiable, relevant outcome indicators
- Aligning goals to realistic timelines
- Widespread reporting on outcomes

Challenge #2 Developing operational plans
- Strengthen local capacity including technical support
- Focus on elected local governments
- District and ward/panchayat level data bases on outcomes incidence
- Incentives for local participation

Challenge #3 Managing multiple jurisdictions
- Activity-mapping
- Greater autonomy in decision making
- Greater autonomy in resource allocation
- Use of IT to increase predictability and transparency in fund flows
- Incentives for performance (monitoring outcomes)

Accountability for Outcomes (2)

Possible Solutions

Challenge # 4 Improving monitoring and oversight
- Use of IT for effective MIS
- Simplifying reporting procedures
- Drawing on NGO's, research bodies to undertake regular process monitoring
- Link funding to monitoring
- Expanding the scope of CAG to include society's, PRIs
- Demystifying audit reports

Challenge # 5 Strengthening citizen monitoring
- Strengthening RTI, section 4
- Building local capacity
- Links with local NGO's
- Strong grievance redressal

Overarching Themes

- Clear goals and benchmarks can translate into outcomes

- For outcomes to be achieved, we need to get the institutional design right
  - Unbundled roles and responsibilities
  - Greater local government autonomy
  - Transparency in fund flows
  - Process monitoring

- Finally, we need to create an enabling environment that privileges 'voice'

Agenda

- General challenges are well recognized
- Specific problems becoming better known.
- Time to talk solutions.

Session 1:

Promises made and promises to keep:
Are the institutions and processes in place?

Institutional Design and CSS: Understanding Processes

Jay Chaudhuri
Centre for Development Finance

CDF

Overview

- The Debate
- Lack of Outcomes
- CSS and institutional framework
  - Problems, example
- *Emphasize processes*
  - For outcomes
  - For accountability
- Conclusion

CDF

Contours of the Debate

- Despite good intentions, many development programmes have failed to make significant progress in achieving outcomes
  - Notable example – child malnutrition
- CSS is the predominant instrument of the centre to influence outcomes
- CSS though part of the problem is also at the core of the solution
- It is worth revisiting ways to improve the effectiveness of public expenditure
- Social sector expenditure is increasingly being funded at the centre
- The institutional design and delivery is central to improving CSS performance

CDF

More funds, same problems

- Why the focus on outcomes?
- Final outcomes are not necessarily linked to money spent
- People are interested in outcomes not the outlay or actual expenditure

CDF

Why CSS?

- Despite good intentions, many flagship programmes have failed to consistently improve development outcomes in India.

- India's constitutional and fiscal architecture means that social sector issues are with states, but funds (via CSS) are increasingly from the centre

CDF

Institutional

- Institutions are directly affecting how effectively funds translate into results
- Institutions hinder service delivery and therefore prevent the achievement of outcomes
  - ICDS – programme placement

CDF

Institutional

- Accountability is fuzzy because of the lack of clarity and overlapping roles between actors
- The institutional framework is complex as different tiers of government and local bodies are governed by a separate framework

CDF

What are some symptoms?

- In many cases, critical scheme functions and processes are not executed properly.
  - Lack of quality
  - Lack of quality data
- Huge variance in quality and success in processes
- PMGSY example

CDF

PMGSY Example

- Proposal preparation
- Lack of prioritization
- Example of a scheme which delivers on impact for human outcomes
- Research suggests that rural road connectivity has strong impacts on previously unconnected habitations.
  - Particularly in health (maternal care) and education (enrolment) (see Research from fan and gulati) and PC Evaluation

CDF

By Length of Roads

	Total No. Habitation	% Unconnected Habitations	
		2000	2009
1000+	232,442	26%	19%
500-999	222,512	37%	29%
250-499	211,601	41%	37%
0-249	279,140	43%	41%
Total	945,695	37%	32%

CDF

No detail is small….

- Getting the house in order….
  - The details matter
- Severe data shortage
- What types of data can give us more information on processes and how institutions perform?
  - One example - Administrative data
    - How often are there process failures, and to what degree?

CDF

Institutions and Performance

- A well designed programme cant be known immediately.
  - Especially because the scheme design is complex and involves so many actors
- Institutional development and integration

CDF

Why emphasize process?

1. What can be measured can be managed (sorry for cliché)
2. Setting roles and responsibilities so individuals can be holed accountable.
3. Processes can be screened for quality and improvement
4. Accountability for outcomes
   1. Improving measurement
   2. Improving processes.

CDF

Process Evaluation links to Institutional Performance

- And how does it link into the institutional framework
  - Because the institutional framework is complex, we can emphasize process as one way to bring a bit more clarity into the picture
- Process analysis is one way in which we can refocus schemes towards the achievement of outcomes – through institutional performance

CDF

Process Measurement as a means for improvement

Measure Processes

Process improvement

Process evaluation

Institutional Effectiveness

Action-Reform/enforce/assist

Impact outcomes

CDF

Program Evaluation	Process Evaluation	Impact Evaluation
One time efforts directed to answer a few questions about program implementation, targeting or impact.	Investigates whether the program is operating as planned.	How much the program affect key outcomes

From: World Bank 2009: For Protection and Promotion

CDF

Process and Accountability

- Roots of weakness in CSS accountability
  - Bureaucratic politicization, lack of information or data, weak citizen voice
- Process can help inform weaknesses
  - To list a few - Institutional mechanisms are riddled with weak planning, limited data for decision making, fragmentation of authority, and confusion over roles and responsibilities, unevenly distributed implementation capacity, and weak PFM

CDF

Process and Accountability

- Emphasizing process in CSS will help accountability and outcomes
  - Unbundle roles and responsibilities (aided by process analysis)
  - Process monitoring
- With the complex institutional framework, brining order to process can assist in both
  - Within public systems
- CDF From public sector to the public

Lessons for Policy

- Capturing the right types of data
  - Recent schemes are better
- To get the design right when emphasizing processes (based on current evidence)
- The Role of IT
  - IT can facilitate more efficient process and programme delivery
  - IT can be instrumental in capturing the types of data we need.

CDF

Some takeaways…..

- CSS can also be a vehicle for translating social sector expenditure into outcomes
- Emphasize process
- Recent efforts for transparency and accountability in CSS are promising, but more is needed
- A lot of work left

CDF

Note of Thanks

- Professor Magaloni – Lessons from Mexico

- Contact:
  - Jay.chaudhuri@ifmr.ac.in

CDF

Public Expenditure Management and
Resource Tracking:
Lessons Learnt from SSA

Anit Mukherjee
Fellow, NIPFP
Accountability Initiative – IFMR Conference
New Delhi: August 25, 2009

What are the issues?

