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Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Orissa (India)**

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Abstract

Many severe health risks in developing countries could be substantially reduced with access to appropriate preventive measures. However, the associated costs are often high enough to restrict access among poor households, and free provision through public health campaigns is often not financially feasible. We describe findings from the first large-scale cluster randomized controlled trial in a developing country context that evaluates the uptake of a health-protecting technology, insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs), through micro-consumer loans, as compared to free distribution and control conditions. Numerous studies have shown that widespread, regular use of ITNs is one of the most effective preventive measures against malaria. However, ownership rates remain very low in most malarious areas, including our study areas in rural Orissa (India). Despite the un-subsidized price, 52 percent of sample households purchased at least one ITN, leading to 16 percent of individuals using a treated net the previous night, relative to only 2 percent in control areas where nets were not offered for sale. However, the increase fell significantly short of the 47 percent previous-night usage rate achieved with free distribution. Most strikingly, we find that neither micro-loans nor free distribution led to improvements in malaria and anemia prevalence, measured using blood tests. We examine and rule out several plausible explanations for this latter finding. We conjecture that insufficient ITN coverage is the most likely explanation, and discuss implications for public health policy.

JEL: I1,I3

Key words: Malaria, Bednets, Microfinance, Public Health

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1 Introduction

Hundreds of millions of people in developing countries still face dire health risks that could be substantially reduced with access to appropriate preventive measures. For instance, the burden of malaria, diarrheal diseases and intestinal worms can be mitigated by insecticide treated bednets, water disinfectants and deworming drugs respectively. Although the cost of such health-protecting technologies is negligible for well-off households, a number of recent randomized controlled trials have shown that the cost can be substantial for the poor, leading to very low demand even with heavy subsidization (Holla and Kremer 2009). In Kenya, Kremer and Miguel (2007) find that a 20% co-pay for deworming drugs reduced uptake from 75 to 19%. In the case of water disinfectant, Ashraf et al. (2010) estimate a price elasticity of demand of -0.6 in urban Zambia, while Kremer et al. (2009) document only a 10% uptake when the product was offered at half-price in Kenya. In rural Kenya, Cohen and Dupas (2010) find that a still remarkable 90% subsidy reduces uptake of insecticide treated bednets to 10%, relative to 99% achieved with free distribution. In rural Zambia, Agha et al. (2007) find that ITN subsidization did not increase ownership rates among the poorest households.

Such high price elasticities, coupled with the positive externalities commonly observed with health-protecting technologies, have provided strong arguments in favor of free distribution. However, cost sharing may still be necessary in situations where public health programs lack sufficient funding to ensure free provision to everyone at risk. Under this scenario, micro-loans may provide a natural alternative delivery mechanism, by ensuring cost recovery while allowing households who do not have sufficient cash on hand to distribute the cost over an extended period of time. In this paper, we describe findings from the first large-scale cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) in a developing country context that evaluates the uptake of a health-protecting technology through micro-consumer loans, as compared to free distribution and control conditions. In addition, we also estimate health impacts by measuring key health indicators through the collection of biological samples (“biomarkers”). Specifically, we evaluate the relative effectiveness of micro-loans at increasing ownership and use of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs), and ultimately at reducing the burden of malaria in highly malarious areas of rural Orissa (India).

Transmitted by *Anopheles* mosquitoes, malaria represents an enormous global health burden, with a worldwide incidence of 300-660 million cases annually, 80 million in India alone (Snow et al. 2005, Korenromp 2005).¹ One third of the human population is estimated to live in areas at risk for the most severe form of malaria, caused by *Plasmodium falciparum* (Snow et al. 2005). The negative association between the disease and growth and the accumulation of human capital have been long recognized (Gallup and Sachs 2001, Sachs and Malaney 2002, Malaney et al. 2004), although studies that convincingly document and quantify causal links are relatively recent within economics.² Numerous studies have shown that high coverage and use rates of ITNs are efficacious at reducing malaria-related morbidity and mortality, as documented in the extensive survey in Lengeler (2004). One key trial demonstrated that ITNs distributed

¹Malaria infection may develop into debilitating febrile episodes and lead to severe anemia, pregnancy complications, permanent neurologic and developmental impairment for children, kidney failure, seizures, coma and death. Mortality rates are particularly high among young children and pregnant women (Breman 2001).

²See Hong (2007a), Hong (2007b), Barreca (2010), Bleakley (2010), Cutler et al. (2010), Lucas (2010), Kitchens (2010).

to achieve near-complete coverage in an area with high levels of perennial malaria transmission in Western Kenya resulted in a 19% reduction in *falciparum* malaria prevalence, a 39% reduction in moderately severe anemia in children under three, and a 90% reduction in malaria vector population (Gimmig et al. 2003, ter Kuile et al. 2003). This last effect is considered to be a key means by which ITNs reduce malaria, through externalities which benefit even individuals not sleeping under an ITN due to the reduction in vectors in an area with high ITN coverage (Hawley et al. 2003, Killeen et al. 2007). However, ITN adoption in most malarious areas remains very low and public health agencies frequently have insufficient resources to provide complete ITN coverage for all individuals at risk. The introduction of cost sharing for health services and products may alleviate budgetary concerns, but it may also lead to the exclusion of vulnerable individuals who do not have access to sufficient funds.

Our field experiment was conducted in collaboration with BISWA (Bharat Integrated Social Welfare Agency), a rural micro-lending organization with a large presence in rural Orissa. We randomly selected 141 villages from communities with BISWA presence in the five districts of Bargarh, Balangir, Keonjhar, Kandhamal, and Sambalpur. After a baseline household survey, completed in spring 2007, we assigned communities to one of three equally sized groups. A control group received no further interventions, while lender clients in a second group (“Free” villages) received at no cost a number of ITNs determined as a function of household composition. Clients from the third group of villages (Microfinance or “MF” villages) were offered contracts for the purchase of ITNs and re-treatments, using consumer loans with a one-year repayment period. The ITN price was *not* subsidized (it even included a small mark-up to cover delivery costs) and it was not negligible, corresponding approximately to the local cost of 20 kilograms of rice. Buyers could decide between purchasing ITNs alone or a bundle which included, in addition, two future re-treatments with insecticide. After six and twelve months, field workers returned to MF and Free communities, and offered re-treatment at no cost both in Free villages and to buyers who chose the bundle in MF communities. In the latter villages, buyers who chose to purchase the ITNs only could re-treat the net for cash.

Our project has several specific aims. First, we evaluated to what extent the offer of small loans for purchasing ITNs would lead to increases in ITN ownership, even among poor households. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-scale cluster RCT to evaluate the efficacy of a public health program where a health-protecting technology was provided at full cost but allowing for repayment over time, as compared to both control conditions or free distribution. In addition, ours is also the first large-scale RCT that analyze the impact of ITNs in India.³

Second, we evaluated the impacts of the intervention on malaria prevalence and hemoglobin levels (an important indicator of malaria exposure) measured through blood tests. The use of biomarkers is important, both because health indicators (and not ITN ownership rates) are the key outcomes and because self-reported health indices commonly suffer from substantial non-random measurement error (Strauss and

³Of the 22 RCTs surveyed in Lengeler (2004), none has been carried out in India, and only one was conducted in a south Asian country (Pakistan, see Rowland et al. 1996), but using within-community randomization. A number of studies conducted in Orissa and other Indian states are listed but not surveyed in Lengeler (2004) because the lack of an appropriate control group.

Thomas 1998).

Third, we analyzed whether re-treatment rates for bednets can be increased by using appropriately designed contracts. Although treatment of nets with insecticide is safe, efficacious and relatively inexpensive, regular re-treatment is rare. More generally, sustained compliance with health-protecting behavior is often problematic in public health initiatives, especially when it involves a monetary cost (Kremer and Miguel 2007, Holla and Kremer 2009). Researchers have argued that commitment devices can help poor households to overcome time-inconsistency in their preferences (Ashraf et al. 2006, Duflo et al. 2009). However, while analogous arguments have been often used to study behavior detrimental to health such as addiction, we are not aware of any study that analyzes the relationship between commitment devices and health-seeking behavior in a developing country.

Lastly, we re-visited the argument that cost-sharing in public health programs induces more use of the services provided. One view among development experts is that cost sharing should be enforced in public health projects, both to improve targeting (by screening out those with no demand) and to increase usage conditional on uptake. One possible reason for the latter is the “sunk-cost fallacy”, whereby individuals will use a product more because they paid a price for it, thereby letting behavior being driven by “sunk” factors that should be irrelevant (Thaler 1980, Arkes and Blumer 1985). Higher prices may also induce more usage if they are seen as signaling higher quality (Riley 2001). In a RCT, Cohen and Dupas (2010) showed that, conditional on willingness-to-pay, Kenyan women who paid higher prices did not use ITNs more relative to others who received them for free. In an earlier RCT, Ashraf et al. (2010) also found no evidence of sunk cost effects in the usage of a water purification product in Zambia, although they estimated that higher prices screened out individuals who were less likely to use the product in the short term.

We find that micro-loans successfully increased ITN ownership and (self-reported) use. Among sample households, 52% purchased at least one ITN in MF villages. This was despite the relatively high price of the ITNs, about 3-5 times the daily agricultural wage in the study area. Although the study design does not allow us to estimate a price elasticity, such high uptake contrasts sharply with the low demand for health products documented among poor households in Agha et al. (2007), Ashraf et al. (2010), Cohen and Dupas (2010), Kremer and Miguel (2007) and Kremer et al. (2009). However, despite the relative success of the sales, the mean uptake (0.24 ITNs per person) was substantively and statistically significantly lower than in areas where nets were distributed for free (0.52).

Usage rates are consistent with the pattern of uptake among study arms. At follow-up, in villages with Free distribution, 47% of individuals were reported as having slept under an ITN the previous night, while the fraction was only 16% in MF villages and 2% in control areas. Usage rates reported to be “usual” during the peak mosquito season in the three experimental arms were respectively 77, 36 and 7%. Conditioning upon ownership, we find that usage rates were *higher* when ITNs were delivered at no cost. Consistent with Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010), we thus find no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that free provision leads to lower usage of health products relative to cost sharing (we actually find support for the opposite).

In MF villages, we also found that re-treatment rates were significantly higher when ITNs were pur-

chased bundled with two re-treatments, even after controlling for household characteristics predictive of contract choice. Although the non-experimental nature of the result does not allow us to interpret it as conclusively causal, the finding is consistent with the implicit inclusion of a “commitment” to re-treat in this contract via the bundling of future re-treatments.⁴ This result has potentially important implications for the design of public health policies, because it suggests that when programs call for cost-sharing and require compliance with certain behaviors over time (such as re-treatment of bednets), the inclusion upfront of any monetary costs of such behaviors may increase compliance.

The most surprising findings of our study, however, come from the evaluation of the health impacts. We found that the increased usage rates did not translate into health improvements, not even in villages where a large number of ITNs were delivered for free to all BISWA households. At standard significance levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal malaria prevalence across experimental arms in the post-intervention survey, and the estimates are precise enough to generate confidence intervals that rule out substantial improvements. Hemoglobin levels barely differed across treatment areas, and we could only document a small improvement (11% of a standard deviation) in Free villages, significant at the 10% level. In addition, the lack of improvements was largely shared by all demographic groups.

Our data allowed us to rule out a number of potentially plausible reasons for the lack of health benefits, including perverse behavioral responses among beneficiaries and measurement error in health outcomes. Ultimately, we conjecture that the most plausible explanation rests on a comparison between our study design (which involved low ITN coverage rates and no monitoring of ITN usage) and the earlier literature on the impact of ITNs on health outcomes (which mostly evaluates programs under high coverage rates and/or close monitoring of health and ITN usage). In this sense, our results should *not* be interpreted as contradicting these earlier seminal studies, whose findings are compelling. Rather, our results complement this literature, and suggest that ITN distribution programs that do not lead to sufficient coverage and regular usage may do little to reduce the malaria burden. This interpretation has potentially important implications, because many public health programs of ITN distribution target vulnerable groups, such as young children and pregnant women, who may represent only a small fraction of the population ([WHO/UNICEF 2005](#)). Such programs may not guarantee sufficiently high coverage (with their associated externalities) and may therefore fail to provide health benefits to the intended beneficiaries. In such a context, cost recovery programs (even when relatively successful at inducing high uptake of health products, as in our case) may further limit the ability to reach the critical levels of coverage required for health benefits to arise.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the study area, the RCT design as well as the nature of the data recorded. This section also includes baseline summary statistics, an assessment of the success of the randomization, and an analysis of attrition between baseline and follow-up survey. Section 3 describes the estimated impacts of the interventions on ITN uptake, (self-reported)

⁴[Mahajan and Tarozzi \(2011\)](#) explore the implications of this result within the framework of a dynamic discrete choice model with time-inconsistent preferences. They show that the choice of contract, along with other information on time preferences and beliefs about future health events help to identify time-inconsistent preferences. They find that a sizeable proportion of the study population is well-characterized as time-inconsistent, albeit to varying degrees.

usage, re-treatment rates and finally on health outcomes. Section 4 considers several potentially plausible hypotheses to explain the lack of health benefits observed in the data. In particular, we evaluate our findings in the context of the existing literature on the efficacy of ITNs in reducing the malaria burden. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 Location, Study Design and Data

This study took place in rural Orissa, India, in a number of communities spread across a wide area in the five districts of Bargarh, Balangir, Keonjhar, Kandhamal, and Sambalpur (Figure 1). Orissa, one of poorest states in India, is also the most highly malaria endemic state in the country. Records from the Indian National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme show that, despite accounting for less than 4% of India’s population, Orissa accounts for 25% of annual malaria cases, 40% of *P. falciparum* malaria, and 30% of malaria-related deaths in the country (Kumar et al. 2007). Data from the 1998-1999 National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) show that the fraction of individuals who had (respondent-diagnosed) malaria over the three months preceding the interview was 8.5% in Sambalpur and Bargarh, 8.8% in Balangir, 12.3% in Keonjhar and 17.2% in Kandhamal.

Our study was conducted in collaboration with BISWA (Bharat Integrated Social Welfare Agency), a micro-lender with a large presence in rural Orissa. At the beginning of the study, BISWA provided a list of 878 villages where it operated, together with rosters of clients as of November 2006. These 878 “BISWA villages” are located in 318 *panchayats* which in turn are part of 26 blocks in the five study districts. Because *panchayats* are relatively small administrative units which comprise a limited number of nearby villages, a maximum of one village from each *panchayat* was allowed in the study, to limit the extent of cross-village contamination.

From these 878 villages, 150 were randomly selected for inclusion in the study; we selected 33 villages from Balangir, 48 from Bargarh, 30 from Keonjhar, 9 from Kandhamal and 30 from Sambalpur. The allocation of the sample was approximately proportional to the number of BISWA communities in each district. Villages were drawn by means of a pseudo-random number generator, and the selection algorithm ensured the inclusion of a multiple of three villages from each block. After the completion of the baseline survey, one-third of villages within each block were then randomly assigned to each experimental arm. Blocks where the Government of Orissa was planning to initiate free distribution of nets were excluded from the sampling frame.⁵ Despite BISWA’s widespread operating network, communities where the micro-lender operate were not a representative sample of all villages in the five study districts. In fact, BISWA villages were, on average, larger and with better amenities than the overall population.⁶ After the baseline

⁵While the study locations were chosen as above to minimize this risk, the sampling scheme was designed to preserve the balanced structure of the sample across treatment groups should the state Government have initiated any unanticipated distribution. Data collected during the post-intervention survey show that indeed distribution of nets from the Government was extremely limited in study areas. We also find virtually no bednet distribution from other NGOs.