- Over the last decade, significant changes have taken place in social sector expenditure in India
- These changes have been systemic, structural, and strategic
- A large part of these changes have taken place due to the accepted wisdom that **increased expenditure was not translating into better outputs**
- The main reasons were: (a) **funds not reaching the target service provider** or beneficiary; (b) **the lack of accountability** of the service providers themselves

---

Public Expenditure, Fund Flows and Accountability

- Outcome:
  - Social sector expenditure especially education and health are channeled directly to parastatal bodies at the State and District
  - Creation of community groups to plan, execute and monitor CSS expenditure
  - Opening of large number of bank accounts to devolve funds to various implementation agencies, including service delivery points such as schools
  - Managing fund flows and tracking expenditure through customized MIS databases for CSS

Macro Picture: Changing Nature of Fiscal Transfers

Figure 1: Transfers to States: 1990-91 to 2006-07

Nearly Rs.50,000 crore (1% of GDP) goes directly to sub-national entities outside the state budget system

---

Micro Picture: Decentralized Implementation

Pre- Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

Broad Function	Responsibility						
	Central Govt	State Govt	District	Block	Village		Service Provider (School)
					GP	Village Groups	
Standards Setting	■	■					
Planning		■					
Asset Creation			■		■		
Operation - Non Teacher		■					
Operation - Teacher		■					
Monitoring and Evaluation	■	■					

Micro Picture: Decentralized Implementation

Post – Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

Broad Function	Responsibility						
	Central Govt	State Govt	District	Block	Village		Service Provider (School)
					GP	Village Groups	
Standards Setting	■	■					
Planning		■	■				
Asset Creation			■	■			
Operation - Non Teacher				■	■		
Operation - Teacher					■	■	
Monitoring and Evaluation	■			■			

Planning, Allocation and Expenditure Cycle

- The two large flagship programs – SSA and NRHM both have adopted the annual plan and expenditure approach.
- This requires high degree of coordination and efficiency in managing fund flows and monitoring implementation at the Centre, State, District, Block and final service delivery points

Planning and Implementation

Still not harmonized across states – plan sizes big, implementation capacity is weak.

So what's happening on the ground?

Three Basic Problems have often been cited:

- " Weak Planning Capacity"

- "Irregular Fund Flows"

- "Low Absorptive Capacity"

Planning

- Annual Work Plan and Budget (AWP)
- Guidelines indicate that planning process should be bottom-up from habitation level
- In practice, most plans are made at district or even the state project directorate office
- Norms need to be strictly followed, otherwise plans are rejected at the Project Approval Board

Planning – Analysis of Bihar state AWP

Total AWP size increased from Rs.3145 crore to Rs.5429 crore

Fund Flow

- Issue seems to be more of fund flow and implementation capacity
- Civil works constitute the largest source of spillovers
- Mainly because funds do not arrive on time
- This leads to clustering of expenditure in the latter half of the year
- We focus on at one particular category: **school grants**

PAISA Project Overview

- Partnership between Accountability Initiative, ASER Centre and NIPFP
- Basic Objective: How resources are utilized in CSS
- How allocations happen – Annual Work Plan
- How much is released and spent
- How funds moves down the chain (Centre-State-District-Block-Service Provider)
- How much reaches the delivery point and when
- How much is spent and when
- Can allocations, fund flow and expenditure be made more efficient

Nalanda Pilot Study

- Sample of 100 schools
- 50 randomly chosen schools from the whole district
- Additional 50 which are nearest to the first 50 schools ("neighbourhood schools")
- Carried out on March 25 – 26, just before the end of the financial year
- Pratham field staff of Nalanda district carried out the survey, funded and coordinated by ASER Centre
- Questions relating to school infrastructure, enrolment, teachers, school grants and "one-lakh" question

SSA Grants

School

Infrastructure

Teachers

School Maintenance

Classrooms: Rs 2,54,000 per additional classroom in UP and UPS both

Repair: Rs 75,000 for major repair in both PS and UPS

TLM: Rs 500 per teacher per annum in PS and UPS both

School Development Grant (SDG): Rs 5,000 per year per PS and Rs 7,000 per year per UPS

School Maintenance Grant (SMG): Rs 5,000 per year upto 3 classrooms; maximum of Rs 10,000 for more than 3 classrooms

Furniture: Rs 500 per child as a one time grant only for UPS which started before 2001

Nalanda Timeline: Financial Year 2008-09

Funds transferred from State to District

Funds transferred from District to Block

Block issues letter to schools for grants

May | June | July | Aug | Sept | Oct

- There is a gap of nearly 4 months between transfer from State Implementation Society to issue of letters by Block Resource Centre

- The actual receipt of grants by schools is even later

Schools Reporting SSA Grants

Receiving : Schools that have received SSA grants until 26th March, 2009
Spending : Out of those who have received grants, schools that have spent
Insufficient: In respondent (mostly headmaster) opinion, whether grant amount sufficient for the purpose or not

Top line: Timeline of grants received
Bottom line: Timeline of grants spent

Grants transferred through cheque from District to Block to School
Earliest transfer to the school bank account was recorded in October

Slide 1

School Maintenance Grant - Receipt and Expenditure

Cumulative %

Received line: 11.1 (Oct), 20.0 (Nov), 62.2 (Dec), 82.2 (Jan), 95.5 (Feb), 100 (Mar)
Spent line: 0.0, 0.0, 6.7, 20.0, 53.3, 100

First SMG expenditure reported in December

80% report expenditure between January and March

Slide 2

Teaching Learning Material - Receipt and Expenditure

Cumulative %

Received line: 11.1 (Oct), 16.7 (Nov), 55.6 (Dec), 79.7 (Jan), 96.4 (Feb), 100 (Mar)
Spent line: 1.9, 13.0, 24.1, 68.5, 100

Similar receipt pattern, but slightly better expenditure timeline

TLM is spent at the discretion of the teachers and Headmaster

Difference with SDG and SMG maybe due to easier spending norms

Slide 3

Reason why grants are unutilized

Reason for not spending	SDG		SMG		TLM	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Lack of Time	12	57.14	16	39.02	10	45.45
No Information	2	9.52	2	4.88	2	9.09
Difficulty in withdrawing money	5	23.81	6	14.63	5	22.73
Administrative and VSS Problems	2	9.52	17	41.46	5	22.73
Total	21	100	41	100	22	100

VSS: Vidyalay Shiksha Samiti – Community groups set up under SSA to monitor civil works, grants and teacher presence, identify out-of-school children, and organize mid-day meals

Administrative problems included teacher absence due to training, deputation for examination duties and updating voter list

Slide 4

Absorptive Capacity: "One-Lakh Question"

Headmasters/Senior Teachers were asked about the problems faced by the school. They were then given a hypothetical situation where the school gets a grant of one-lakh rupees. Investigators were asked to probe the question and get a combination of two or more categories. Each expenditure had to be backed by unit cost calculation. For example, if schools asked for furniture, cost of each desk, chair or bench had to be stated. This question was asked to ascertain the real need of the school vis-à-vis the SSA grants

Type of Expenditure in One-Lakh Question

Number of Schools

Boundary wall: 13, Girls toilet: 52, Furniture: 68, Study materials: 34, Computers: 42, Teachers: 42, Rooms: 19, Subject books: 41

Slide 5

Summary of amount asked for by Schools in different categories

Legend: Subject Books, Teachers, Study Material, Girls Toilet, Rooms, Computer, Furniture, School Boundary

Slide 6

School Infrastructure is old…

Years of School Operation

Number of Schools

< 10: 4, 10 - 20: 0, 20 - 30: 8, 30 - 40: 17, 40 - 50: 21, 50 - 60: 28, >60: 22

Maintenance and repair expenditure will be significant in order to improve the quality of school infrastructure

"Projected requirement of 3 lakh additional classrooms out of which only 61 thousand has been completed; SSA guidelines encouraged opening new schools rather than expanding existing ones" (State Project Director, Bihar)

Slide 1

PTR is over 40 in more than 90% of schools

Pupil - Teacher Ratio

Significant increase expected in recurring expenditure on teacher salaries and training if PTR target of 40 is to be achieved.

Bihar govt has appointed nearly 2 lakh new teachers. At the same time, 15 lakh out of school children have been brought into the school system

Slide 2

Challenges going forward…

- It is generally believed that SSA has been able to solve the issue of access to elementary education, and it is time to focus on improving quality
- Our survey shows that quality of basic inputs – school infrastructure and teachers – still require significant resources
- State governments need to be given more financial flexibility through greater budgetary devolution than through national norm-based transfers through SSA
- The structure of SSA planning, fund flows and expenditure norms needs to be revisited
- A roadmap from tied to untied school grants is urgently required - it is likely to increase expenditure efficiency and accountability in the long run

Slide 3

From Spectators to Participants
Strengthening local participation and accountability

Yamini Aiyar
Accountability Initiative
August 25th 2009

Slide 4

Opening up? 'Invited spaces' for participation

- 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. Institution of the Gram Sabha creating a 'state-sponsored public sphere'
- Greater role for local governments in planning and implementation of flagship service delivery programs- NREGA, NRHM, JNNURM
- Community based monitoring. Creation of local committees to plan and monitor programs. Social auditing: the new mantra
- RTI, citizens' charters opening up spaces for greater scrutiny by citizens

Slide 5

But lukewarm response…

- Gram Sabhas rarely held. Besley (2005) survey of four South Indian states found a mere 20% households had ever attended a GS
- Participation in community-based organizations is weak. Banerjee et al (2006) study on Village Education Committees - no awareness about roles and responsibilities, fund flows or even about their own membership.
- Panchayats/ Urban Local Bodies rarely involved in planning or implementation
- At every level the system – design and implementation mechanisms - creates incentives NOT to participate

Slide 6

Participation: A complex process

- Awareness, information, capacity – essential pre-requisites

And there are risks to mobilization
- Opportunity costs
- Collusion and co-option
- Vested interests

Challenges to Participation

- **Institutional Design**: resources and resource flows, capacity, planning mechanisms

- **Collective action**: catalyzing and facilitating participation, information needs, opportunity costs, collusion

- **Accountability**: follow-up action and grievance redressal, collective action leading to tangible outcomes

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Institutional design: The problem

- Tied funds: No room for adapting to local needs
- Delayed and unpredictable funds: Implementing decisions made is impossible. Sehore, MP- PTA decides to fix a leaky roof but no funds
- Limited resources: Resources do not match needs. Nalanda, Bihar responses to 'one lakh' question clear indicator that money is not enough
- Limited capacity: Training grants largely unspent. But in the absence of resources, can capacity be built in a vacuum?
- Multiple bodies for planning: Vertical, fragmented planning

So why participate?

Institutional reforms for participation

- *Institutional incentives*:
  - Untied grants with flexibility
  - Transparency in fund flows to ensure predictability
  - Money follows the problem- aligning fund flows with needs on the ground
- *Improved capacity and planning mechanisms at local government level*:
  - Horizontal planning: Schematic to thematic approach
  - Regular, reliable training
  - Data and information for planning

Mobilizing for Participation

Conditions for participation

- *Information*: The *sine qua non* for participation.

Improving information access: IT enabled oversight

- Strengthening RTI, particularly compliance with section 4
- MIS systems to enable easy access to 'real' time information
- Demystifying information – information needs to be relevant and comprehensible to citizens

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Mobilizing for Participation

Conditions for participation

- *Grievance redressal and action*: Appropriate, timely, and transparent follow-up of decisions made at local level

Action for participation, Madhya Pradesh

- Regular intervention to mobilize VECs
- Information helps to create 'noise'
- Large meetings help to initiate a conversation

But

- Participation hampered by apathy, or a sense of helplessness: *"what can we do",* and by lack of trust in the system: *"we complain, no-one comes", "nothing can be done"*
- People want to *see* change to *believe* that their participation can lead to results

Action leads to outcomes: Andhra Pradesh

- Letter-and-spirit follow-up, and tangible grievance redressal has an impact in Andhra Pradesh. Findings from a study on Social Audits in NREGA:
  - Huge jump in perceptions towards public officials
  - One month after SA, 87% laborers said they would *not conduct* social audit on their own. 6 months later 95% respondents said they *would* conduct social audits on their own.
  - State support for public hearings mean that people will believe that their grievances will be redressed– a light at the end of the tunnel inspires trust to go through the tunnel

But some fodder for thought …

- From creating incentives, to facilitation, to follow-up action and grievance redressal: participation will thrive only when an *activist* government pursues it. But why should a government willingly create a 'countervailing power'? What incentives does the government have?
- What of civil society? Is it a participant in these invited spaces? Or an activist enabler and facilitator? A watchdog? Or a collaborator?
- Institutionalized participation works, as we saw in AP. But when does it get reduced to rhetoric and ritual? These are not so much unanswered questions, inasmuch as there cannot be cut and dried answers to them…?

And finally

- Are we over romanticizing participation? And what of the state? Is participation a way of the state off-loading its own responsibilities?

Session 2:

**Moving towards outcomes:
Lessons from best practice**

The ASER Experience : 2005 to now......

अपर ASER

New Delhi : August 2009

What is the "value added" for each year in school? What do we want for our children?

Do we really know our children? Large families / multi grade classrooms

• Parents "send" children to school and are concerned about "inputs" . Parents often over-estimate what children can do (JPAL study)

• Teachers "teach" the course for the grade level. Focus on "inputs" Teachers often over-estimate what children can do (SchoolTELLS)

• In village meetings, demand is for more "inputs". (Jaunpur study)
• Schools ask for more "inputs" (PAISA 1 lac question)

Primary schools in India are not organized to identify children who are getting left behind. There is very little systemic action to help children "catch up".

Learning delayed is learning denied. Children need to learn satisfactorily at the right time to make adequate progress through the education system to complete at least the elementary stage.

High level policy positions

UNIVERSAL ENROLLMENT

• MDG goals refer to universal enrollment

• India's national goals (SSA) refer to universal enrollment, retention and reduction of social and gender gaps.

• In India, from school/village level to state & national level enrollment numbers are collected frequently, published and discussed.