⁶In Appendix A.1 we document this observation by using village-level characteristics from the 2001 Census of India. Unfortunately, census data do not allow to evaluate differences in terms of exposure to malaria risk or bednet ownership rates.

survey, but before the intervention, nine of the 150 villages were found to have no actual BISWA activity and were then excluded from the study. Data from these villages are excluded from the analysis.

Next, we describe the pre-intervention data and the nature of the intervention in detail, and we briefly lay out the nature and timing of the later data collection efforts. The description of the findings from the post-intervention surveys is left to Section 3.

2.1 Baseline Household Survey

The pre-intervention baseline survey was completed in May-June 2007 for a random sample of 1,844 households with a total of 10,062 members. The sampling frame at baseline included all households with preexisting BISWA accounts as of November 2006, regardless of whether they had an active loan at the time of the survey. Within each sampled village, we selected randomly 15 households from lists provided by BISWA. In villages where fewer than 15 BISWA households were present, all households were included.

The baseline survey assessed a broad range of demographic, socio-economic and health variables, including information about expenditure in (or, when relevant, home production of) a comprehensive list of 18 different consumption categories. For each household member, we also recorded age, gender, schooling, occupation, and a complete history of notable health-related problems in the six months before the survey. We recorded health events that satisfied one or more of the following: resulted in loss of one or more days of school or work; required hospitalization or surgery or consultation with health workers; or, were due to malaria. For each episode, we also recorded all related health expenditures, including any cost for lodging and transportation or loss of income due to missed days of work for the sick person or any caretaker. Although the health history section of the questionnaire was very detailed, the respondent-reported nature of these data should be kept in mind, because self-reported health information is often plagued by non-random measurement error (Strauss and Thomas 1998). In addition, in areas with continuous malaria transmission, adults are often parasitemic but asymptomatic because of acquired partial immunity (Vinetz and Gilman 2002). Fevers of different origins are also often mistakenly attributed to malaria, and symptoms for very young children may be hard to identify.

Because accurate measurement of health impacts was essential for the study, the key health outcomes (malaria infection and hemoglobin levels) were measured in the field with rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) which require very small blood samples. Blood testing was performed for all pregnant women, children under the age of five (U5), mothers of U5s, and one randomly selected adult (age 15-60). Fingerprick blood samples were obtained, which required less than 0.5 ml of blood each. Malaria prevalence was determined using the Binax Now malaria RDT. This test is well validated in comparison to blood smears for the diagnosis of malaria. The RDT detects both current and recent infections, up to 2-4 weeks prior to the test. The test does not indicate the level of parasitemia, and can only detect positive / negative for malaria infection, and whether that infection is due to *P. falciparum*, to one of the other *Plasmodium* species, or both (Moody 2002, Farcas et al. 2003, van den Broek et al. 2006, Khairnar et al. 2009).⁷ Anemia,

⁷The test has been shown to have both good *specificity* and *sensitivity*. Both these concepts are defined assuming that the “null hypothesis” of the test is that the individual does not have malaria. The specificity is calculated as the fraction of negative cases correctly diagnosed as such (that is, one minus the probability of a Type-I error). The sensitivity is the fraction

defined here as hemoglobin (Hb) levels below 11 grams per deciliter of blood, is a common health condition in developing countries, with multifactorial causes, including nutrition and intestinal parasites (Thomas et al. 2006). Malaria can severely worsen anemia, because the parasite destroys red blood cells, and can cause bone marrow dysfunction that can persist for weeks, shortened red cell survival and gastrointestinal haemorrhage. A significant change in anemia rates in U5 is often one of the most sensitive indicators of changes in malaria prevalence (Hawley et al. 2003, ter Kuile et al. 2003, Leenstra et al. 2003). Hemoglobin levels were tested with the HemoCue 201 Hb analyzer, a portable, accurate system for measuring Hb. The test, like the one used to detect malaria prevalence, requires less than 0.5 ml of blood and delivered results in approximately 15 minutes. Consent for testing both malaria infection and Hb levels was sought for the same set of individuals.⁸ Overall, malaria infection was tested in 2,561 individuals from 1,704 households, and Hb levels were measured for 2,532 from 1,687 households.

The survey questionnaire also included questions aiming at gauging respondents’ risk aversion and time preferences. Separate sections gauged knowledge and practices related to malaria and bednets, including perceived protective power of nets and treatment with insecticide. Crucial to our analysis, the survey instrument also included a complete “census of sleeping spaces”, where surveyors recorded the sleeping arrangement of household members during the night before the interview, including bednet usage.

2.1.1 Baseline Summary Statistics and Randomization Tests

After the completion of the baseline, the 141 villages were randomly assigned to three study groups of 47 villages each. We label the three arms (described in detail later) as “MF” (microfinance), when nets were offered for sale on credit, “Free”, when the intervention called for free distribution of ITNs, and “Control” when neither intervention was introduced. In Table 1, we report selected summary statistics from the baseline, together with tests for balance across treatment groups. The null of equality of means across arms is not rejected at standard significance levels in 19 of 21 variables, which suggests that the randomization provided overall good balance across experimental arms.

A large majority of households belong to Scheduled Castes and Tribes and Other Backward Castes, and less than 10% of household heads had a secondary school diploma or above. Estimates of expenditure per person per day ranged from 22.3 to 24.2 Rs per person per day, but the estimates are very precise, so that we reject the null of equality across the three arms at the 10% level (p-value= 0.085). Using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates (World Bank 2008), these estimates are just below 1.5 USD per person per day. Approximately 20% of households are below the official poverty line for rural Orissa (see table caption for details). Note that, despite all sample households being affiliated to BISWA, more than half of respondents state that it would be difficult or impossible for the household to borrow

of positive cases correctly diagnosed as such (that is, one minus the probability of a Type-II error). The test is particularly sensitive for *P. falciparum* infection. Sensitivity is lower for *P. vivax*, *P. malariae* and *P. ovale*.

⁸At baseline, but not at follow-up, we also included blood tests to measure the prevalence of Lymphatic filariasis (LF), another mosquito-borne and potentially seriously debilitating tropical disease. Foo et al. (2011) includes the details, and documents the high prevalence of LF in the study area, an unexpected result given that LF was mostly known to be endemic in coastal districts of Orissa.

the sum of Rs 500, which is approximately the price of two program ITNs (see below).

At the time of the intervention, at least one bednet was already present in 65% of households, which on average had paid Rs 79 per net. However, bednet coverage was far from universal, with one third of households not owning any nets and an overall mean of one bednet every three persons. The number of treated nets was even lower, ranging from 0.02 ITNs per head in control areas to about 0.05 in Free and MF villages. Despite the low ownership rates in all three arms, the null of equality is rejected at the 5 percent level (p -value = 0.027). Less than 15% of individuals slept under any type of bednet the night before the baseline survey, and less than 3% slept under an ITN, which also did not differ significantly between study arms. On the one hand, reports about bednets used the night before the interview are unlikely to suffer from significant recall bias. On the other hand, the baseline survey was completed during the hot and dry season, when mosquitoes are less of a nuisance and malaria risk is lower.⁹ For this reason, we also asked about bednet use in periods of high mosquito activity. During such periods, more than half of the members were reported as sleeping “regularly” under a bednet. Note, however, that the vast majority of nets in the area were not treated with insecticide, so that even during the mosquito season the protective power of the available nets remained suboptimal. In Figure 2 we show that usage rates are not identical for different ages and genders, although the differences are relatively limited. On average, U5 children appear to be most likely to be protected by nets, while we find a dip in net usage among teenagers. Women 15 to 30 years old are more likely to use nets than men of the same age, while the sign of the difference is usually reversed for older adults. In any case the vertical distance between gender-specific lines rarely increases beyond 3-4 percentage points.

The results of the blood tests are reported in the bottom rows of Table 1. Twelve percent of tested individuals tested positive for malaria, in almost all cases its most severe form, caused by *P. falciparum*. Almost half of the tested individuals have anemia, although there is significant heterogeneity by age and gender in its prevalence (see Figure 3). Approximately 80% of tested U5, of either gender, are anemic. Anemia rates decline significantly among adults aged 15 to 45, but prevalence remains extremely high (60%) among women, while it is less than 12% among men. The prevalence increases again among older adults, where it characterizes about three-quarters of women and one quarter of men. These patterns for anemia for different ages and genders are common in developing countries (see for instance Thomas et al. 2006). The prevalence of malaria is more balanced between genders and age groups, although women are 3 percentage points more likely to test positive for the parasite (and the difference is significant at the 5% level). Overall, these statistics document the overall poor health status of the study population, and they are consistent with large potential health gains from a reduction in the malaria burden.

2.2 The Intervention

The 141 study villages were revisited in September-October 2007, when our field team carried out an information campaign (IC) largely common to all study villages. The IC was carried out publicly, after all BISWA members in a village had been invited. It included a brief presentation about malaria, the means

⁹Our study did not measure mosquito activity, but the seasonality of malaria transmission is well known and confirmed by studies conducted in neighboring areas (Sahu et al. 2003, Sharma et al. 2006).

by which it is transmitted and the importance and rationale for ITN use, a demonstration of how to hang nets properly, and advice on proper use and re-treatment.¹⁰ The only difference in the IC across experimental arms was that in treatment communities it included an explanation of the intervention assigned to the village. In the 47 “Free” villages, all households with at least one BISWA member (regardless of whether they were included in our baseline sample) received a number of free nets as a function of family composition, with a maximum of four. The nets were treated with insecticide on the spot by trained personnel, following rules recommended by the World Health Organization ([World Health Organization 2002](#)).¹¹ Individuals were also informed that our team would return after six months to re-treat the nets at no cost. Treatment was completed with a chemical concentration that made re-treatment optimal after six months, using K-Othrine flow, which contains deltamethrin, a highly effective pyrethroid.¹²

In the 47 “MF” communities, ITNs were offered through micro-loan contracts and, like in Free communities, only BISWA clients were targeted. ITNs could also be purchased for cash, but this option was chosen in only a handful of cases. The micro-consumer loans were offered by BISWA separately and in addition to any other loan already outstanding. There was no movement of funds at the time the loan was initiated: if a household decided to purchase one or more ITNs, the nets were delivered and repayment was scheduled to be completed within one year (see below). At the time of delivery, nets were treated identically to that described above for free distribution villages, but the IC also included a detailed explanation of the loan contracts. ITN distribution and recording of loan contracts were to be completed 2-3 days after the IC.¹³ The time interval between the IC and the purchase decision was introduced to ensure that the households had an opportunity to consider the offer carefully. A second visit was conducted approximately one month later, where ITNs were offered again with the same contracts. No ITNs were offered after this second visit. The program ITNs were of very good quality and significantly sturdier than most of the pre-existing nets in the study areas.¹⁴ During both village visits, detailed records were taken regarding attendance and ITN uptake by households included in the baseline survey, together with summary statistics about ITN

¹⁰The script of the IC is available upon request from the authors.

¹¹While wearing gloves, the field worker dipped the washed net into a bucket where water had been mixed with the appropriate quantity of insecticide. After being soaked for a few minutes, the net is removed from the bucket and is laid flat on a plastic sheet or mat in the shade to dry. The concentration of the insecticide was determined based on the manufacturer’s instructions: 10 ml of insecticide to 500 ml of water for single nets and 15 ml-750 ml for double nets.

¹²Pyrethroids have been widely used for bednet impregnation with encouraging evidence about the lack of side-effects on human health ([World Health Organization 2005](#)). In Orissa, synthetic pyrethroids have been in use since 1999, and tests performed in 2002-03 in several districts (including our study districts Balangir, Kandhamal and Keonjhar) showed high rates of susceptibility to deltamethrin of *Anopheles culicifacies* and *A. fluviatilis*, the two most common malaria vectors in the state ([Sharma et al. 2004](#)). The insecticidal efficacy of deltamethrin compound has also been confirmed in Sundargarh, which borders the study district Sambalpur ([Yadav et al. 2001](#), [Sharma et al. 2006](#)).

¹³In reality, loan management was not carried out uniformly across the study areas by BISWA personnel. In some locations, especially in Bargarh and Balangir, BISWA officers were less careful, to the extent that in some cases our field team played a central role in loan management and repayment.

¹⁴ITNs were composed of white polyester multifilament, mesh size 156, and 75 denier. The nets have bottom reinforcement of 28 cm, and single nets are 180×150×100 cm; double nets are 180×150×160 cm. The nets have been supplied by Biotech International Limited. A total of 6,750 single and 3,250 double nets have been supplied, of which Biotech generously donated 5,000 single and 2,500 double nets.

distribution at the community level (comparable data were also recorded in villages with free distribution).

ITNs were offered for sale with two alternative loan contracts, both at BISWA's standard interest rate, 20% per year. With the first offer (contract "C1"), single sized ITNs were sold on credit for Rs 173, double sized ITNs for Rs 223, and repaid with twelve monthly installments of Rs 16 (single) or Rs 21 (double). Households were informed that survey personnel would re-visit the villages after six and twelve months and offer re-treatment for Rs 15 (single) or Rs 18 (double). With the second contract ("C2"), the household purchased not only the ITN but also a sequence of two re-treatments. In this case, the price was Rs 203 (single) or Rs 259 (double), to be paid as twelve monthly installments of Rs 19 (single) or Rs 23 (double). With the second option, no cash payment was required for re-treatment as the loan amount already included the price of the insecticide. To put these prices in perspective, at the time of the intervention, daily wages for agricultural labor were around Rs 50, and the price of one kilogram of rice was approximately Rs 10. For sample households, we recorded separately the number and size of the nets received and the contract chosen for the purchase of each net.

BISWA's microcredit operations are based on group lending. Loans, which require no collateral, are offered to borrowers organized in self-help groups (SHGs), who share the responsibility among members for repayment. The 141 baseline communities hosted a total of 502 SHGs, formed by an average of 12.3 individuals. The number of SHGs per village ranged from one (in about 40% of the communities) to 33 (in one village), with 80% of villages containing no more than four SHGs. Each SHG member is responsible for the repayment of all loans granted to the group, which diffuses responsibility to all group members and according to BISWA has been remarkably successful at ensuring timely repayment. Default is only determined at the end of the loan period, so BISWA clients are allowed some flexibility in the repayment schedule. For instance, a borrower may miss a few monthly repayments during the "lean" agricultural season, and pay current and past dues after the harvest; early repayments are also allowed.

2.3 Post-intervention Data and Attrition

Our project team re-visited MF and Free villages in March-April 2008 and in September-October of the same year for the re-treatment of the bednets, which was completed by study personnel in a central location within villages. In Free villages, the service was provided free of cost. Re-treatment was also without additional cost in MF villages for those households which had purchased ITNs with the C2 contract, whose price included both the ITN and two re-treatments. Those who purchased ITNs using the C1 contract type (which did not include pre-purchased re-treatments) were offered re-treatment for cash. At the time of the first re-treatment, a short questionnaire was completed, with detailed records of re-treatment choices and summary information about bednet ownership and usage. Finally, at the time of the second re-treatment, we only recorded re-treatment choices and, in MF villages, information about loan repayment up to that point.