UNIVERSAL LEARNING

• MDG goals - No definition or reference to children's learning goals

• National (SSA) goals are broad ...."education of satisfactory quality relevant for life".... "learning enhancement"

• In India, government measurements of learning levels come out every few years.

Challenge: At macro & policy level ...

How to bring learning to centre of stage? Progress, equity ?

Can children read?

Simple assessment tool "Figure it out yourself"

पढ़ने का टेस्ट

कहानी
मैं और मेरी बहन छत पर खेल रहे थे । अचानक आसमान में बादल गरजने लगे, बिजली कड़कने लगी । बड़ी-बड़ी बूँदें पड़ने लगीं । हम जल्दी से भागकर नीचे आ गए । तभी भैया गरम-गरम समोसे और पकौड़े ले आया । हमने खिड़की के पास बैठकर समोसे-पकौड़े खाये और बारिश का मज़ा लिया ।

Grade 2 level text

अनुच्छेद
सोनू बाग में खेल रहा था । वहाँ आम के बहुत पेड़ थे । सोनू ने एक आम तोड़ा । आम बहुत मीठा था ।

Grade 1 level text

अक्षर
ल	प
स	
क	र
ट	

Letters

शब्द
लाभ	दूध
पैर	
चाकू	कूड़ा
छोटा	

Simple common words

Annual Status of Education Report : ASER

- *ASER 2005 -2008 : A citizens view of elementary education*
- How far have we come? Done every year since 2005. 2% education cess.
- Randomly selected 15,000 villages. Schools in villages visited too
- ~ 320,000 households and 700,000 children between 3 and 16
- District level estimates of reading and arithmetic (govt does not have any)
- Children's schooling and learning status assessed in the household
- Schools observed for basics : teachers, rooms, textbooks, water etc

Operational aspects of ASER

- Sampling design
- Basic tools ..floor test
- District as the unit
- Simple fast analysis
- "Digestible" findings

Organizational aspects of ASER

- 570+ districts participate (total~ 600)
- In each district, a local group for survey, dissemination and action. Pratham facilitates.
- 25,000 volunteers participate each year
- Funds from individual citizens... Rs 30,000 per district.

ASER 2008 INDIA : Reading Report Card

Percentage of children in India who can :

Std	Cannot recognize letters	Read Letters	ReadWords	Read Std 1 text	Read Std 2 text	Total
1	34.9	41.9	16.4	4.1	2.7	100
2	13	31.9	31.2	15.1	8.8	100
3	6	18.1	25.6	28.1	22.2	100
4	3.2	10.1	17.3	28.6	40.9	100
5	1.9	6.2	11.1	24.6	56.2	100

ASER 2006-2008 Selected states : Reading levels

% Children in Std 5 who can read Std 2 level text fluently			
	2006	2007	2008
HP	65.8	82.3	75.7
MP	73.4	78	87.4
CHH	53.9	58	75.7
BH	65.1	67.9	63.9
RJ	56	50.1	52
UP	37.2	46.9	43.5
TN	29.2	34.8	28.4

Slide 1

Reading Curves: Expected vs Actual

ASER 2008 RURAL
Annual Status of Education Report
Facilitated by PRATHAM

% Children who can read Std 2 level text : All India

Big gaps between expected basic level and current reading level.

Despite big improvements in basic reading in one year several states, large gaps remain.

Where does the country want to be by 2010?

What plans are being put in place?

Slide 2

Impact, implications of ASER

Impact on allocations:

Architecture of ASER meant to link to SSA Annual Work Plans at district level.

By 2007, AWP guidelines had been revised to include a component of "learning enchancement". Apart from teacher training, remedial education etc, each district can spend up to 2% of district allocation on learning outcomes.

Impact on practice :

Many states use ASER-like tools in their own assessments

Large scale "LEP" programs rolling out.....

- Bodhi Vriksh in Bihar
- Nai Disha in UP
- Adhaar in HP
- Read Chattisgarh

Looking forward :

Citizens have shown that "taking stock" on an annual basis can be done on a key outcome in elementary education.

2009 will be the 5th consecutive year of ASER.

Who will continue it? What plans are being put in place?

Annual Status of Education Report
ASER 2009 RURAL
Facilitated by PRATHAM

Slide 3

Find out ... this year how many children in India can read? Can they do arithmetic? Can they read English?...........   SUPPORT ASER 2009

Annual Status of Education Report
ASER 2009 RURAL
Facilitated by PRATHAM

Rs. 30,000 for a district
Rs. 500 for a village

Slide 4

Session 3:

Information Technology: The magic bullet?

Slide 5

Prioritization & IT: Possibilities

Dr. Jessica Seddon Wallack
Centre for Development Finance @ IFMR

CDF

Slide 6

Prioritization is a complex process with a large portion of philosophy.

- "Big-think" normative frameworks (role of the state, theory of development)
- Nested decision problems
  - Time: decade>plan>year>month>today.
  - Institutions: centre>state>local
- Dimensions: across programs, across beneficiaries, over time (sequencing) ...

CDF

2 Options for Prioritization

- Prioritization by Diagnosis
- Prioritization by Preference Aggregation

P from Above: IT & Diagnostics

- The basics:
  - Data management
  - Data visualization
  - Analytics
- IT as substitute for oversight - automated & real-time consistency checks.
- IT as substitute for capacity – embedded decision rules
- IT and enabling new information flows – expand the "eyes"

Public Grievance & Redressal
(eGov Foundation)

PGR for prioritization (Ktka)

Answer Options	Yes	No	Sometimes	Response Count
Annual work programme or priorities?	13	10	13	36
Monthly work programme or priorities?	18	3	11	32
Weekly work programme or priorities?	27	4	2	33
Daily assignments?	25	4	4	33
			answered question	45
			skipped question	29

Source: Wallack & Nadhamuni, 2008

What's Wrong With This Picture?

IT & Preference Aggregation

- Voting is yes/no over many issues & values
- IT can extend both dimensions
  - Lowering costs for more frequent, more specific polls.
  - Capturing intensity of preferences

Prioritization[2]: Where to Start?

- Create space for prioritization closer to the priorities: Simplify paperwork/reporting across schemes enable supply-demand matching.
- Data management
  - integration of non-traditional data for decision support.
    - Perhaps starting with the most urgent & working up to longer-run?
  - Strengthening administrative data systems
    - Starting with simplifying reporting to gain internal acceptance?

Accountability for Outcomes – NREGA experience in AP

B.Rajsekhar
Director, Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT)
Govt of AP

NREGA and RTI

- Commitment to transparency and accountability runs throughout the NREGA;
- This commitment also flows from the Right to Information Act, 2005;
- The onus of providing information is on the State so as to ensure transparency and accountability;
- The NREGA mandates that the RTI be followed in letter and spirit – proactive disclosure of information must be strictly complied with at all levels;

NREGA and the MIS

- It is in context to this commitment to transparency the Go AP decided to invest its time and energy in the initial phases to create a Management Information System;
- Even as the Scheme was notified the MIS was put into place with the help of Tata Consultancy Services;
- All job cards were generated by the MIS at the Mandal (Block) level;
- Most importantly – all payments were made through the MIS – musters fed into the system, pay-orders generated and money transferred into PO accounts of the labourers;

EGS Procedure

- Application for Job card
- Issuing Job Card
- Application for Work
- Allocation of work
- Opening Post office Accounts
- Muster roll at worksite
- Generation of Pay Order
- Distribution of Pay slip
- Payment of wages (Fortnightly)

End to end ICT Solution

- NREGS Software deployed at every Mandal for handling all the transactions
- 1098 Mandal computer centers established
  - Issuance of job card
  - Estimates and Shelf of works
  - Work commencement orders
  - Pay orders for wages and material
  - Pay slips
  - All other financial transactions

Home page — http://www.nrega.ap.gov.in

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Every Household can be tracked ..
State View

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Job Card Holders Information

District ALL   Mandal ALL   Gram Panchayat ALL

District Name	No of HH Issued Job Cards	No of HH - SC	No of HH - ST	No of HH - BC	No of HH OTHERS	Total No of Wageseekers	Male(Nos)	Female (Nos)
Adilabad	4,32,887	1,08,248	1,29,083	1,70,453	25,038	9,90,475	4,98,446	4,92,029
Anantapur	7,09,781	1,30,853	33,173	3,66,972	1,78,528	17,55,667	9,01,618	8,54,049
Chittoor	6,06,026	1,67,352	38,028	2,19,080	1,81,258	14,21,306	7,10,594	7,10,712
East Godavari	7,50,391	2,02,514	62,648	2,90,471	1,94,735	14,66,658	8,06,384	6,60,274
Guntur	4,88,882	1,69,780	35,615	1,41,813	1,41,334	10,24,185	5,29,102	4,95,083
Kadapa	4,68,632	1,22,360	17,848	1,49,354	1,78,897	10,28,188	5,20,974	5,07,214
Karimnagar	4,98,172	1,54,607	24,564	2,06,797	32,393	11,08,773	5,53,805	5,54,968
Khammam	5,63,852	1,18,537	2,00,626	1,87,414	39,253	13,25,118	6,73,864	6,51,254
Krishna	3,84,782	1,61,220	17,239	1,48,677	57,416	8,45,654	4,34,381	4,11,273
Kurnool	5,00,334	1,32,281	12,308	2,85,910	69,116	12,27,448	6,32,002	5,95,446
Mahabubnagar	6,65,827	1,61,811	63,230	3,92,381	48,302	16,14,629	8,18,467	7,96,162
Medak	3,70,355	1,10,911	28,515	2,04,400	26,415	8,44,741	4,20,181	4,24,560
Nalgonda	6,72,044	1,61,997	96,154	3,57,448	56,409	16,15,226	8,20,202	7,95,024
Nizamabad	3,57,031	85,119	39,984	1,96,047	35,789	8,63,784	4,24,937	4,38,847
Prakasam	4,70,343	1,44,167	19,795	1,41,674	1,14,716	8,83,673	4,41,543	4,42,130
Total	1,09,08,083	27,91,559	12,03,029	50,91,797	17,39,123	2,47,32,413	1,26,10,036	1,21,22,377

Every Household can be tracked ..
Phase I - Chittoor Dist. view - 6,06,026 HHs

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Job Card Holders Information

District Chittoor   Mandal ALL   Gram Panchayat ALL

Mandal Name	No of HH Issued Job Cards	No of HH - SC	No of HH - ST	No of HH - BC	No of HH - OTHERS	Total No of Wageseekers	Male(Nos)	Female (Nos)
B Kothakota	10,552	1,436	549	3,914	4,632	22,519	11,107	11,412
Baireddi Palle	10,846	2,712	411	4,632	3,088	27,264	13,750	13,514
Bangarupalem	13,666	4,728	635	4,297	4,205	30,886	15,820	15,064
Buchinaidu Khandriga	9,031	3,278	1,667	2,945	1,141	20,027	10,077	9,950
Chandragiri	11,061	3,379	883	2,425	4,372	24,910	12,242	12,668
Chinnagottigallu	6,470	1,404	502	1,652	2,912	14,367	7,306	7,061
Chittoor	9,119	3,184	319	2,205	3,411	18,533	8,718	9,815
Chowdepalle	8,095	1,962	312	3,299	2,522	19,957	9,946	10,011
Gangadhara Nellore	13,643	5,954	222	1,964	5,503	33,665	16,939	16,726
Gangavaram	10,434	2,613	265	4,904	2,652	25,308	12,628	12,680
Gudi Palle	7,650	1,006	69	5,470	1,085	17,100	8,059	9,041
Gudipala	8,455	3,867	301	2,236	2,051	20,254	10,254	10,027
Gurramkonda	9,148	1,678	251	2,581	4,636	22,513	11,435	11,079
Irala	9,053	3,126	379	2,405	3,143	19,335	9,587	9,748
K V B Puram	12,427	3,744	1,374	5,016	2,286	29,797	15,092	14,705
Total	6,06,026	1,67,352	38,028	2,19,080	1,81,258	14,21,306	7,10,594	7,10,712

Every Household can be tracked ..
Baireddipalle Mandal View - 10,846 HHs

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Job Card Holders Information

District Chittoor   Mandal Baireddi Palle   Gram Panchayat ALL

Panchayat Name	No of HH IssuedJobCards	No of HH - SC	No of HH - ST	No of HH - BC	No of HH - OTHERS	Total No of Wageseekers	Male (No.s)	Female (No.s)
ALAPALLE	406	104	1	118	183	1,058	532	52
BAIREDDIPALLE	947	228	2	390	326	2,157	1,055	1,10
BELUPALLE	626	238	9	225	154	1,539	790	74
CHAPPIDIPALLE	645	363	14	153	115	1,744	899	84
DEVADODDI	599	27	14	391	165	1,525	777	74
DHARMAPURI	486	210	34	218	24	1,276	650	62
G.T.PALLE	315	104	0	79	132	945	483	46
GADDUR	323	14	4	198	107	917	466	45
GANGINAYANIPALLE	366	43	2	244	77	847	420	42
GOLLACHEMANAPALLE	501	117	0	230	154	1,259	601	65
KADAPANATHAM	455	135	3	219	98	1,161	606	55
KAMMANAPALLE	371	79	54	162	76	943	480	46
KHAMBAMPALLE	366	102	0	127	137	920	462	45
KOTHUR	322	134	1	52	135	907	446	46
LAKKANAPALLE	781	208	0	328	245	1,862	899	96
Bairedi Palle(Total)	10,846	2,712	411	4,632	3,088	27,264	13,750	13,51

Belupalle GP View - 626 HHs

NREGS-AP — National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Job Card Holders Information