A detailed post-intervention survey was conducted shortly after the second re-treatment, between December 2008 and April 2009. The content of the survey instrument was similar to the baseline questionnaire and again measured ITN ownership and usage, and health status. Malaria prevalence and hemoglobin lev-

els were measured by similar methodology to the baseline survey. A longitudinal data set was created by re-contacting all baseline households whenever possible. We also increased the number of biomarkers collected by attempting to test all household members for malaria and hemoglobin, rather than for specific demographic groups as was done at baseline.¹⁵

Attrition at follow-up was limited and mostly due to temporary migration or inability to find eligible respondents despite repeated visits.¹⁶ Of the 1,844 initial households, 1,768 (96%) were re-interviewed, and the null of equal attrition rates among arms is not rejected at standard levels (see Appendix A.2 for details).¹⁷

3 Results

Before describing the results of the intervention, we lay out the basic notation that will be maintained throughout the rest of the paper. First, the village-specific experimental arm relevant for unit i (household or individual) is described by the binary variables $Free_i$ ($= 1$ if the unit lives in a village where ITNs were distributed free of cost) and MF_i (in villages where ITNs were offered for sale on credit). The index t denotes time and indicates when the relevant variable was recorded. We use the following time subscripts: $t = b$ denotes baseline (spring 2007), while $t = d$ for data gathered during ITN distribution (fall 2007), and finally $t = p$ for the final post-intervention survey. Unless noted otherwise, all regressions results describe intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates. In other words, we focus on post-intervention differences in outcomes between experimental arms, regardless of actual program uptake. All statistical inference is conducted with tests and standard errors robust to the presence of intra-village correlation of residuals.

3.1 Bednets uptake and Ownership

We first evaluate the impact of the intervention on ITN uptake, measured at $t = d$, in fall 2007. Because no distribution took place in control areas, we estimate the following model using only information from the 1,199 panel households residing in the 94 Free and MF villages:

$$y_{id} = \beta_{Free}Free_i + \beta_{MF}MF_i + u_{id}, \tag{1}$$

¹⁵In addition, we also significantly enlarged the sample by including households not interviewed at baseline. First, 10 new households were randomly surveyed from each of the 141 baseline communities. Finally, an additional 25 villages were included in the study, and 15 households were selected from each of these communities. The new villages were selected from the same randomly sorted lists used for the selection of the communities at baseline, by selecting the “next 25 villages” from the list. All these non-baseline households were drawn from census lists regardless of BISWA affiliation, so that both BISWA and non-BISWA households are included. Information from the enlarged sample is not used in this paper and will be used in a separate study.

¹⁶The survey protocol called for at least three attempts, but a handful of households were re-contacted after 4 or 5 visits. Refusals accounted for only 13 of the 76 lost households.

¹⁷We also investigated changes in the demographic structure of the households located both at baseline and follow-up. We find little evidence that such changes were associated to the interventions in ways that could potentially matter for the interpretation of the results (see Appendix A.2 for details).

where y_{id} is a measure of net uptake for household i at the time of the intervention d .¹⁸ We estimate all regressions with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), clustering standard errors at the community level. The results are displayed in columns 1-4 of Table 2. In communities with free distribution, almost all sample households (96%) received at least one ITN, with an average of 2.7 nets per household, about one every two people. Of the 610 sample households in Free villages, only 25 did not receive any nets, in 22 cases because our field teams could not locate any member at the time of the delivery. In MF villages, ITN acquisition was significantly lower, with 309 of 589 (52%) of households purchasing at least one ITN (1.2 nets per household, or one ITN every four people). Almost all buyers chose to purchase on credit, with only ten households choosing to pay in cash. The null of equality in ITN uptake between Free and MF communities is rejected at any standard significance level. Still, it is remarkable that 52% of sample households purchased one or more ITNs, despite their non-trivial cost. Among buyers in MF villages, mean uptake (2.3 ITNs per household) was close to that achieved with free distribution (2.8), although the difference is significant at the 10% level. The high uptake of ITNs purchased on credit contrast sharply with the very low purchase rates for health products documented among poor households in [Agha et al. \(2007\)](#), [Ashraf et al. \(2010\)](#), [Cohen and Dupas \(2010\)](#), [Kremer and Miguel \(2007\)](#) and [Kremer et al. \(2009\)](#).

In Table 3, we look at correlates of ITN purchase among households in MF villages. The results are from a Linear Probability Model where the binary dependent variable = 1 if the household purchased at least one ITN (marginal effects calculated from a probit model are almost identical). These results are obviously to be interpreted as descriptive and do not necessarily imply causal associations between the predictors and the decision to purchase. All covariates were recorded in the baseline survey which, as a reminder, was carried out 4-5 months before the net sales. Regressors include measures of expenditure, indebtedness with the micro-lender BISWA, demographic structure, ownership and usage of nets, proxies for risk aversion and time preferences, perceived protective power of nets, and measures of past exposure to malaria (see the table caption for additional details). To reduce the influence of outliers, variables in Rupees are transformed either into logarithmic values or, if zeros are present, using the quartic root, which has a shape similar to the logarithm for positive numbers ([Thomas et al. 2006](#)). The study design does not allow us to estimate price elasticities, because the same products were offered at the same conditions in all communities. We omit some of the estimated coefficients from Table 3 for brevity, but none of the non-reported slopes (listed in the table caption) are significant at standard levels.

Most of the predictors are not statistically significant at standard levels, and overall the model explains only 11% of the variance of purchase decisions. Demographic structure and head characteristics are not significant, either individually or jointly (p-value= 0.6276). In particular, presence of U5s does not increase the probability of purchase. Richer households (defined by higher monthly total expenditure per head) are *less* likely to purchase ITNs, despite controlling for ownership and usage of pre-existing nets: a 10% increase in per capita expenditure predicts a 1.2% decrease in the probability of purchase, and the slope is significant at the 5% level. This could be because poorer households may have found the opportunity to purchase ITNs on credit more appealing. Also interesting is that usage of nets the night before the interview is one of the strongest predictors of purchase: conditional on other covariates, households where

¹⁸The results are almost identical if we also include non-panel households that were not re-interviewed after the intervention.

everyone used a net were 21 percentage points *more* likely to purchase nets relative to others where no one did. This is consistent with bednets being an experience good, with earlier usage perhaps associated with higher perceived benefits (Dupas 2010).

An increase in the monetary cost of malaria episodes in the 6 months before the baseline interview from 0 to the median value in MF villages increases demand by 9 percentage points ($0.019 \times 590^{1/4}$). Malaria-related deaths in the previous five years increase the predicted probability of purchase by 10 percentage points. However, deaths were rare (only nine respondents reported any) and the coefficient is not significant. Like in Cohen and Dupas (2010), we find that anemia levels are not correlated with demand. However, both self-reported malaria episodes and prevalence as measured by our blood tests are among the strongest predictors. Moving from a household with no self-reported past malaria cases in the previous six months to one where every member had been sick increases the probability of purchase by 27 percentage points. Similarly, an increase from 0 to 100% in the fraction of blood tests positive for malaria predicts a 20 percentage points increase, and both coefficients are significant at the 1% level.¹⁹ Overall, these results strongly suggest that measures of past exposure to malaria are strongly associated with the decision to purchase.

While there was little variation in household uptake rates in Free villages, in MF villages there was significant heterogeneity (see Figure 4). The distribution of the mean number of ITNs delivered for free to sample households is very concentrated around the mean. Most of the variation is due to differences in household composition or (in rare cases) to the absence of household members during the visit. The sale of ITNs on credit led instead not only to a lower mean but also to more variation, with no purchases in five of the 47 villages. Two outliers among the MF communities were villages where a large number of households decided to purchase many ITNs for resale. If we omit these two communities from the analysis, uptake in MF areas declines from 0.24 to 0.2 ITNs per person (results not shown).

Next, we turn to the assessment of bednet ownership at the time of the post-intervention household survey, completed in winter 2008-09, that is, about one and a half years after the intervention. We report ITT estimates where the dependent variable y_{ip} is the number of bednets owned by the household, regardless of acquisition mode or treatment status, either in total (column 5 of Table 2) or per person (column 6). Net ownership was reported by the respondent, but enumerators were instructed to ask permission to check that the net was present with the household. The presence of the net was confirmed in about 90% of cases so that the estimates are likely to be only marginally affected by reporting errors (see also Section 4.3). The model is then

$$y_{ip} = \beta_0 + \beta_{Free}Free_i + \beta_{MF}MF_i + u_{ip}, \quad (2)$$

where $\hat{\beta}_{Free}$ and $\hat{\beta}_{MF}$ are the estimated differences in net ownership at follow-up relative to control villages. In columns 7 and 8, we also report difference-in-differences (DD) estimates where the dependent variable is the change in net ownership between pre and post-intervention surveys. In this case, the estimated

¹⁹Recall that self-reported malaria cases were recorded for all members with a six-month recall period, while blood was drawn only from a subset of them at the time of the baseline survey. The two measures of malaria exposure are therefore not comparable.

regression is then:

$$y_{ip} - y_{ib} = \beta_0 + \beta_{Free}Free_i + \beta_{MF}MF_i + u_{ip}, \quad (3)$$

where ownership is either at the household level or on a per capita base. As expected, given that net ownership at baseline was overall balanced across treatment arms (see Table 1), the impacts estimated with models (2) and (3) are very similar, although they are more precise in the latter models.

The relative magnitude of the estimated coefficients is consistent with the uptake results described earlier. The sale of ITNs on credit was successful in increasing ownership rates, although less than with free distribution. Even in control communities, we observed a small but statistically significant increase of 0.07 nets per person, while the increase was 0.18 in MF villages and 0.35 with free distribution. The very small increase in net ownership in control areas provides suggestive evidence that the short information campaign likely did not change behavior substantially. Free distribution led to a coverage of 0.63 nets per person, which is close to the figure of 2/3 of nets per person which has been taken to represent full coverage in some contexts (see for instance [ter Kuile et al. 2003](#)). However, we also find evidence that the increase in net ownership was much lower than the number of nets delivered during the intervention; on average, households received 2.7 nets in Free villages, but post-intervention net ownership was only 1.9 higher than at baseline, and 1.6 higher than in control areas (column 7). Similarly, in MF communities, an average of 1.2 nets per household were purchased, but at follow-up the difference in ownership relative to controls was only 0.6. These findings are consistent both with the new nets not being retained, or with older nets being disposed of, a point we will return to later in the paper.

3.2 Bednet Usage

Next, we move to the analysis of bednet usage among panel households. We re-estimated models (2) and (3) using respondent’s reports about individual bednet usage as the dependent variable. Both at baseline and follow-up, we recorded whether each household member had slept under a bednet the night before the interview, and whether the net had been treated in the previous six months. We also asked about bednet usage during the peak mosquito season, but in this case the distinction between treated and untreated nets was made only at follow-up, so for this outcome we estimate only model (2). The results are shown in Table 4. Estimates of model (2) are obtained using all household members at follow-up. By construction, the DD estimates (model 3) use only information about bednet usage for individuals who were household members at both time periods, and this explains the smaller sample sizes for these regressions.

The results, in Table 4, are largely consistent with the ownership patterns in Table 2: net usage in MF villages is significantly higher than in control areas, but remains significantly lower than that achieved with free distribution (column 1). The difference in usage of “any net” or ITNs between MF and Free villages is always significant at the 1% level. In control areas, at follow-up 18% of individuals slept under a net the night before the interview (column 1), but only 2% slept under a treated net (column 3). The DD estimates in column 4 show virtually no increase in the usage of ITNs relative to baseline in control villages. In MF villages, we find instead a 13 percentage points increase in ITN usage relative to baseline. The increase is even larger (46 percentage points) with free distribution. The estimated impacts are overall

very similar when we use only information from the follow-up.

An interesting finding is that the newly available ITNs appear to have displaced non-treated nets, especially in areas with free distribution. The figures in column 6 show that usage rates of untreated nets increased by 5 percentage points in control areas and barely changed in MF villages, while the fraction of users *decreased* by about three percentage points in Free communities. These overall patterns are confirmed when we look at “regular usage” during the peak mosquito season although, as expected, reports indicate significantly higher usage in this case. In control areas, 66% of individuals are reported as using nets regularly (column 7), but only 6% use ITNs (column 9). In MF villages these proportions increase to 83 and 36%, and with free distribution they reach 93% (that is, almost complete coverage) and 77%. Once again, the results for untreated nets suggest replacement of older, untreated nets with new ITNs (column 10). The fraction of individuals sleeping regularly under an untreated net is 0.59 in control areas, 0.47 in MF areas and only 0.15 in Free villages. These findings are also consistent with the observation, discussed earlier, that the increase in the number of nets between pre and post-intervention surveys was significantly smaller than the number of nets distributed during the program. Most likely, some of the new ITNs were given away or lost, while a number of them replaced lower-quality, previously owned ones, although we did not directly measure this.

A related question is whether the newly acquired bednets were disproportionately allocated to specific demographic categories. In Figure 2, we have shown that usage rates at baseline were higher among very young children but were otherwise relatively homogeneous. In Figure 5, we show changes in the fraction of household members who slept protected by an ITN the night before the interview, by gender, age group and experimental arm. A first conclusion that emerges is that the changes are overall very similar between genders (compare graphs A and B).²⁰ Second, increases in usage rates are larger for younger individuals. This is especially true in Free areas, where usage for both genders goes up by about 60 percentage points among U5, but only by half as much among members over 60 years old. Third, although the increase in usage rates is significantly larger with Free provision, both the age gradient and the similarity between genders are observed regardless of whether the nets were acquired for free or on credit. Hence, we find no evidence that the allocation of available ITNs depended significantly on the mode of acquisition (see Hoffmann 2009 for an opposite result).

3.2.1 ITN Usage Related to Cost

The design of our study also allows us to look, to some extent, at the relationship between the price paid and the use of ITNs. A number of development practitioners hold the view that usage, conditional on ownership, may be lower when there is no cost sharing. There are three main motivations why users who have paid a positive cost may be more likely to use the product than with free provision: first, cost-sharing naturally implies self-selection into purchase, so that individuals who care more about the product are more likely to be willing to pay for it and hence to use it; second, positive prices may be interpreted as quality signals; third, the so-called “sunk-cost fallacy” may lead individuals to use a purchased product relative to

²⁰In no case the null of equal changes between genders can be rejected at standard levels (results available upon request).

a free one because they want to rationalize ex-post the purchase. Two recent RCTs have questioned these arguments; [Ashraf et al. \(2010\)](#) addressed the provision of chlorine in Zambia, and [Cohen and Dupas \(2010\)](#) study the case of ITNs in Kenya. Both studies use a two-stage randomization design. In a first-stage, the willingness to pay is revealed through actual sales at randomly determined prices. In the second stage, a randomized discount implies that individuals with the same revealed willingness to pay actually pay a different price.

Our study, lacking such two-stage randomization, is not ideally designed to study the link between ITN cost and usage. However, we show below that in our sample we found *higher* usage rates, conditional on ownership, when ITNs were received at no cost. In our sample, the net effect of self-selection, quality signalling and sunk-cost effect was thus not consistent with the hypothesis that free products are used less than purchased ones. One limitation of our results is that, like in [Cohen and Dupas \(2010\)](#), although ownership was confirmed by direct observations of the nets in the field, bednet usage was self-reported. Free provision of ITNs may have led to overstated usage rates, perhaps because of gratitude, or because beneficiaries were afraid of losing the nets if sparsely used. To reduce the risk of reporting bias, we count a net as having been used the night before only if the net was seen by field staff during the follow-up survey, and identified by them as one of the nets distributed through our program. In a large majority of cases, enumerators were able to verify the presence of the nets (see Section 4.3). The likely extent of reporting bias is further reduced by the fact that previous-night usage was very similar when estimated independently from two separate sections of the survey instrument, see Section 4.3.