District: Chittoor | Mandal: Baireddi Palle | Gram Panchayat: BELUPALLE

Jobcard ID	Head of the family	Registration Date	Caste	No. of Disabled	No. of SHG_Members	N
101416110010020007	Bangi Subramnayam	03/10/2006	OTHERS	0	0	
101416110010020068	I. E.Nagaraju Naidu	08/12/2006	OTHERS	0	0	
101416110010020069	K Lakshmi Pati Naidu	03/01/2007	OTHERS	0	0	
101416110010030001	Erukula Narayanappa	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030002	Erukula Venkatramappa	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030003	Erukula Esvaraiah	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030004	Danamayyagari Murivenkatappa	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030005	Earukula Muneppa	27/03/2006	ST	0	1	
101416110010030006	Erukula Venkatesappa	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030007	Erukula Rajanna	27/03/2006	ST	0	0	
101416110010030008	Thirlakuppam Devarapalu	27/03/2006	SC	0	0	
101416110010030009	Thirlakuppam Venkatesu	27/03/2006	SC	0	0	
101416110010030010	Thirlakuppam Sankarappa	27/03/2006	SC	0	1	
101416110010030011	Ramayyagari Gopal	27/03/2006	SC	0	0	
Total				626		

Erukula Venkatesappa HH View

NREGS-AP — National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Household Details

Jobcard ID	101416110010030006	Date of Registration	27/03/2006
IAY Benficiary	Yes	Land Reform Beneficiary/Landowner	Yes
Land Owned in Acres	0	BPL No.	
Khatha No.		Ration Card No.	
Total Days Worked	236	Total Wage Earned(Rs.)	17912
Caste	ST		

Worker Code	Name	Age	Gender	Relationship	Account No.	Paying Agency	Branch	SelfHelpGroup Name	SHG ID	Disabled	MPHSSID	Voter ID
01	Venkatesappa	50	M	Self	0606189		Branch Post Office, Belupalli			N		
02	Jayamma	45	F	Wife	603110		Branch Post Office, Belupalli			N		

Every Work can be tracked - State

NREGS-AP — Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Total Works Overall Status

District: ALL | Mandal: ALL | GramPanchayat: ALL | Village: ALL
Financial Year: 2008-2009

District	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given - (Nos)	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given - (Rs in Lakh)	Works Inprogress - (Nos)	Works Inprogress - (Rs in Lakh)	Works Completed - (Nos)	Works Completed - (Rs in Lakh)	Shelf of Works - (Nos)	Shelf of Works - (Rs in Lakh)
Khammam	98,946	63,568.07	37,304	30,403.81	16,241	9,815.95	45,401	23,318.31
Krishna	17,070	17,814.24	3,903	6,770.50	3,445	1,012.11	9,722	10,031.64
Kurnool	56,652	72,364.85	22,297	30,939.12	6,032	7,956.53	28,323	33,449.21
Mahabubnagar	86,423	84,425.77	33,194	41,279.46	9,167	6,999.88	44,062	36,146.43
Medak	44,419	66,982.01	15,215	24,103.22	3,987	5,481.48	25,217	37,397.32
Nalgonda	73,286	94,831.31	25,812	41,275.33	5,427	6,640.81	42,047	46,915.16
Nizamabad	42,262	61,936.92	13,644	23,076.01	5,602	8,040.02	23,016	28,880.89
Prakasam	36,732	30,525.26	10,628	9,943.42	4,219	3,241.09	21,885	17,340.74
Ranga Reddy	24,039	32,270.53	6,049	11,580.49	3,048	4,204.09	14,962	16,485.96
S.P.S Nellore	28,782	35,412.43	9,618	13,205.74	4,202	3,873.89	14,962	18,352.80
Srikakulam	25,851	43,576.52	8,926	18,751.28	3,145	3,313.90	13,780	21,511.34
Visakhapatnam	11,933	21,863.76	3,204	11,563.48	791	576.80	7,938	9,723.48
Vizianagaram	32,215	45,606.82	11,630	24,554.79	3,708	6,812.13	16,677	14,239.87
Warangal	43,095	55,549.17	13,107	24,373.42	6,772	8,718.29	23,215	22,457.46
West Godavari	11,935	11,347.03	4,097	4,247.41	2,495	1,035.59	5,343	6,064.03
Total	12,09,058	12,06,980.60	4,25,087	5,28,651.60	1,49,029	1,31,368.24	6,34,942	5,46,960.76

* Shelf of Works indicates works in shelf plus work commencement letters issued but not in progress.

Every Work can be tracked

Phase III - West Godavari Dist View

NREGS-AP — Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Total Works Overall Status

District: West Godavari | Mandal: ALL | GramPanchayat: ALL | Village: ALL
Financial Year: 2008-2009

Mandal	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given -(Nos)	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given -(Rs in Lakh)	Works Inprogress - (Nos)	Works Inprogress - (Rs in Lakh)	Works Completed - (Nos)	Works Completed - (Rs in Lakh)	Shelf of Works (Nos)	Shelf of Works (Rs in Lakh)
Achanta	301	66.20	229	56.21	34	3.52	42	6.47
Akiveedu	364	251.12	88	67.06	28	7.45	248	176.62
Attili	410	166.06	258	110.70	108	27.25	44	28.11
Bheemavaram	550	270.97	154	91.51	40	11.96	364	167.50
Bhimadole	156	374.24	28	121.44	6	14.08	112	238.72
Buttayagudem	527	657.99	146	232.10	39	34.58	342	391.31
Chagallu	115	358.33	32	97.28	5	8.69	78	252.16
Chintalapudi	353	451.97	149	120.69	84	39.07	120	292.21
Denduluru	309	372.17	99	147.44	21	13.33	189	211.41
Devarapalle	59	209.48	19	66.33	5	25.56	35	117.59
Dwaraka Tirumala	205	320.34	81	151.91	14	13.47	110	154.96
Eluru	302	313.31	58	52.97	34	15.12	210	245.21
Ganapavaram	79	60.76	53	49.67	25	10.32	1	.76
Gopalapuram	202	335.54	66	180.63	22	18.14	114	136.77
Iragavaram	574	131.69	76	74.80	94	8.55	195	84.99
Total	11,935	11,347.03	4,097	4,247.41	2,495	1,035.59	5,343	6,064.03

* Shelf of Works indicates works in shelf plus work commencement letters issued but not in progress.

Every Work can be tracked

Buttayagudem (ITDA) Mandal View

NREGS-AP — National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Total Works Overall Status

District: West Godavari | Mandal: Buttayagudem | GramPanchayat: ALL | Village: ALL
Financial Year: 2008-2009

Panchayat	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given -(Nos)	Total Tech & Admin Sanction Given -(Rs in Lakh)	Works Inprogress (Nos)	Works Inprogress (Rs in Lakh)	Works Completed (Nos)	Works Completed (Rs in Lakh)	Shelf of Works -(Nos)	Shelf of Works -(Rs in Lakh)
ALIVERU	18	32.66	7	9.30	0	.00	13	23.36
ANTARVEDIGUDEM	19	39.76	7	15.42	1	3.44	11	20.91
ATCHIAHPALEM	18	29.26	2	4.25	1	1.98	15	19.05
BUTTAYAGUDEM	24	17.20	0	8.63	1	.28	15	8.09
DORAMAMIDI	57	79.74	29	37.96	2	3.74	26	37.01
GANAPAVARAM	32	33.41	3	9.62	0	.00	29	23.59
JAINAVARIGUDEM	10	9.29	1	.16	1	5.82	8	3.41
KANATYAKUNTA	33	25.08	13	19.75	0	.00	20	5.33
KORSAVARIGUDEM	54	69.99	6	9.22	0	.00	48	60.77
KOTARAGAVARAM	16	13.77	3	8.05	0	.00	13	5.72
KOTARAMACHANDRAPURAM	16	29.33	10	18.92	1	2.06	5	8.76
KOYARAJAHMUNDRY	15	20.49	7	12.87	6	7.23	2	.36
LAXMIGUDUDEM	22	11.22	9	8.92	9	2.37	4	.29
MANGALAHPALEM	15	5.26	2	3.25	4	.97	9	2.04
MANTHIGUDEI	15	27.51	7	5.67	0	.00	15	21.84
Total	527	657.99	146	232.10	39	34.58	342	391.31

Every Work can be tracked Antarvedigudem GP

NREGS-AP — National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

Wage Seeker | Works | Funds | Reports | Analysis

Consolidated list of Works

District: West Godavari | Mandal: Buttayagudem | GramPanchayat: ANTARVEDIGUDEM | Village: ALL
Financial Year: 2008-2009 | Status: ALL

Work Code	Cat Code	Work Type Name	Work Name	Total Cost (Rs.)	Total Person Days	Status	Start Date
0507202030030001	05	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks	JIMMULAJOLUVADU TANK	231229	2937	In-Progress	11-05-2008
0507202030030002	05	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks	UTA CALVA TANK	303046	3779	In-Progress	04-05-2008
0507202030030003	05	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks	LOTHUVADU TANK	229682	2858	In-Progress	04-05-2008
No of Works	19	Improvement					

Slide 1: Work Estimate View

Every Work can be tracked Work Estimate View

Work Estimate

State	Andhra Pradesh	District	West Godavari
Mandal	Buttayagudem	Panchayat	ANTARVEDIGUDEM
Work Code	050730203003050003	Survey No.	
Type of Work	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks	Work Name	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks

Task Name	Quantity	Units	Labour Cost Unskilled(Rs.)	Labour Cost Skilled(Rs.)	Material Cost(Rs.)	Total Cost(Rs.)	Person Days
Small stumps removal	5	Nos.	70	0	0	70	0
Tractor hire charges for transportation of 225-300mm rough stone	1	Trips	0	0	94	94	0
Engaging labor for consolidation and sectioning of bund	1840	Cu.m	16560	0	0	16560	207
Light Bush Clearence	2500	Sq.m	3750	0	0	3750	46
Medium Bush Clearence	200	Sq.m	400	0	0	400	5
Juli flora Clearence including uprooting and removal of stumps	150	Sq.m	675	0	0	675	8
Engaging Labor for excavation of carted earth in ordinary soils including loading and unloading	40	Cu.m	2160	0	0	2160	27
Earth work excavation, transportation and disposal of Ordinary soil by head loads with lifts and lead for Embankment upto 40 meters	1800	Cu.m	205200	0	0	205200	2565
Tractor hire charges for carted earth	16	Trips	0	0	600	600	0
Ploughing the Existing Bund Top width with Tractor Mounted Ploughing Blade for better bonding of casing layer	345	Sq.m	0	0	173	173	0
Total			228815	0	867	229682	2858

Slide 2: Work Progress View

Every Work can be tracked Work Progress View

Work Progress(Period wise)

View Progress Details	From Date	To Date	Completed(%) (cumulative)	Total Person Days*	Reported By	Remarks
Period-1	04/05/2008	10/05/2008	3.1	88	K.RAMESH	
Period-2	11/05/2008	17/05/2008	11.29	234	K.RAMESH	
Period-3	18/05/2008	24/05/2008	25.78	414	K.RAMESH	
Period-4	25/05/2008	31/05/2008	32.41	190	K.RAMESH	
Period-5	01/06/2008	07/06/2008	47.85	441	K.RAMESH	
Period-6	08/06/2008	14/06/2008	54.85	200	K.RAMESH	
Period-7	15/06/2008	21/06/2008	58.13	94	K.RAMESH	
Total				1661		

Muster Rolls

Note: * Person Days are according to Quantity of work done.

Work Progress Details

Work Code	050730203003050003	Survey No.	
Type of Work	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks	Work Name	Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks
Groups	All Groups	Work Progress Details	Muster Rolls & Payments

Slide 3: Period-7 Muster

Every Work can be tracked

Period - 7 (all groups) - Muster

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
under National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005

Print

Period Wise Consolidated Muster Rolls

District : West Godavari
Panchayat : Antarvedigudem
WorkID : 050730203003050003
Period : 15-JUN-2008 to 21-JUN-2008
WorkName : Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks
WorkType : Improvement (or) strengthening of bunds for Irrigation tanks

Mandal : Buttayagudem
Village : ANTARVEDIGUDEM
Group Name : All Groups
PayOrder Id : 425
PayOrder Date : 25-JUN-2008

Serial No.	Jobcard ID	Surname	Name	Caste	Age	Sex	Days	Payment Per Day(Rs)	Amount (Rs)
1	30003	MODIUM	NAGAMANI	ST	35	F	4	89	365
2	30003	MODIUM	BUCHIRAJU	ST	38	M	4	89	365
3	30008	KUNJA	GAVARAMMA	ST	30	F	5	89	456
22	30053	BATT	RAJAMMA	ST	30	F	4	89	365
23	30060	MADAKAM	MANGA	ST	23	F	4	89	365
			Total amount paid						**9209**

Slide 4: Consolidated Muster Roll

Consolidated Muster Roll

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National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-AP
Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

NREGS-AP

Wage Seeker Works Funds Reports Analysis

Social Audit

Consolidated Muster Rolls (Info)

State	ANDHRA PRADESH	District	Chittoor	Mandal	Mulakalacheruvu	Panchayat	COWDASAMUDRAM
Village	COWDASAMUDRAM	Year	2007-2008	From Date	01/04/2007	To Date	31/03/2008

View Report

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Site Best viewed in 1024*768 Resolution