For each household, we calculate the ratio between the number of utilized BISWA nets measured as described above, and the number of BISWA nets delivered to the household.²¹ The top panel of Figure 6 shows estimates of usage rates of ITNs delivered through our program in Free and MF villages, as a function of the number of nets delivered to the household in fall 2007. The bottom panel shows estimates of the difference in usage rates between MF and Free villages, together with 95% confidence intervals. The results show no evidence that paying a positive price increases usage, consistent with the findings in [Ashraf et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Cohen and Dupas \(2010\)](#). However, our results differ from these earlier contributions because the fraction of nets in use was actually 16-31 percentage points *higher* in free communities, and the null of equality is always rejected at the 5% level. Barring systematic over-reporting of usage of ITNs received for free, this unexpected finding could perhaps arise from social interaction effects such as imitation or social norms facilitated by the higher overall ownership rates in Free villages. Probing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an important area of future research, since it suggests another channel through which externalities may occur (in addition to the infection externalities discussed later).

3.3 The Decision to Re-treat

Periodic re-treatment with insecticide is known to increase significantly the protective power of bednets. Although several public health programs worldwide are advocating the use of long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) which do not require re-treatment, in many locations the supply of LLINs is still limited. Regular

²¹The results are similar if we use, as denominator, the number of BISWA nets present in the household's dwelling during the follow-up visit, or if we estimate usage rates for all BISWA nets, regardless of whether the net was actually observed.

ITNs were the standard type of treated bednet in our study areas at the time of the intervention, but re-treatment of ITNs has been uncommon (see Section 2.1.1).

In Free and MF villages, our team conducted two re-treatment campaigns approximately six and twelve months after ITN delivery, as recommended based on the type and concentration of the insecticide. In villages with free distribution of nets, the re-treatment was offered free of charge. In MF villages, whether re-treatment was offered for cash or at no additional cost depended on the contract chosen by net buyers. As a reminder, BISWA offered all microfinance clients the opportunity to purchase nets through two alternative contracts. The first contract included only the treated net (contract “C1”), while the second was a bundle which also included a sequence of two re-treatments (contract “C2”). Contract C2 can therefore be seen as one which financially “commits” the buyer to comply with future re-treatments. Clients could also choose a mix of contracts, but among the 309 households (of 589) who purchased ITNs, only 19 of them (6%) did.²² Among the 290 clients who purchased nets with only one type of contract, the choice was almost exactly evenly split, with 144 choosing C1 and 146 choosing the “commitment product” C2.

During re-treatment campaigns, no additional payment was required if nets had been purchased with C2, but owners of C1 nets had to pay cash in order to obtain re-treatment. Fees were Rs 15 for a single net and Rs 18 for a double. Table 5 shows the re-treatment rates in Free villages relative to those observed among buyers in MF communities, shown separately as a function of the contract chosen. The sample comprises all panel households that received ITNs during the intervention, excluding the handful in MF communities who purchased ITNs with both contract types. After six months, 92% of free nets were re-treated (column 1), but the proportion of treated nets decreased to 83% at the second re-treatment campaign (column 3). Both re-treatment rates were thus very high, although not universal.²³

As expected, re-treatment rates were also high among households who purchased the commitment product C2 in MF communities, although the rates are 8-9 percentage points lower. Remarkable differences emerge instead relative to re-treatment rates among buyers who chose contract C1. During the first re-visit, only 36% of nets purchased with C1 were re-treated, with the fraction declining to 21% during the second re-visit. The difference in re-treatment relative to the mean observed in Free villages, as well as relative to C2, are statistically significant at all conventional levels. Overall, then, we find a very strong association between re-treatment rates and pre-commitment to re-treat. These results, however, do not necessarily identify a causal association between contract type and probability of re-treatment, because households chose the contract, so that contract type is endogenous. This is also confirmed by results from a linear probability model where we regress a binary variable equal to one if a buyer household in a MF village purchased at least one net with the commitment product C2 on the same set of covariates we used to explain purchase decisions in Table 3 (the results are available upon request). In fact, several demographic characteristics and measures of past malaria exposure are statistically significant predictors of contract

²²Seven of the 13 were from one of the two “outlier” villages where a large number of nets were purchased with the purpose of resale.

²³A sizeable fraction of the shortfall was accounted for by nets being no longer with the household. Re-treatment rates increase to 94 and 91% in the first and second re-visit if we exclude households where at least one net was reported as having been sold, stolen, lost or otherwise not available for re-treatment. Whether the ITN is still with the households is, however, likely to be endogenous and we do not report these results in the table.

choice.²⁴ However, we find that the estimated differences in re-treatment rates are overall similar once we include in the regressions all these other correlates (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 5).

Overall, re-treatment rates were very high when offered for free. The fraction of nets with insecticidal capability should have therefore remained very high over time, increasing the protective power of nets. In MF communities, on the other hand, not only were significantly fewer ITNs distributed, but the fraction re-treated was also lower, largely due to the low re-treatment rates among households who chose the non-commitment product C1. The results, albeit nonexperimental, suggest that there is some scope for improving compliance with prescribed behaviors by designing protocols that “commit” households in a financial sense to a particular course of action. This is consistent with similar findings regarding savings behaviors in developing and developed country contexts (Bryan et al. 2010).²⁵

3.4 Impact on Health Outcomes

Next, we finally move to the main outcomes of interest, that is, the measures of hemoglobin levels (Hb) and malaria infection detected through finger-prick blood rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). Our prior hypothesis was that the considerable increase in ITN ownership rates would have led to significant improvements in health outcomes, especially in areas with free distribution. Unfortunately, we will show that such improvements did not take place.

As a reminder, at baseline the population targeted for testing comprised pregnant women, all U5s as well as their mothers, and a randomly selected adult (age 15-60). In the post-intervention survey, the availability of additional funding allowed us to include all household members in the target population. Overall, blood testing at follow-up was performed on 75% of panel household members, while 19% were not tested because they were not present during the visits, and 6% refused. In Appendix A.3 we show that both refusal and absence were balanced across experimental arms, and that testing success was significantly higher (~90%) for U5s and women 15-45. Adult men were the least likely to be tested, mostly because they were most likely to be at work during the survey.

The ITT estimates of the program impact on malaria prevalence and anemia are reported in Table 6. We look at three different outcomes. First, malaria prevalence as measured by a binary variable equal to one if the RDT indicated current infection with *Plasmodium*.²⁶ Second, Hb levels, measured in grams per deciliter of blood. Third, the prevalence of anemia, defined as $Hb < 11g/dl$. We estimated these impacts using two alternative samples. The first included all blood tests completed at follow-up, regardless of whether the individual had been tested at baseline, giving a sample of 7,154 individuals tested for malaria

²⁴This result is opposite to what found in Tarozzi et al. (2009) using the same data: such earlier work focused on a much shorter list of correlates and in that case we could not reject the null that contract choice was uncorrelated with household characteristics.

²⁵Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) exploit the features of the contracts, along with information on time preferences and beliefs about future health events, to identify time-inconsistent preferences in the context of a dynamic discrete choice model with hyperbolic discounting.

²⁶The tests could also distinguish to some extent the *Plasmodium* species, but because *P. falciparum* was responsible for almost all infections, we simply model malaria using a binary format.

and 7,149 for Hb levels.²⁷ Next, we show DD estimates using, by construction, only information from individuals tested in both surveys, giving a sample of 1,896 observations for malaria and 1,869 for Hb levels.²⁸ All regressions were then estimated using individuals as the unit of observations, but the standard errors are as usual clustered at the village level.

Among all individuals tested at follow-up in control areas, 18.3% tested positive for malaria. Prevalence was 22.7% and 22% in Free and MF communities respectively. Malaria prevalence is therefore about 20% *higher* in intervention communities, although the null of no difference between each intervention arm and control areas cannot be rejected at standard levels.²⁹ Because of the positive point estimates and the relatively tight standard errors, we can also reject the null hypothesis of large reduction in malaria prevalence in intervention relative to control areas. The lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for β_{Free} is -0.022 , which corresponds to a 12% reduction in malaria prevalence relative to control areas. Similarly, the corresponding lower bound for β_{MF} (-0.026) would imply a 14% lower prevalence than in control villages. Many earlier RCTs evaluating the impacts of ITN adoption found reductions in prevalence substantially larger than these lower bounds (see [Lengeler 2004](#), Appendix 8 and 9).

The DD estimates are similar to the results in levels. Relative to baseline, malaria prevalence in control areas increased by 6.3 percentage points (from a baseline of 0.11, see Table 1). When we calculate mean changes in malaria prevalence within villages, we find that prevalence declined in only 11 of 47 control, 9 of 47 Free and 8 of 47 MF villages, while we observe increases in prevalence in 20 control, 27 Free and 30 MF communities, and no change in the remaining locations. The overall increase in prevalence was not unexpected, because the baseline survey was completed during the hot and dry months of spring, when malaria prevalence is lower, and the follow-up survey during winter, when malaria prevalence is generally higher in our study districts. However, consistent with the follow-up only estimates, the null of equal change in intervention areas cannot be rejected at standard levels, although the estimated increase in prevalence in intervention areas was about twice as large as in control villages. This was most surprising for areas where ITNs were distributed free of cost, where we have documented very large increases in ITN ownership and (self-reported) usage, as well as very high rates of net re-treatment.

Looking now at hemoglobin levels, when we use all follow-up data, Hb levels were on average 11.4 g/dl in control and Free villages, and 11.5 in MF communities. The estimated impacts are therefore close to zero and not significant at standard levels (column 3). The DD estimates are the only instance where we find some evidence of positive impacts of the intervention, although only in Free villages: mean Hb increased by 0.28 g/dl in control areas, 0.32 in MF and 0.50 in Free villages. The DD between Free and control areas is significant at the 5% level, although its magnitude is small and just above 10% of a (baseline)

²⁷Consent was sought to test all individuals for both malaria infection and Hb. Both tests were completed for 7,138 individuals, while we have valid data for malaria only for 16 individuals, and for Hb only for 11.

²⁸The ITT estimates that include all tests from individuals that were already part of the household at baseline are almost identical to those with the full sample.

²⁹Given that ITN ownership and usage are significantly higher in Free and MF villages relative to controls, these results also lead to a *positive* association between malaria prevalence and ITN usage or ownership, when we estimate the relationship with instrumental variables, using treatment status as instrument (results available upon request).

standard deviation.³⁰ When we look at anemia prevalence, we find that it was 38.4% in control areas, 39.4% in Free and 38.9% in MF villages (column 5). Anemia prevalence was then close to identical across experimental arms, and the differences are never significant at standard levels. Consistent with the increase in mean Hb, the DD estimates show that anemia prevalence decreased by 11.1 percentage points in control areas (column 6). This was a large decline ($\sim 20\%$ relative to baseline levels), and is significant at the 1% level. In Free communities, we find a 2.4 percentage points additional decline in anemia relative to control areas, but the difference is not, unlike for Hb, statistically significant. The decline in anemia prevalence was instead smaller in MF villages relative to control areas, although the difference, equal to 3.5%, is not significant. However, the null of equal change in MF and Free communities is rejected at the 10% level.

A key question is whether the lack of health benefits was shared by all demographic groups. The bars in Figure 7 show malaria and anemia prevalence for each experimental arm by gender and age group, together with 95% confidence intervals. Among adult males (age 15 or above), malaria prevalence was $\sim 15\%$ and almost identical across arms (panel A). Among U5s, prevalence was 11% in control villages but about twice as large in intervention communities: 18.4% in Free and 19.8% in MF villages. However, the estimates are imprecise, and the difference relative to control is not significant at standard levels, although the p-values are relatively small (below 0.2).³¹ Prevalence among males is highest among 5-14 boys, where in each arm it is ~ 15 percentage points higher than for younger children, so that the differences among groups are almost identical in the two age groups. These patterns change when we look at females (panel B), although again differences between arms are never significant at standard levels. Among females, we observe almost identical prevalence across arms among the youngest girls ($\sim 15\%$) and higher prevalence in intervention villages in older age groups. In each experimental arm, the highest prevalence is observed among females of age 5 to 59. Overall, these results document remarkable differences in malaria prevalence across sub-groups, but these differences are largely concentrated between genders or across age groups rather than across experimental arms. Consistent with the baseline results, the results for anemia (panels C and D) show large systematic gaps across gender-age groups. In particular, these results confirm the U-shape of anemia prevalence with respect to age for both genders, as well as the significantly higher anemia rates among females 5 and older relative to males of the same age. Like for malaria, however, the differences in anemia prevalence between arms are small and never significant at standard levels.

4 Interpretation and Discussion

Given the published evidence regarding efficacy of ITNs in reducing the malaria burden in a variety of areas and conditions (Lengeler 2004), we expected to observe declines in malaria and anemia prevalence associated with increases in ITN ownership and use in our Free and MF villages. Indeed, one of the primary

³⁰The increase in Hb, despite the overall increase in malaria prevalence, is likely due to better nutrition during the follow-up survey, which was conducted in a period when household income is seasonally higher for many households. In both pre and post-intervention surveys, November and December are the two months which are most frequently indicated by respondents as being associated with the highest seasonal income.

³¹Details of the test statistics are available upon request from the authors.

objectives of our study was to evaluate to what extent a program of ITN sales on credit could replicate the benefits of free distribution. Overall, our results show that micro-loans were partly successful at increasing ITN ownership and usage. Although we found statistically significant increases in ITN ownership and usage in MF villages relative to control areas, the increases remained well below what was achieved with free distribution. Despite this, malaria indices remained similar between MF and Free communities and more surprisingly, such outcomes did not improve relative to control areas. Why did this happen? In this section, we provide evidence against a number of *a priori* plausible hypotheses, and discuss other explanations which we conjecture are likely to be key in explaining the results.

4.1 Changes in Other Prophylactic Behavior

A first hypothesis for why improvements in malaria indices were not seen is that the availability of a larger number of ITNs led to unexpected behavioral responses leading to perverse outcomes. On the one hand, sleeping under an ITN provides a mechanical barrier against mosquito bites: an important reason for the successful reduction in malaria burden in several ITN studies is the late-night biting habits of most anophelines (Pates and Curtis 2005).³² On the other hand, there are other precautions that can be taken to reduce the risk of malaria. Examples are indoor or outdoor wall spraying with insecticide, mosquito coils, or the control of drainage pools. It is possible that the broader availability of ITNs in Free and MF villages reduced the use of such alternative prophylactic measures. We tested this hypothesis using data on knowledge and practices collected during the post-intervention survey.

In Table 7, we look at differences among experimental arms in knowledge about causes of malaria (panel A), precautions taken against it (panel B) and wall spraying (panel C). The survey instrument asked respondents—without prompting—to list all possible causes of malaria, and then asked “[w]hat are the best precautions you can take to protect yourself from getting malaria.” In each arm, 85% or more of respondents list mosquito bites as a cause of malaria. Overall, households in intervention communities appear to be about as knowledgeable regarding causes of malaria as those in control areas, although the test of equality is rejected at the 10% level (but not at the 5%) for three of the four causes of malaria, and although in three of four cases it is one of the experimental arms that suggests the best knowledge. There was no systematic variation in malaria-avoiding behavior among groups (panel B). Bednets are by far the most commonly listed precaution, mentioned by 82-87% of respondents (with the highest proportions in intervention villages). The next two most common precautions are “avoid contaminated environment” (16-21%) and “avoid drinking contaminated water” (5-8%). For all indices, the test of equal means is not rejected at the 5% level, although the joint null of equality for all behaviors is rejected (p -value = 0.0421). However, the differences in alternative risk-avoiding behavior are not consistent with such behavior being more common in control villages, and indeed in several cases they indicate the opposite (for example, use of smoke or long sleeves, or cleaning of drainage pools).

Next, we analyze differences in residual spraying of indoors or outdoor walls (panel C). Spraying, like

³²Although we did not collect information regarding the species, number and feeding patterns of malaria vectors in our study villages, in areas within one of our study districts (Keonjhar), Sahu et al. (2009) found that biting activity of the major local malaria vectors was concentrated in the two middle quarters of the night, regardless of the season.

ITNs, is widely considered an effective tool in the fight against malaria (Mabaso et al. 2004, World Health Organization 2006). In 2008-09, 36% (38%) of respondents reported that spraying of inner (outer) walls had been done since the fall of 2007, when the ITN distribution took place. Although the null hypothesis of equal proportion among treatment groups cannot be rejected at standard levels, the magnitude of the differences between control and intervention areas is large. While 40% of households had the inner walls sprayed after 2007 in control areas, 37% did in Free villages and the fraction declines to 30% in MF communities. The proportions who had the outer walls sprayed in the three groups were respectively 53, 48 and 44%. The reason why the null is not rejected despite the large differences is that the intra-village correlation for these two variables is very large (0.41 and 0.63 for inner and outer spraying respectively). Our data do not tell us if these differences were driven by household decisions, or if instead they resulted from choices made by public health officials who may have scheduled wall spraying taking into account our intervention. To evaluate whether differences in spraying rates help explain the lack of health benefits in intervention villages, we re-estimate the ITT models in Table 6 including dummies for recent wall spraying among the regressors. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 we show that this leaves the estimated impacts almost identical. Overall, then, we find no evidence that our results are due to changes in household risk-coping behavior.

Similarly, the lack of effect on malaria or anemia prevalence cannot be explained by the presence of other ITN distribution programs, possibly sponsored by the Government or by other NGOs. First, the results on net ownership in Table 2, which showed large increases in ITN ownership rates in treatment versus control areas, included nets from all sources. Second, the figures in panel D of Table 7 confirm that the number of nets received from other sources was very small and not significantly different across all arms. As expected, given the supply of BISWA ITNs, we also find that fewer nets were purchased from the market in MF and especially Free villages.

4.2 Measurement Error in Malaria Indices

Another possible reason for the lack of observed impact on malaria indices was errors in reading the RDTs. On the one hand, the RDTs we used to detect malaria infection have been shown to have very high sensitivity (the probability of detecting a positive correctly) and specificity (the probability of detecting a negative correctly). On the other hand, the interpretation of RDTs presents a degree of subjectivity that could lead inexperienced readers to make errors: the RDT result is read on a test strip, located on a card, where a reagent is added to the blood sample. The presence of *Plasmodium* antigens (histidine-rich protein 2, or HRP2) in the blood is signaled by the appearance of darker lines on the white strip. Although high concurrency between test readers (including non-trained ones) has been documented in clinical trials of the Binax RDT (Khairnar et al. 2009), a degree of subjectivity is hard to rule out completely, because the lines can sometimes be difficult to detect when parasitemia is low. At the beginning of the study, the reliability of the RDTs was successfully checked by testing a limited number of blood samples with or without malaria infection, but during the field work RDT results were not confirmed with microscopy, so we cannot gauge directly the nature and extent of measurement error. However, measurement error seems

an unlikely explanation for the lack of health benefits from our program, for a number of reasons.

First, random misclassification of a binary dependent variable leads, by construction, to negative correlation between the error and the true value of the variable. As long as the true and the mis-measured values are positively correlated (as they likely are in our case) this leads to attenuation bias (Hausman et al. 1998, eq. 15).³³ As prevalence tended to be *higher* in treatment areas, misclassification would more likely have led instead to *underestimation* of the differences.

Second, we carried out a small validation study after the conclusion of the follow-up survey (in July 2009) in collaboration with the Malaria Research Centre (MRC) Field Station in Rourkela (Orissa), which confirmed the accuracy of the RDTs. A total of 205 blood samples were independently collected from the MRC team from individuals with malaria symptoms from three villages. The RDT cards were interpreted by three different blinded readers, that is, two of the testers who were part of the field team during our study, and the most senior survey monitor in our research team. These results were then compared with thick and thin blood smears read with microscopy by the MRC team for the same samples, with the smear result accepted as the correct infection status. The results showed very high sensitivity ($> 90\%$ for each of the three readers, see Table A.15 for details). The fraction of correctly identified negatives (specificity) ranged from 74 to 85%. The lower specificity (higher prevalence) measured by the RDTs relative to microscopy was not surprising, given that these tests often detect the presence of the *P. falciparum* antigens up to 2-4 weeks after parasitemia has cleared (Humar et al. 1997). The RDT results were then very similar but not identical between readers (pairwise correlations ranged from 0.78 to 0.88). To check whether systematic differences in the interpretation of the malaria RDT played a role in the results, we re-estimate program impacts using tester fixed effects (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 8). The differences among experimental arms become slightly smaller, but they remain positive and not significant at standard levels.

In addition, we note that if parasitemia was declining in treatment villages over the course of the study, the likelihood of fainter, harder-to-detect test lines may have increased in these areas, possibly *overestimating* the reduction in prevalence. Finally, measurement error was unlikely to be a problem for the Hb testing, which also showed little evidence of differential changes across experimental groups. Even in this case erroneous testing cannot be ruled out entirely, but measuring Hb simply requires reading a number from the display of a HemoCue machine. In addition, the strong cross-sectional correlation between malaria infection status and hemoglobin levels supports the reliability of the malaria RDTs. When we regress Hb on a dummy for a positive malaria test, the slope is significant at a one percent level (slope -0.19 , p-value = 0.000). Overall, we conclude that the lack of a salutary effect on malaria indices observed in our data reflect the reality in our sample, and is not the result of imperfect measurements.

4.3 Reliability of Reporting of ITN Ownership and Usage

An alternative possibility for the lack of impact on malaria indices in intervention villages is that respondents systematically overstated the number of program ITNs retained by the household and/or the usage rates, conditional on ownership. Given that the study design did not call for regular nightly checks on net

³³This is unlike the standard case of classical measurement error in a continuous dependent variable, which only affects the variance of OLS estimates, while retaining consistency.

usage, our data do not allow us to rule out the possibility of low usage rates. However, our data provide strong evidence against a large and systematic over-reporting in the number of ITNs owned.

The ITT estimates of usage rates discussed earlier were obtained using information on bednet usage recorded separately for each individual included in the household roster. However, bednet usage during the previous night, as well as the actual presence of the net with the household, were also recorded independently in a census of sleeping spaces. Surveyors listed all sleeping spaces used by household members (including those outside the dwelling) and recorded the identity of the person(s) who slept there the previous night. The surveyor also recorded whether the space was protected by a net and, in such cases, the origin and price of the net and of any recent re-treatment. Finally, for all nets reported as having been used, surveyors asked to see the net and, if allowed to do so, they recorded whether the net was in good condition, hanging properly, and recognizable as one of those distributed by our program. We can therefore re-estimate the ITT for ITN usage the night before the survey using this alternative source of information.

The results in column 1 of Table 9 show that these alternative ITT estimates of net usage are almost identical to those discussed earlier (compare with column 1 of Table 4). The major difference in the two sets of results is that information from the census of sleeping patterns was only available for about 85% of members, with most missing data due to the temporary absence of the member the previous night. The similarity of the results reflect very strong concordance between the two data sources regarding bednet usage. The correlation between the two independently measured indicators of net usage is 0.94. While it is possible that respondents misreported similarly on both sets of responses, the remarkable degree of consistency across sections makes it unlikely. In addition, such concordance is not simply due to the respondent reporting every household member as either using or not using nets the night before. If that had been the case, it would have been easy for the respondent to mis-report usage and still produce high consistency between the two data sources. Although most of the variation in bednet usage is between and not within households (the intra-household correlation of usage is about 0.75), the correlation between the two separate reports is still very high (0.87) if we use only information from households where there is intra-family variation in usage. Overall, these findings suggest that net usage the night before the survey was accurately measured. Of course, such measures are noisy indicator of consistent bednet usage, and there remains the possibility of systematic over-reports of regular usage during the peak malaria season.

Next, we use information from the census of sleeping patterns to check the actual presence of the bednets mentioned (regardless of reported usage) by the respondent. In a large majority of cases the surveyor was allowed to see the net (column 2): this happened 85% of the times in control areas, and even more frequently in MF (89%) and Free villages (93%). Overall, usage rates of nets observed by the surveyors are only slightly lower relative to the reports unconditional on observation (column 3). Additional evidence that our intervention improved the availability and quality of ITN protection is provided in columns 4 and 5. In control areas, only 4.4% of individuals were using a net in good conditions, that is, a net without sizeable holes or tears. The proportion was 9.3 percentage points higher in MF villages and a remarkable 29.3 percentage points higher in Free communities. This was due to usage of program ITNs, which were of good quality and relatively new. In column 5 we see that virtually no BISWA nets were present in control

areas, which also confirms the absence of cross-arms contamination. In MF villages, 14% of individuals used program ITNs (observed by the enumerator) the night before the survey. This corresponds to about half of all nets seen by the surveyors and reported as having been used the night before in MF villages (the total was $0.144+0.127=27.1\%$, see column 3). In villages with free distribution, 47% of individuals were reported as having used a BISWA net the night before and this accounted for almost all the observed nets used the previous night (the total being $0.144+0.360=50.4\%$).

In addition, the large number of ITNs retained by households is confirmed by the high re-treatment rates, especially in Free villages (see Section 3.3). Finally, only between 2 and 6% of the nets reported as having been used the night before were seen hanging properly within the dwelling. This may have been largely because interviews were done during the day, when nets are usually stored away to avoid being damaged, and to increase living space in what are often small dwellings, and where sleeping and living environments frequently coincide. In the end, our analysis strongly suggest that our program did increase considerably both the availability of ITNs (especially with free distribution) and ITN usage.

4.4 ITN Coverage

The most likely explanation for the lack of impact of our intervention on malaria indices is that even in villages with free distribution, the fraction of sleeping spaces protected by ITNs remained low. Recall that only BISWA clients receive free ITNs or the offer of ITNs for sale on credit. Although BISWA has a large presence in the study area, we estimate that on average only 20% of people live in households with at least one BISWA affiliate and thus were eligible for the study.³⁴ Low coverage rates are common in public health programs that only distribute free ITNs to pregnant women and young children. Such high-risk demographic groups are consensus targets, for instance, according to guidelines of the World Health Organization and the US President’s Malaria Initiative (USAID-CDC 2005, World Health Organization 2007). The targeting of vulnerable groups is justified on the ground that regular usage of an ITN secures some protection to the individual user. On the other hand, it is now accepted that the externalities offered by mass adoption of ITNs are a key factor for ITN efficacy, although the relative role of personal versus mass protection of ITNs is not yet well understood (Hawley et al. 2003, Killeen et al. 2007). Our conjecture is that the increase in ITN ownership and usage rate in study villages was not sufficiently large to dent the cycle of malaria transmission. To probe this hypothesis, we first look at the relationship between village-level coverage and malaria prevalence and, next, we interpret the results in light of the large existing literature on the relationship between ITNs and malaria burden.

As a first step, we estimated village-specific malaria prevalence at follow-up in all intervention communities. We then plot the results against a measure of village-wide ITN coverage calculated as the ratio

³⁴We estimated the fraction using village population from the 2001 census of India, together with estimates of the total number of individuals living in households with at least one BISWA member. Let \hat{s}_v and \hat{b}_v denote respectively average household size and average number of BISWA affiliates in BISWA households in village v , both estimated using baseline survey data. Let also m_v be the number of BISWA members in the village, as provided by the micro-lender. Then, if we denote by p_v the village population from the census, our estimate of the fraction who lives in BISWA households is $\hat{s}_v(m_v/\hat{b}_v)/p_v$.

of the total number of ITNs distributed to BISWA households (regardless of their inclusion in the survey sample) and total village population. For total population, we used village-specific data from the 2001 Indian Census. Although not up-to-date, these are a good proxy for current population, and if anything, in most cases 2001 population would underestimate current population, so that our estimates may overestimate true coverage. The two panels at the top of Figure 8 show the plot of malaria prevalence versus ITN coverage rates. In the two bottom panels we repeat the exercise for the change in prevalence relative to baseline. Each graph also shows the fitted values of two OLS regressions, one where we include data from all villages (the thicker line) and the other where we exclude the very few villages where the ITN coverage ratio was larger than 0.35 (the thinner line with the '+' pattern).

Panel A shows that, in Free villages, there is a *positive* association between malaria prevalence at follow-up and program coverage. When we include all villages, the estimated slope is positive (0.56) and significant (p-value = 0.000). However, when we exclude three outlier villages with coverage > 0.35 the slope decreases to 0.12 and is no longer significant at standard levels (p-value = 0.264). When we look at mean changes in malaria prevalence over time (panel C), the results are similar: the slope is positive and significant with the full sample but it becomes smaller and not significant when we exclude the three outliers. In MF villages (panels B and D), where the relative number of ITNs distributed was even lower, the slope of the regressions are never significant at standard levels and in all but one of the four regression lines they are negative. Because the ITN coverage achieved in MF communities was endogenously determined by household purchase decisions, its association with malaria prevalence (or its change) should not be interpreted as necessarily causal. In communities with free distribution, the number of ITNs delivered was decided by our research team based on household size and composition. This produced variation in ITN coverage resulting only from the distribution of BISWA affiliation and household composition within the community. Even so, BISWA affiliation could be associated with village characteristics related to malaria prevalence, although if we regress malaria prevalence at baseline on ITN coverage the slope is close to zero (0.03) and not significant (p-value = 0.720). The results of the DD regressions in panel C eliminate any possible spurious correlation due to time-invariant (observed or unobserved) village-level characteristics, but we cannot exclude the presence of other unobserved differences in trends correlated with both ITN coverage and malaria prevalence. Despite these caveats, we can at least say that, in our sample, the coverage of the intervention did not appear to be systematically related to either the levels or the changes in malaria prevalence.

The next question is then whether we can reconcile our results with the several earlier RCTs that have documented large reductions in malaria burden following distribution of ITNs. The unique features of our study make comparisons difficult, but these very differences in design likely hold the key to explain the different findings. In particular, in all but one of the 14 cluster RCTs surveyed in [Lengeler \(2004\)](#), the number of ITNs distributed was sufficient to ensure that almost all sleeping spaces were protected by nets in treatment communities. For instance, in the largest of these studies, ITNs were delivered in number sufficient to cover all sleeping spaces in 113 of 221 communities in Kenya ([ter Kuile et al. 2003](#)). In the RCT conducted in Ghana analyzed in [Binka et al. \(1996\)](#), ITNs were supplied in quantities adequate to cover all sleeping spaces in half of 96 communities. [Nevill et al. \(1996\)](#) describes a study where ITNs in

half of 56 zones in Kenya were issues to 96% of beds listed during a census. The one exception among the surveyed articles is [D’Alessandro et al. \(1995\)](#). In this study, re-treatment with permethrin was attempted with all bednets in half of 104 villages in The Gambia, but only $\sim 60\%$ of children under the age of four slept regularly under ITNs. Interestingly, the program was unsuccessful in reducing child mortality in the one stratum (out of five) where coverage and usage rates remained relatively low. Our program never achieved more than 50% coverage and in most cases covered a significantly lower share of the population (Figure 8). The low coverage may have played an important role in the lack of effects on malaria if benefits arise only beyond certain thresholds in coverage. The existence of non-linearities in the coverage-benefits relationship is indeed strongly suggested by studies that documented the existence of large externalities of ITNs. [Gimnig et al. \(2003\)](#) and [Hawley et al. \(2003\)](#) found that the number of *Anopheles* mosquitoes as well as rates of parasitemia, anemia and mortality were significantly lower in children who did not use nets but lived within 300 meters of an intervention village with close-to-full ITN coverage. However, no benefits were seen in compounds near intervention areas where ITN coverage was less than 25%. It is possible that such thresholds are also important for the protection of ITN users, and not only for non-adopters. It must be kept in mind, however, that our data are not suited to test this hypothesis formally. If the threshold lies beyond the range of ITN coverage achieved in our study, even in Free areas, our conjecture is perhaps reasonable but it is still based on an “out-of-sample” prediction.