Slide 5: Consolidated Muster Roll

Consolidated Muster Roll

Jobcard ID	Name	WorkID	Pay Order Id	Work Name	From Date	To Date	PayOrder Gen Date	Days	Payment Per Day(Rs)	Amount (Rs)	Account No.	Bank/PostOffice Name
010005	bhudevi	1014503 0300404 0213	2375	Restoration and Deepening of existing wells-Deselting and Deepaning at Pilappabavi	06-MAY-2007	19-MAY-2007	26-MAY-2007	14	69	968	796427	Branch Post Office Cowdasamudram
010005	bhudevi	1014503 0300405 0230	2664	Desilting,Deepening of Tanks and Silt Disposal on Bund or away from the Bund-Kakarlakunta	05-JUN-2007	09-JUN-2007	12-JUL-2007	3	71	220	796427	Branch Post Office Cowdasamudram
010005	bhudevi	1014503 0300405 0230	2942	Desilting,Deepening of Tanks and Silt Disposal on Bund or away from the Bund-Kakarlakunta	10-JUN-2007	16-JUN-2007	18-JUL-2007	6	98	600	796427	Branch Post Office Cowdasamudram
010005	bhudevi	1014503 0300405 0270	3625	Desilting,Deepening of Tanks and Silt Disposal on Bund or away from the Bund-Kakarlakunta	22-SEP-2007	29-SEP-2007	29-SEP-2007	6	58	361	796427	Branch Post Office Cowdasamudram
TOTAL AMOUNT										2149		

Slide 6: Web based monitoring

Web based monitoring

- MCCs upload data everyday into NREGS website

  - Every household can be tracked

  - Every work can be tracked

  - Every muster roll can be downloaded

  - Every rupee can be tracked- to whom paid

  - Please visit the web site http://www.nrega.ap.gov.in

IT and accountability

- IT provides efficient methodology for pro-active disclosure of info

- Transaction-based IT architecture - Enable user-defined reports & analysis

- *Does all this mean – Accountability?*
- *IT in conjunction with primary stakeholders monitoring*

NREGS-Social Audit

- An innovative feature of the NREGA – central role given to "Social Audits";
- Section 17 of the NREGA mandates the conduct of Social Audits
- Basic objective of the Social Audit - ensure public accountability in the implementation of projects, laws and policies;
- An entitlement for all stakeholders to participate in the process of decision making and validation of the Scheme – as a continuous process of public vigilance;

NREGS, Social Audits and MIS-

- In AP the M&E mechanism didn't stop with the MIS, Social Audits were introduced in the NREGS;
- Effectiveness of a Social Audit depends on full access to information;
- Collating information and demystifying it is an important part of the Social Audit – the MIS facilitates the process in AP;
- Consolidated Muster Rolls / pay-orders are available online at the click of a button;
- Preparation time for Social Audits is reduced to a week (from the time that the RTI is filed);

Beginnings of the SA in AP

- A pilot SA of NREGS was undertaken in Nalgonda District
- Realization that unless a formal platform is provided for the community to ask questions no amount of publicity will bear fruit in NREGS-AP
- Insights of the pilot led to resolve that SA would be an important part of the NREGS-AP
- Decision to begin the process in three districts initially to evolve a roll-out strategy

Social Audit process

- Mandal is the administrative unit (Average 21 Panchayats) in which SA is done

- SA is done in all the panchayats over a 10 day period.

- Starts with application filed under RTI for relevant records of EGS

- SRPs &DRPS go into the villages and identify literate youth (@2-4 per habitation) from labourer's families

- These are trained as VSAs

- 100 people (approximately) are formed into 9-10 teams

Social Audit Process

- Each team does Social Audit in 2-3 gram panchayats
- Verification of figures on records with facts on ground
- Awareness building on rights and entitlements of the wage seekers
- Corrective measures are taken immediately
- On a pre notified date a social audit public meeting is held.
- Public, concerned officials, political representatives, media participate
- Village wise SA findings are read out, public testifies, officials respond
- Corrective action is taken.

Some Figures.......

- Number of districts ongoing   : 22
- Number of Habitations covered   : 50,000
- Value of EGS works   : Rs.3000 crores
- Number of village activists trained : 50,000
- Number of MPDOs trained in SA   : 600
- Number of CSOs involved   : >150
- Wage seekers reached   : 45 lakhs
- Applications filed under RTI   : > 700
- Documents scrutinized publicly   : 50 lakh records
- Elected Reps participated   : 20000
- **No. Of MLAs attended SAs   : 50**
- **Amount Recovered through voluntary
  returns by those who have embezzled : Rs.2.5 Crs**

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE TO FINDINGS

- About 1428 Field Assistants and 144 Technical Assistants dismissed .

- Criminal Action initiated on 203 people

- 10 Mandal Parishad Development Officers suspended.

- 1171 Departmental Enquiries initiated

IT in Social Audit

- Exclusive web site for SA –
  www.socialauditap.com
- All SA reports are available in the public domain
- SA reports in Telugu are sent by post to GramIT Rural BPO at Ethakota, EG Dt
- Translated and put on the web-site by a dedicated team
- Moving into DBMS architecture – to enable user-friendly reports

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Public Accountability – Best practice

- Aug 20th 2009 - National Workshop on NREGA: A step towards governance reform, transparency and accountability

  - *AP social audit process to be replicated in all the states*

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**Expenditure Governance and Information Technology:
Assessing India's Situation and Potential**

Nirvikar Singh
Professor of Economics
University of California, Santa Cruz

Presentation for CDF-IFMR and CPR conference "From Outlays To Outcomes: Getting Development From Development Expenditure," New Delhi, August 25, 2009

August 25, 2009

Outline

1. Expenditure quality and budget management
2. Accountability
   - Internal
   - External
3. Role of information technology
   - Indian examples
   - International experience
4. Conclusions

August 25, 2009

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Expenditure quality

- Poor quality
  - Performance indicators, e.g., HDIs, PSE losses
  - Direct observation of inefficiencies
  - Exit – private/self-provision

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Budget management

- Good formal institutions at national level
  - ICAS
  - IAAS and CAGI
- Weaker at state level
- Still weaker at urban local level
- Almost non-existent at rural local level
  - Not much of budget to manage

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Accountability

- Internal
  - Hierarchies
  - Checks and balances
- External
  - Intergovernmental competition
  - Electoral mechanisms

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Information technology

- Internal and external accountability
- Transparency and monitoring
- Integration with non-IT pieces of government
- Policies, programs and practices
  - Discretion and transaction-intensity

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IT: Indian examples

- Panchayats, plans and programs
- Drishtee
- Railway reservations

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IT: International experience

- *Ghana*: Information Clearing House
- *Tanzania*: Improved District Governance
- *Kenya*: Electronic Graft Management
- *South Africa*: South African Social Security Agency
- *Chile*: Public Expenditure Management Project
- *Guatemala*: Public Expenditure Management Project
- *Bolivia*: Results-Based Public Management
- *Malaysia*: e-Perolehan (e-Procurement)
- *China*: Performance-based Budgeting in Guangdong
- *Uzbekistan*: Disease and Public Health Database

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IT: Lessons

- Objectives
- Scale
- Scope
- Back-end vs. front-end
- Public services vs. public infrastructure
- Levels of government
- Integration and incentives
- Human resources

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Conclusion

- Accountability requires non-IT reforms as well as IT
- Enhancing efficiency of internal processes key to improving expenditure quality
- External monitoring helps
- Address all the components of the value chain
- Prioritize and tackle in manageable pieces

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