A better comparison for our study might be the eight additional studies reviewed in [Lengeler \(2004\)](#) where the impact of ITNs was evaluated using a within-community randomization. In such studies, the intra-community coverage rates were low, but large reductions in malaria indices were observed nonetheless. However, these studies involved intense monitoring of net usage and/or health outcomes, including a combinations of nightly surprise visits and frequent (sometimes daily) health checks. Such study design could have induced behavioral responses such as increased compliance with regular ITN usage.³⁵ Conversely, our study involved a brief information campaign in fall 2007 and two rounds of blood tests (at baseline and follow-up) separated by about 18 months, while no permanent structure was in place to ensure continuing compliance with ITN use and to monitor the health status of the study population. To sum up, the lack of health benefits of our intervention are not necessarily in contrast with the large benefits documented by others, but may instead complement them by highlighting the need to examine the relative importance of the two distinct channels (individual usage and externalities) through which malaria reduction occurred in these studies.

5 Limitations and Conclusions

The primary objective of this study was to evaluate whether sale on credit could increase ITN ownership and usage, and in turn decrease the burden of malaria in a poor rural area of Orissa (India) where existing markets and public health interventions have not been successful at ensuring adequate ITN coverage.

³⁵All these eight studies were also carried out within relatively small geographical areas, with the exception of one where the study population was spread across one district.

Across the 47 MF villages, our program succeeded in selling $\sim 1,100$ ITNs on credit to BISWA clients over a few months. The micro-loan program increased ITN ownership substantially relative to control areas, with 52% of sample households purchasing at least one net. This was despite the relatively high price of the ITNs, about 3-5 times the daily agricultural wage in the study area. The increased ownership rates were also associated with large increases in (self-reported) use. At follow up, 16% of individuals were reported as having slept protected by an ITN the night before the survey, compared to only 2% in control areas. Regular usage rates during the peak mosquito season was only 6% in control areas, but it increased to 36% with micro-loans, an increase of over 500%. These purchase rates are substantially higher than those in earlier studies who documented very low cash purchases of health products among poor households, despite heavy subsidization (Ashraf et al. 2010, Cohen and Dupas 2010, Kremer and Miguel 2007 and Kremer et al. 2009). Hence, our work suggests that micro-loans should be considered as a potentially effective tool to increase uptake of health products in poor areas, when free provision is not possible or desirable (although the lack of impacts on malaria indices in our study areas, which we will review below, adds an important warning).

A number of caveats should, however, be taken into account when interpreting the relative success of our micro-loans intervention at increasing ITN ownership rates. First, not everyone repaid the micro-loans in full. At the time of the follow-up survey, 1 to 1.5 years after the sales, we estimate that 49% of sample households had repaid the loan in full, although one in every five (20%) had not repaid anything. On average, the fraction of the loans repaid among sample households was 64%: assuming no further repayment, the MF program corresponded to an average subsidy of 36% on the full price of the ITNs. Second, although our study area comprised a large number of villages spread across a very wide geographical area, the study population is not a representative sample of the five districts where we operated. Our study villages were selected because BISWA already had a presence there, and only BISWA clients were eligible for the intervention. Therefore, our study does not identify the impacts of introducing sales of ITNs on credit within a population with no access to BISWA's credit network. Extending sales to non-BISWA clients within our study communities could have increased the overall coverage of ITNs within the village, but our data are silent about this. In addition, data collected at the village level during the delivery of ITNs, in the fall of 2007, indicate that uptake was larger among households included in our baseline survey relative to non-sample households. So our results, while valid for our sample, may over-estimate the overall impact of micro-loans on uptake and usage at the village level in our study areas.

Third, our results do not imply that liquidity constraints were the only reason for the low ITN ownership rates observed before our intervention. In fact, our research design does not identify what demand would have been if the same ITNs had been *only* offered for cash. However, almost all households who purchased ITNs did so choosing the loan contract, and only a handful purchased cash. Hence, the offer of micro-consumer loans plausibly played a crucial role in explaining the relatively high uptake. In addition, despite all sample households being affiliated to the micro-lender BISWA, many still appeared to be credit constrained. At baseline, more than half of respondents stated that it would have been difficult or impossible for the household to borrow Rs 500 or more (see Table 1), an amount close to the price of two program ITNs. The micro-consumer loans offered by BISWA were granted separately and in addition to

any other loan already outstanding. Without such consumer loans, most households would have likely had difficulty acquiring a number of ITNs sufficient to protect all household members, either purchasing them in cash or initiating loans for their purchase.

Finally, the increase in ITN ownership and usage observed in micro-loans communities remained significantly below that achieved with free distribution. In these latter locations, 47% of individuals were reported as having slept under an ITN the previous night. This is 31 percentage points more than in MF villages. The fraction reported as sleeping regularly under an ITN during the peak mosquito season was 77%, that is, 41 percentage points more than in MF villages. The possibility of substantial cost recovery offered by micro-loans needs therefore be traded-off with product uptake which is likely to remain well below universal. Although (unlike [Cohen and Dupas 2010](#)) we find that micro-loans also led to significant screening based on malaria risk, such non-universal purchase rates likely limit the possibility of reaching mass coverage, which in some situations may be essential for the success of health campaigns.

Next, we also found evidence against the hypothesis that, conditional on ownership, ITNs that had been purchased on credit were more likely to be reported as having been used the night before the follow-up survey relative to ITNs received for free. Our findings are thus consistent with analogous conclusions found for ITNs in Kenya ([Cohen and Dupas 2010](#)) and for water disinfectant in Zambia ([Ashraf et al. 2010](#)), although we find that free ITNs were actually being used *more* than ITNs purchased on credit. In addition, we document that, in communities where ITNs were sold on credit, regular re-treatment with insecticide was significantly higher among households who decided to “commit” to re-treat by purchasing ITNs bundled with a sequence of two re-treatments. Although contract choice makes pre-commitment clearly endogenous, we find that the gap in re-treatment rates remains similar if we control for a large number of household characteristics which also include proxies for preference parameters. These results suggest that in situations where public health programs call for cost-sharing and also require compliance with certain behaviors over time, the inclusion upfront of any monetary costs of such behaviors may increase compliance. Despite its non-experimental nature, we think this result has potentially important policy implications and deserves further examination.

Finally, perhaps the most surprising result of our study is that we found close to no improvements in either malaria prevalence or hemoglobin levels, not even among households which received nets for free. At follow-up, malaria prevalence was 18% in control villages, but it was 4 percentage points *higher* in MF and Free communities, although the null of equality cannot be rejected at standard levels. The estimates are also sufficiently precise that we can reject the hypothesis of improvements in prevalence as large as those documented in several earlier studies on the health impact of ITNs. Hemoglobin levels and anemia prevalence were almost identical among experimental arms: we only find a statistically significant increase in hemoglobin levels with free distribution as compared to control areas (p-value = 0.038), when we estimate a DD model for the subset of individuals tested both at baseline and at follow-up, but the change is small in magnitude.

All malaria indices were measured with blood samples analyzed with RDTs. Our prevalence measures are thus likely accurate, although additional measurements could have helped in identifying impacts. While our RDTs assessed the prevalence of *Plasmodium* parasitemia, we did not assess clinical disease, that is,

episodes of malaria illness accompanied by recognizable symptoms. In a partially immune population (such as in our study areas in Orissa), clinical malaria is an important marker. In addition, we assessed malaria prevalence (the fraction of individuals who tested positive at a given time), but not incidence (the number of episodes during the study period), and did not conduct active surveillance for malaria during the course of the study. Detecting incident cases would have likely improved our case-finding for malaria, and provided a more accurate assessment of malaria burden. This may have resulted in a more sensitive detection of the impact of ITNs on decreasing malaria burden. Finally, our study was not designed to measure entomologic indicators such as anopheline density, biting rates and behaviors. We thus were not able to assess directly one of the key impacts of ITNs, and thus lacked a more direct measure of their community-wide protective effect. Although our indirect assessment of this (through malaria and anemia prevalence) suggests there was little effect on the vector population, direct measurement could have provided better confirmation for one possible reason that our intervention did not reduce the malaria burden.

One additional limitation is that our study was conducted with standard ITNs, and not with the long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) that are being increasingly used in many mass distribution campaigns, particularly in Africa. Although lower availability and higher cost for LLINs are still considerations in the decision of whether to use ITNs or LLINs in such programs, these factors are becoming less important, as LLINs become more available and less expensive with each passing year. The WHO now recommends that all mass bednet campaigns utilize LLINs ([World Health Organization 2007](#)). Use of LLINs in our program would have eliminated the issue of re-treatment, which our study examined in detail; the higher cost of LLINs could have altered the ownership and use decisions in ways difficult to predict. Crucially, LLINs may have provided a more reliable insecticide concentration on the ITNs in the field, given that they are factory pre-treated, more wash resistant, and do not need to be re-treated every six months. In our study, field staff treated bednets following guidelines from the insecticide manufacturer and the World Health Organization ([World Health Organization 2002](#)). However, concentrations decline over time, especially when the net is washed frequently. Towards the conclusion of the follow-up survey, seven ITNs that were re-treated approximately six months earlier were tested by gas chromatography. Of the seven ITNs, only two had deltamethrin concentrations that approached the level recommended for field-treated ITNs. While it is not unexpected to find low insecticide concentrations six months after re-treatment (particularly if the ITN has been washed multiple times), these tests suggests that the use of LLINs may have led to better health impacts.

While keeping these caveats in mind, we argue that the lack of improvements in malaria indices do not appear to be the consequence of behavioral changes among beneficiaries, differential attrition and consent to being tested, poor measurement of health outcomes, or low retention rates of ITNs. Rather, we conjecture that the findings are likely explained by a combination of two factors. A first likely cause was the low ITN coverage achieved by our program, even in communities with free provision of ITNs, a result of our program targeting only households affiliated to the micro-lender BISWA. Second, our study design did not include direct monitoring of ITN usage, or frequent measurement of health outcomes. Both these features are in stark contrast with the earlier studies surveyed in [Lengeler \(2004\)](#) that have documented large benefits of ITNs on malaria indices. We emphasize that low coverage, coupled with low or no monitoring,

are likely to mimic more closely actual public health interventions than studies carried out under ideal trial conditions. Unfortunately, although we argue that our conjecture is likely correct, our study was not designed to generate variation in monitoring and coverage.

Importantly, the unique features of our study design also imply that our results should *not* be interpreted as contradicting earlier studies on the efficacy of ITNs. That our findings may instead be an important complement to the literature is indeed consistent with the view expressed in [Lengeler \(2004\)](#) (p. 10) when he wrote that

[t]he results presented in this review are from randomized controlled trials where the intervention was deployed under highly controlled conditions, leading to high coverage and use rates. [...] Therefore, the bulk of data in this review describe impact under ideal trial conditions (efficacy) rather than impact under large-scale programme conditions (effectiveness). While the difference between efficacy and effectiveness is likely to be small for certain medical interventions (such as vaccination or surgery), it can potentially be large for preventive interventions such as ITNs.

Far from suggesting that ITNs are not useful to combat malaria, our results suggest that public health interventions which only achieve the distribution of a relatively limited number of ITNs may fail to achieve the desired effects. Much more may be needed, and efforts should include ensuring high village-wide coverage, providing incentives for regular use, and possibly adding complementary interventions such as indoor residual spraying, case management and environmental measures. Otherwise, in the words of [Hawley et al. \(2003\)](#) (p. 126) “low levels of coverage with treated nets or, worse, untreated or poorly treated nets, may do little but fritter away scarce resources”.

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


Figure 1: Study Areas

Notes: Study communities include 30 villages in Sambalpur, 9 in Kandhamal, 30 in Keonjhar, 33 in Balangir and 48 in Bargarh.




Figure 2: Net Usage at Baseline, by Age and Gender

Notes: Each line is a locally linear non-parametric regression of usage on age (in years). Regressions are estimated using a bi-weight kernel with bandwidth equal to 7. We categorize a household member as “using any net regularly during peak season” if the survey respondent responded “yes” to the question “Does [name] usually sleep under a bednet when there are lots of mosquitoes around?”. The sample includes information from all members at baseline of the 1,768 panel households. Sample sizes for females and males respectively are 4,738 and 4,747 for usage in peak season, 4,529 and 4,459 for usage of any net the previous night, and 4,507 and 4,439 for usage of ITNs the previous night.




Figure 3: Malaria and Anemia Prevalence, by Demographic Group

Notes: The columns represent the results of blood testing for anemia ($n = 2,532$) and malaria ($n = 2,561$) prevalence.




Figure 4: Mean Number of ITNs delivered per Head.

Note: Data from fall 2007. Each histogram represents the distribution across villages of the mean number of ITNs delivered per capita by our intervention. Each intervention group includes 47 villages. The outlier in the left tail of the uptake distribution in Free villages is due to a large number of sample households not present during the visit. The two outliers in the right tail of the distribution in MF communities are due to a number of sample households who purchased a large number of ITNs for resale.




Figure 5: Changes in previous night usage of ITNs, by Age and gender

Notes: Each column shows the change from baseline to follow-up survey in the fraction of household members in a specific age-gender group who slept under an ITN the night before the interview, by experimental arm. Each column also displays 95% confidence intervals, robust to intra-village correlation. By construction, the changes are calculated only for individuals who were part of the household both at baseline and at follow-up.




Figure 6: Fraction of observed BISWA nets used the previous night

Notes: Data on usage rates from post-intervention survey (winter 2008-09). For each household, usage rates are calculated as ratios, with the numerator equal to the number of BISWA nets reported as used the night before, seen by field staff during the follow-up survey, and identified by them as nets distributed through our program and the denominator is equal to the number of BISWA nets delivered to the household. 95% confidence intervals are robust to intra-village correlation (see text for details).




Figure 7: Post-intervention Malaria and Anemia Prevalence, by Age and Gender
 Notes: Columns show anemia or malaria prevalence in the specific age-gender group, by experimental arm. Each column also displays 95% confidence intervals, robust to intra-village correlation.




Figure 8: Malaria Prevalence vs. Intensity of ITNs Distribution

Note: Data from winter 2007 and winter 2008-09. Each circle in the graphs represents a village. Each graph also shows fitted values of two village-level OLS regressions of prevalence (or its change) on ITN coverage. The dotted lines are fitted values when we exclude villages with coverage larger than 0.35 (corresponding to the vertical line). The point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parenthesis) of the slopes, using all villages or excluding outliers respectively, are as follows: (A) 0.56 (0.13) and 0.12 (0.19); (B) -0.03 (0.46) and 0.40 (0.70); (C) 0.39 (0.18) and 0.18 (0.56); (D) -0.45 (0.41) and -0.52 (0.76).

Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics and Randomization Tests

	(1) Control	(2) Free	(3) MF	(4) p-value	(5) s.dev.
Scheduled Caste/Tribe/Other Backward Castes	0.9 (0.013)	0.933 (0.013)	0.912 (0.021)	0.421	0.256
Household size	5.5 (0.103)	5.6 (0.117)	5.3 (0.086)	0.138	2.22
Male	0.499 (0.007)	0.512 (0.007)	0.511 (0.006)	0.296	0.704
Age	27.8 (0.385)	27.4 (0.357)	27.9 (0.324)	0.495	0.235
No. children U5	0.499 (0.033)	0.506 (0.030)	0.487 (0.026)	0.892	0.452
Male household head	0.952 (0.009)	0.941 (0.011)	0.932 (0.010)	0.368	0.287
H. Head has some schooling	0.72 (0.018)	0.706 (0.027)	0.714 (0.021)	0.908	0.476
H. Head completed secondary education or above	0.084 (0.016)	0.075 (0.013)	0.114 (0.015)	0.123	0.154
Expenditure per Head (Rs per day)	22.3 (0.928)	21.2 (0.827)	24.2 (1.101)	0.085	7.9
Poor	0.195 (0.025)	0.24 (0.031)	0.196 (0.024)	0.463	0.408
Difficult/impossible for household to borrow Rs 500	0.525 (0.029)	0.529 (0.031)	0.518 (0.026)	0.953	0.500
Ratio Debt/total yearly expenditure	0.485 (0.081)	0.435 (0.061)	0.416 (0.049)	0.769	1.06
Household has at least one net	0.654 (0.030)	0.628 (0.029)	0.68 (0.023)	0.373	12.9
Nets (per capita)	0.287 (0.020)	0.264 (0.018)	0.311 (0.018)	0.167	0.3
ITNs (per capita)	0.021 (0.006)	0.046 (0.013)	0.055 (0.014)	0.027	0.146
Used net last night	0.131 (0.022)	0.116 (0.019)	0.162 (0.017)	0.195	0.295
Used ITN last night	0.019 (0.006)	0.022 (0.007)	0.03 (0.010)	0.617	0.134
Use regularly nets during "mosquito season"	0.564 (0.032)	0.512 (0.030)	0.572 (0.028)	0.304	0.453
Malaria prevalence	0.108 (0.016)	0.116 (0.018)	0.123 (0.018)	0.841	0.275
Hemoglobin	11.0 (0.087)	10.7 (0.096)	11.0 (0.087)	0.132	1.64
Anemia prevalence (Hb < 11 g/dl)	0.527 (0.024)	0.569 (0.025)	0.504 (0.020)	0.121	0.418

Source: Data from 1844 households included in the pre-intervention household survey (April-May 2007). Notes: Per-capita statistics are weighted by household size. For each variable, columns 1-3 show the experimental arm-specific means and the corresponding standard errors, adjusted for intra-village correlation. Column 4 reports p-values for a test of the null hypothesis that the means are identical across the three experimental arms. Column 5 contains the standard deviation of the variable calculated over the whole sample. "Poor" is a dummy equal to one if per capita monthly household expenditure is below a poverty line equal to Rs 381 = $326 \times (373/319.5)$, where 326 is the official poverty line for rural Orissa in 2004-05, and 373 and 319.5 are the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers in May-June 2007 and July 2004-June 2005 respectively.

Table 2: Bednet Acquisition and Ownership

Dependent variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	ITNs delivered	Any ITN Delivered	ITNs delivered (> 0 only)	ITNs delivered (per capita)	Any Bednet Ownership (Follow-up Survey, Winter 08/09) Nets owned	Nets owned (per capita)	Nets owned DD	Nets owned DD (per capita)
Free=1	2.65 (0.07)	0.96 (0.02)	2.77 (0.05)	0.52 (0.01)	1.46 (0.163)	0.27 (0.027)	1.56 (0.109)	0.28 (0.023)
MF=1	1.19 (0.21)	0.52 (0.05)	2.28 (0.32)	0.24 (0.04)	0.66 (0.161)	0.15 (0.029)	0.57 (0.106)	0.11 (0.023)
Intercept (Control)					1.89 (0.119)	0.36 (0.019)	0.30 (0.072)	0.07 (0.015)
Difference: Free – MF	1.46	0.43	0.49	0.27	0.80	0.13	0.99	0.17
p-value ($H_0 : MF=Free$)	0.0000	0.0000	0.1275	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	1199	1199	894	1199	1767	1767	1759	1759
R-squared	0.55	0.81	0.65	0.55	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.10
no. clusters	94	94	89	94	141	141	141	141

Notes: Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to intra-village correlation. All estimated coefficients in columns 1 to 8 are significant at the 1% level. In columns 1 to 4 the dependent variables refer to the number of nets delivered during the intervention (fall 2007). In column 2, the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if the household received at least one net during the intervention. The regressions in columns 5 to 7 refer to all bednets owned by households as measured during the follow-up survey (winter 2008-09).

Table 3: Correlates of ITN purchase

Dependent variable: at least one ITN purchased	OLS-LPM	
Log(monthly total expenditure per head)	-0.116	(0.053)**
Debt towards BISWA (per head, quartic root)	-0.005	(0.009)
Cost of malaria episodes last 6 months (per capita, quartic root) ¹	0.019	(0.011)*
% members who slept under net last night	0.209	(0.093)**
% members who slept under ITN last night	-0.053	(0.279)
# nets owned by household	0.007	(0.026)
# nets treated last 6 months	-0.033	(0.036)
% members using nets during peak season	-0.035	(0.079)
Any malaria-related deaths last 5 yrs	0.101	(0.141)
Expected cost of a malaria episode (quartic root) ²	0.014	(0.019)
% tested members positive to malaria	0.202	(0.080)**
% members with self-reported malaria episodes last 6 months	0.272	(0.116)**
Subjective $P(\text{malaria} \mid \text{untreated net}) - P(\text{malaria} \mid \text{ITN})$ ³	-0.066	(0.106)
Subjective $P(\text{malaria} \mid \text{no net}) - P(\text{malaria} \mid \text{ITN})$ ³	-0.140	(0.142)
Observations	513	
R-squared	0.11	

Notes: OLS estimates of a linear probability model with a binary dependent variable = 1 if the household purchased at least one ITN. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust to intra-village correlation. Statistical significance is indicated with * (10% level), ** (5%) and *** (1%). Data on ITN purchase collected during sale operations in fall 2007. All other data are part of the baseline survey (spring 2007). Only panel households included. Sample size is smaller than the 589 panel households in MF villages because 76 observations (13%) have at least one regressor missing. Also included in the model are the following regressors, none of which is significant at standard levels: intercept, age, gender and schooling of household head, household size, number of members younger than 5 years old, or 5 to 14, or older than 60, measures of risk aversion and intertemporal preferences. Risk aversion is measured by an indicator equal to one when the respondent chose a no-risk lottery from a list of different lotteries (played with real monetary payoff), differing in the expected value and variance of the reward. We evaluated time preferences with 12 questions where the respondent had to choose between an earlier reward and a later but larger one. The regression includes a dummy equal to one when the respondent always chose the earlier reward, and a variable recording the number of “preference reversals” implicit in the choices, which arise when an individual chose a reward at date t over a larger one at date $t + s$ but preferred the later reward when the two dates were shifted by an equal time period.

¹ Includes all actual expenses for in-patient and out-patient care, drugs, transportation and lost household earnings. ² Expected total cost of a malaria episode for a working adult male, including all items listed above. ³ The probabilities were elicited by asking respondents to express the likelihood of an event by choosing an integer between zero (impossible event) and ten (certainty).

Table 4: Bednet Usage in Panel Households

Dependent variable	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)									
	Previous night					Usual in peak season				
	Any net	Any net	ITN	ITN	Untreated net	Untreated net	Any net	Any net	ITN	Untreated net
Free	0.358 [0.038]***	0.378 [0.036]***	0.447 [0.030]***	0.46 [0.031]***	-0.086 [0.025]***	-0.084 [0.026]***	0.268 [0.034]***	0.332 [0.037]***	0.708 [0.031]***	-0.437 [0.039]***
MF	0.125 [0.038]***	0.09 [0.034]***	0.14 [0.024]***	0.126 [0.026]***	-0.013 [0.030]	-0.037 [0.026]	0.173 [0.037]***	0.179 [0.036]***	0.296 [0.037]***	-0.12 [0.046]**
Intercept (Control)	0.176 [0.025]***	0.05 [0.019]***	0.022 [0.006]***	0.003 [0.007]	0.149 [0.023]***	0.049 [0.016]***	0.659 [0.032]***	0.089 [0.022]***	0.064 [0.014]***	0.59 [0.032]***
DD	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	no
Difference: Free – MF	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33	-0.07	-0.05	0.09	0.15	0.41	-0.32
p-value ($H_0 : MF=Free$)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0015	0.1046	0.0001	0.0003	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	9037	7707	8986	7647	8986	7647	9454	8442	9317	9317
R-squared	0.099	0.091	0.203	0.199	0.015	0.007	0.08	0.061	0.353	0.145
no. clusters	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141

Notes: Data from spring 2007 (baseline) and winter 2008-09 (follow-up). Panel households only. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. All figures are OLS estimates. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 (DD=no) report estimates of model (2), where we include information from all household members listed at follow-up in panel households. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 (DD=yes) report differences-in-differences estimates of model (3), where observations include only members of panel households present both at baseline and at follow-up, which explains the smaller sample sizes in these regressions. Missing values are responsible for the other differences in sample sizes: mostly, in some cases the respondent did not know if the net being used the previous night was treated or not, and in other cases net usage the previous night was not known while regular usage during the peak season was.

Table 5: Re-treatment Rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	First re-treatment (spring 2008)		Second re-treatment (fall 2008)	
	All	All, adding controls	All	All, adding controls
MF, “Commitment contract” (C2)	-0.08 (0.030)***	-0.06 (0.028)**	-0.09* (0.054)	-0.19 (0.084)**
MF, C1	-0.56 (0.059)***	-0.50 (0.055)***	-0.62 (0.059)***	-0.58 (0.062)***
Intercept (Free)	0.92 (0.013)***	-	0.83 (0.016)***	-
Includes baseline characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes
$H_0 : C1=C2$				
Difference	0.48	0.50	0.53	0.39
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	875	781	875	787
R-squared	0.346	0.373	0.293	0.358
Clusters	89	88	89	87

Notes: Data from first (spring 2008) and second (winter 2008) re-treatment of bednets in Free and MF communities only. The regressions are estimated using only information from households who received at least one ITN during the intervention. OLS regressions with standard errors (in parenthesis) robust to intra-village correlation. The dependent variable is the household-specific ratio between treated bednets and total ITNs delivered during the intervention. Asterisks denote significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. The regressions in columns 2 and 4 include the same baseline household characteristics used to predict ITN purchase in Table 3 (full results are available upon request from the authors). Missing values in some of these characteristics explain the decline in sample size relative to the results in columns 1 and 3. We do not report the intercept in these regression because the inclusion of other covariates makes it non-comparable with the other models.

Table 6: Impact of Intervention on Health Indices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	+ve Malaria		Hemoglobin		Anemic (Hb < 11g/dl)	
	Follow-up	DD	Follow-up	DD	Follow-up	DD
Free distribution= 1	0.037 [0.030]	0.054 [0.040]	-0.033 [0.105]	0.222 [0.107]**	0.01 [0.022]	-0.024 [0.033]
Micro-loans= 1	0.044 [0.035]	0.063 [0.039]	0.023 [0.094]	0.046 [0.123]	0.005 [0.021]	0.035 [0.035]
Constant	0.183 [0.022]***	0.063 [0.028]**	11.433 [0.064]***	0.277 [0.075]***	0.384 [0.012]***	-0.111 [0.024]***
Only panel individuals	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7154	1896	7149	1869	7149	1869
No. clusters (villages)	141	141	141	141	141	141
R-squared	0.0022	0.0037	0.0001	0.0036	0.0001	0.0021
Free=MF (p-value)	0.833	0.8289	0.6058	0.1568	0.8474	0.0937*
Free=MF=0 (p-value)	0.3538	0.228	0.8749	0.1025	0.9043	0.2437

Notes: Data from baseline (Spring 2007) and post-intervention household surveys (Winter 2008-09). All results are OLS estimates with individual observations. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. Estimates in columns 2, 4 and 6 (DD) only include tests from individuals tested both at baseline and at follow-up.

Table 7: Knowledge of Causes of Malaria and Risk Mitigating Behavior

	(1) Control	(2) Free	(3) MF	(4) Test of equality (p-values)
(A) Causes of malaria				
Drinking contaminated water	0.105	0.059	0.073	0.055
Mosquito bites	0.845	0.892	0.854	0.058
Contaminated environment	0.116	0.131	0.148	0.447
Don't know	0.037	0.025	0.051	0.065
(B) Malaria-avoiding behavior				
Bednets	0.819	0.866	0.830	0.139
ITNs	0.023	0.023	0.017	0.718
Proper clothing (long sleeves etc)	0.004	0.008	0.010	0.268
Avoid drinking contaminated water	0.076	0.054	0.058	0.471
Insecticides	0.009	0.008	0.017	0.352
Repellents/mosquito coils	0.030	0.020	0.020	0.554
Smoke	0.016	0.023	0.022	0.622
Clearing stagnant water	0.028	0.021	0.022	0.702
Cleaning drainage system/sewage	0.054	0.075	0.087	0.093
Avoiding contaminated environments	0.158	0.170	0.211	0.151
Proper diet	0.051	0.039	0.037	0.618
Medicine	0.042	0.033	0.066	0.058
Other ways	0.035	0.021	0.027	0.469
Don't know	0.035	0.030	0.024	0.608
(C) Residual spraying of walls				
Inner walls sprayed in 2008-09	0.403	0.368	0.296	0.242
Outer walls sprayed in 2008-09	0.531	0.481	0.442	0.580
(D) Number of nets from other sources in the 12 months before the follow-up survey				
from Government/health centers	0.051	0.054	0.136	0.321
from NGOs other than BISWA	0.004	0.000	0.019	0.328
Purchased from the market	0.678	0.139	0.511	0.000

Notes: Data from winter 2008-09. Only panel households are included ($n = 1,768$). The figures in panels A and B show proportions of respondents who list, unprompted, the cause/behavior indicated in the row header. The p-values in columns 4 are calculated for a test of the joint null hypothesis that means are identical across experimental arms. All tests are robust to the presence of intra-village correlation of residuals

Table 8: Impacts on Malaria Prevalence: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Base results		Controls for spraying		Blood Tester FE	
	Follow-up only	DD	Follow-up only	DD	Follow-up only	DD
Free=1	0.037	0.054	0.04	0.062	0.021	0.038
	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.026]	[0.036]
MF=1	0.044	0.063	0.035	0.055	0.023	0.046
	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.029]	[0.036]
Intercept	0.183	0.063	0.185	0.064	0.379	0.227
	[0.022]***	[0.028]**	[0.025]***	[0.031]**	[0.043]***	[0.047]***
Observations	7154	1897	7154	1897	7154	1897
R-squared	0.0022	0.0037	0.0051	0.0041	0.0467	0.0415
Clusters	141	141	141	141	141	141
Free=MF	0.833	0.8289	0.8893	0.8584	0.9502	0.8200
Free=MF=0	0.3538	0.228	0.3899	0.2407	0.6479	0.3971

Notes: Data from baseline (Spring 2007) and post-intervention household survey (Winter 2008-09). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. The results in columns 1 and 2 corresponds to the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. In columns 3 and 4, regressors also include dummies for inner walls having been sprayed in 2008/09, a similar dummy for spraying of outer walls and two dummies = 1 when information about spraying is missing for inner or outer walls respectively.

Table 9: Direct Observations of Nets Used the Night Before the Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Slept under a net	Surveyor was allowed to see the net	Slept under a net seen by surveyor	Slept under a net in good conditions, seen by surveyor	Slept under a BISWA net seen by surveyor	Slept under a net seen hanging properly by surveyor
Free	0.375	0.075	0.360	0.293	0.472	0.037
	[0.039]***	[0.043]*	[0.038]***	[0.024]***	[0.030]***	[0.011]***
MF	0.135	0.037	0.127	0.093	0.133	0.009
	[0.037]***	[0.046]	[0.036]***	[0.017]***	[0.022]***	[0.008]
Intercept	0.170	0.851	0.144	0.044	0.002	0.018
	[0.025]***	[0.041]***	[0.024]***	[0.010]***	[0.002]	[0.005]***
Observations	8018	2780	8018	8018	8018	8018
Clusters	141	128	141	141	141	141
R-squared	0.1077	0.0089	0.1049	0.1040	0.2406	0.0078
Free=MF	0.0000	0.1189	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0161
Free=MF=0	0.0000	0.0911	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0044

Notes: Data from post-intervention household survey (Winter 2008-09). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. All regressions are individual-specific and are estimated using only information about household members who slept in or around the house the night before the survey.

A Appendix

A.1 Comparison of Sample Villages and Overall Study Districts

The villages included in our sample were selected from a list of 878 villages where BISWA operated in 2007. In Table A.10, we evaluate the characteristics of communities in our sample relative to other communities in the five study districts, by using data from the 2001 Census of India on a broad range of village-level characteristics. Overall, the five study districts include a population of 8,991 villages. Although the data used in this paper have been collected in 2007-09, the time gap relative to the 2001 census is short enough that a comparison between sample and non-sample villages should be informative.

The results show that the null hypothesis of equality of means between sample and non-sample villages is strongly rejected for most of village characteristics (column 6). Sample villages are relatively large (both in terms of area and population), with mean total population more than twice as large as in non-sample villages. Sample villages also appear to be closer to towns, although not to a large extent. Mean distance from the nearest towns is 35 kilometers among non-sample villages and only 1-10 kilometers less in sample villages. Amenities are overall significantly better in sample villages, as reflected, for instance, in the higher proportion of villages with schools, health centers, a post office, a telephone connection and electricity. Interestingly, sample villages are also characterized by significantly larger fractions of land devoted to rice cultivation. This may have implication on malaria prevalence, because rice fields are often an ideal breeding ground for larvae of *Anopheles* mosquitoes.

We also test the null hypothesis that village characteristics are on average equal in the three experimental arms (column 7). This is useful, because the randomization tests in Table 1 only evaluated balance in household-level characteristics among villages included at baseline. We find that balance also existed for a large number of community characteristics. In a list of 26 variables, the test of equality across groups is only rejected, at the 10% level, for the presence of a middle school in the village.

A.2 Attrition and Changes in Household Composition

We look first at attrition at the household level, which was equal to 5% in MF and control villages and 3% in Free communities (see Table A.11, column 2). The null of equal attrition rates among arms is not rejected at standard levels, regardless of whether we use individual or joint tests. There was little correlation between attrition and household characteristics at baseline, including RDT results and bednet ownership and usage (columns 3 and 4). The only regression coefficients that are individually statistically significant indicate that households with an older and better educated head are less likely to exit the panel. On the other hand, we cannot reject the joint null that all the included slopes are equal to zero (p-value=0.14).

We also investigated whether significant changes in household composition took place between the baseline and the follow-up survey, as well as whether such changes were balanced across experimental arms, which is potentially important for two reasons. First, changes in availability of ITNs may also arise from changes in the number and age of household members (for instance, young children often share a sleeping space with their parents). Second, malaria and anemia prevalence at baseline differed across age and gender groups (see Figure 3), so that changes in the demographic structure of the household may confound, in principle, aggregate changes in such health measures calculated over all household members. We looked at both entry into or exit from panel households and to changes in the relative weight of different demographic groups. This analysis is possible because our enumerators filled a complete household roster both at baseline and at follow-up, so that we can separately identify new members as well as individuals who left the household because of death or relocation.

We look first at entry into and exit from households. The tabulation in Table A.12 shows that significant changes took place between baseline and follow-up survey. We find that 1,000 of 9,675 individuals are no longer present in the household, but we also find that new members are in similar numbers (916). About one-third of new members are temporary visitors. Overall, the fractions of members who are matched, new

or no longer present are similar across treatment groups, and we cannot reject the null of equality (see the table notes for the details of the test).

Next, in Table A.13 we analyze changes in the demographic structure of baseline households, again by experimental arm. Each row displays coefficients of a separate OLS regression estimated at the household level, where the dependent variable is the change—between baseline and follow-up—in the fraction of household members that belong to the row-specific age-gender group, while the regressors are dummies for the two intervention groups. The figures in column 1 show relatively small changes in control villages, with the coefficient largest in magnitude equal to -0.011 for the proportion on males 45 and older. Overall, we find small but statistically significant increases in the mean fraction of U5s, counter-balanced by declines in individuals 45 years old and above. This pattern is broadly consistent with the presence of a relatively small number of births coupled with deaths of older members. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 show that changes were largely similar in intervention villages, although in some cases the differences in changes are statistically significant. When we look at significant coefficients we find that, relative to control communities, the decline in the proportion of older members is about one percentage point larger for males in MF communities and one percentage point smaller for females in areas with free distribution. We also find smaller increases in the fraction of U5 in MF villages, where actually the fraction of girls declined on average by 0.2 percentage points over the study period. Overall, the results in Tables A.12 and A.13 show that changes in baseline household structure were fairly balanced across arms. Even in cases where we can reject the null of equal differences in changes among experimental groups, the differences are always small enough that none of the results described in the paper should depend on differential changes in household composition.

A.3 Post-intervention RDT Success Rates

In the post-intervention survey, all members of households re-contacted after the baseline were targeted for blood tests. Our testers were able to successfully test 75% of members in panel households, while 19% could not be tested because they were not present at the time of the visits and only 6% because consent was not given, see columns 1 and 4 in Table A.14. The figures in columns 2 and 5 of the same table show that absence and refusal were almost identical across experimental arm, which is reassuring. However, we also find important differences in testing success across different age groups (columns 3 and 6). Almost one third of adult (15-45) males (the omitted category in the regressions) could not be tested because of absence during the visits, probably because they were more likely to be off to work. Testing rates among all other demographic groups were significantly higher, especially among U5 of either gender and among women 15 years old and above. For these groups testing rates were close to 90%. The testing rates are very close between boys and girls, and the null of equality between genders cannot be rejected for both U5s and 5 to 15 year old children. We find instead some evidence of gender differences across age groups in refusal rates, which are highest among women over 45 (8%) and girls U5 (9%). Refusal rates are 3 percentage points lower among U5 boys, but the null of equality between genders cannot be rejected at standard significance levels.

Table A.10: Comparison of Sample Villages vs. Overall Village Population in Study Districts

	(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Not in sample	Means, by village category		Free, $n = 47$		MF, $n = 47$	no. of Villages	H_0 : All equal	Tests (p-values) H_0 : Exper. arms equal
Area of Village (in hectares)	275.2	413.1	476.4	417.4	417.4	8991	0.000***	0.608	
Number of Households	121.5	261.4	359.0	284.3	284.3	8991	0.000***	0.526	
Scheduled Caste population (%)	0.134	0.164	0.164	0.173	0.173	8630	0.012**	0.921	
Scheduled Tribe population (%)	0.478	0.328	0.372	0.321	0.321	8630	0.000***	0.597	
Females	0.501	0.497	0.496	0.499	0.499	8630	0.128	0.763	
Primary school	0.746	0.936	0.979	0.936	0.936	8991	0.000***	0.432	
Middle school	0.236	0.383	0.596	0.447	0.447	8991	0.000***	0.096*	
Secondary school	0.129	0.319	0.404	0.298	0.298	8991	0.000***	0.523	
Hospital	0.002	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.000	8991	0.001***	0.312	
Number of Primary Health Centres	0.025	0.106	0.064	0.064	0.064	8991	0.132	0.712	
Number of Primary Health Sub Centres	0.105	0.170	0.234	0.213	0.213	8991	0.029**	0.727	
Well Water	0.815	0.830	0.872	0.809	0.809	8991	0.692	0.678	
Tank Water	0.557	0.702	0.723	0.745	0.745	8991	0.000***	0.899	
River Water	0.120	0.106	0.170	0.149	0.149	8991	0.747	0.643	
Canal	0.050	0.128	0.149	0.128	0.128	8991	0.034**	0.943	
Number of Post Office	0.158	0.234	0.383	0.255	0.255	8991	0.003***	0.246	
Number of Telephone connections	0.285	0.532	0.617	0.553	0.553	8991	0.000***	0.682	
Bus services	0.228	0.255	0.298	0.298	0.298	8991	0.499	0.866	
Number of Commercial Banks	0.027	0.064	0.064	0.085	0.085	8991	0.242	0.906	
Number of Agricultural Credit Societies	0.027	0.085	0.106	0.106	0.106	8991	0.043**	0.919	
Approach - Paved Road	0.332	0.383	0.426	0.362	0.362	8991	0.506	0.813	
Distance from the nearest Town (in Kilometers)	34.9	34.3	25.2	26.1	26.1	8991	0.000***	0.445	
Electricity for Domestic use	0.465	0.702	0.575	0.681	0.681	8991	0.000***	0.389	
Electricity of Agricultural use	0.066	0.106	0.064	0.149	0.149	8991	0.346	0.386	
Wet Rice (irrigated) cultivated Area (%)	0.075	0.151	0.188	0.183	0.183	8875	0.000***	0.727	
Dry Rice (not irrigated) cultivated Area (%)	0.422	0.504	0.483	0.510	0.510	8875	0.003**	0.864	

Notes: Data from the 2001 Government of India Census. The point estimates in column 1 indicate means in villages not included in the baseline sample, while estimates in columns 2 to 4 indicate means in villages that belong to the group indicated in the column header. The figures in column 6 are p-values for the null hypothesis that the mean of the variable indicated in the row header is the same across all four village groups. The p-values in column 7 are for the test of equality among the three experimental arms. Statistical significance is indicated as *** (1% level), ** (5%) or * (10%). All tests are heteroskedasticity-robust.

Table A.11: Attrition between Pre and Post Intervention Household Surveys

Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if household was not re-interviewed at follow-up	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.041 [0.005]***	0.05 [0.013]***	0.2 [0.108]*	0.173 [0.109]
Free		-0.023 [0.014]	-0.022 [0.014]	-0.021 [0.013]
Micro-loans		-0.003 [0.015]	-0.001 [0.015]	0.004 [0.015]
log(monthly expenditure/household size)			0.011 [0.012]	0.014 [0.011]
# household members			-0.002 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]
Access to electricity			0.011 [0.010]	0.011 [0.010]
BISWA Debt/(Total yearly expenditure)< 0.05			-0.01 [0.016]	-0.021 [0.017]
BISWA Debt/(Total yearly expenditure)> 0.25			-0.006 [0.022]	-0.012 [0.022]
Baseline bednets per head			-0.018 [0.023]	-0.035 [0.021]
% Members who slept under net last night			-0.009 [0.016]	0.002 [0.017]
% Members who sleeps regularly under net			0.001 [0.017]	0.009 [0.017]
Household head is male			0.008 [0.019]	0.025 [0.017]
Household head's age (log)			-0.05 [0.019]***	-0.053 [0.020]***
Household head had any schooling			-0.024 [0.013]*	-0.029 [0.012]**
% malaria +ve in household				-0.005 [0.013]
% anemic (Hb< 11) in household				0.005 [0.011]
Observations	1844	1844	1814	1645
R-squared	0	0	0.01	0.02
H_0 : all coefficients = 0 (p-values)		0.11	0.21	0.14

Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1% (***) level. All regressions include observations from 141 clusters (villages). The smaller sample size in columns 3 and 4 is due to missing values in one or more regressors.

Table A.12: Changes in Household Membership

	Control	Free	MF	Total
Member at both baseline and follow-up	2,809	3,051	2,815	8,675
%	82.6	81.4	81.8	81.9
New member at follow-up	175	212	221	608
%	5.1	5.7	6.4	5.7
New member (visitor) at follow-up	99	121	86	306
%	2.9	3.2	2.5	2.9
No longer a member at follow-up	319	363	318	1,000
%	9.4	9.7	9.2	9.4
Total	3,402	3,747	3,440	10,589
%	100	100	100	100

Notes: All figures are calculated for the 1,768 households re-contacted in the post-intervention survey. At standard significance levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence between treatment and a categorical variable representing the different membership status indicated along the rows of the table (p-value= 0.7157). The test is a Pearson chi-squared statistic robust to clustering ([Rao and Scott 1984](#)).

Table A.13: Changes in Household Demographic Composition

	Regression Coefficients			Value at Baseline (4)
	Constant (1)	Free (2)	MF (3)	
Males, U5	0.007* (0.0035)	-0.004 (0.0043)	-0.005 (0.0049)	0.044
Females, U5	0.008*** (0.0029)	-0.007 (0.0040)	-0.010** (0.0046)	0.042
Males, 5 to 15	0.003 (0.0031)	0.001 (0.0043)	0.004 (0.0047)	0.096
Females, 5 to 15	0.000 (0.0032)	0.006 (0.0050)	-0.002 (0.0043)	0.089
Males, 15 to 45	-0.004 (0.0048)	0.008 (0.0071)	-0.001 (0.0065)	0.254
Females, 15 to 45	0.005 (0.0042)	0.004 (0.0061)	0.006 (0.0058)	0.256
Males, over 45	-0.011** (0.0044)	0.001 (0.0058)	0.012** (0.0058)	0.114
Females, over 45	-0.007** (0.0031)	-0.008* (0.0048)	-0.005 (0.0053)	0.106
Cross-equation joint tests	Statistic		p-value	
Free = 0	F(8,129)=	1.4187	0.2031	
MF = 0	F(8,129)=	2.0016	0.0596*	
Free = MF = 0	F(16,121)=	1.5921	0.0904*	

Notes: All figures are calculated for the 1,768 households re-contacted in the post-intervention survey. Each row reports coefficients of a separate OLS regression estimated at the household level, where the dependent variable is the change—between baseline and follow-up—in the fraction of the household who belongs to the specified age-gender group. The figures in column 1 are mean changes in control areas, while the coefficients in the next two columns are the differences in the changes, relative to control areas, in Free (column 2) and MF (column 3) communities. Standard errors (in brackets) and tests are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1% (***) level. The joint tests at the bottom of the table are robust to the presence of cross-equation correlation of residuals.

Table A.14: Post-intervention Malaria Biomarkers: Testing Success Rate in Baseline Households

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Absent	Absent	Absent	Refusal	Refusal	Refusal
Free		-0.001 [0.018]	-0.001 [0.018]		-0.009 [0.015]	-0.01 [0.015]
MF		0.006 [0.018]	0.005 [0.019]		0.018 [0.016]	0.017 [0.016]
Male, 0-5			-0.212 [0.020]***			0.017 [0.013]
Female, 0-5			-0.205 [0.023]***			0.045 [0.017]***
Male, 5-15			-0.121 [0.018]***			0.017 [0.010]*
Female, 5-15			-0.136 [0.019]***			0.008 [0.010]
Female, 15-45			-0.187 [0.015]***			0.011 [0.006]*
Male, > 45			-0.133 [0.017]***			0.003 [0.006]
Female, > 45			-0.212 [0.018]***			0.036 [0.009]***
Constant	0.194 [0.007]***	0.193 [0.013]***	0.32 [0.018]***	0.057 [0.006]***	0.054 [0.011]***	0.043 [0.012]***
Observations	9589	9589	9555	9589	9589	9555
R-squared	0.0000	0.0001	0.0404	0.0000	0.0023	0.0052
Clusters	141	141	141	141	141	141
Free=MF=0		0.9209	0.9343		0.2303	0.2355
M=F,0-5			0.7449			0.1558
M=F,5-15			0.4402			0.4505
M=F,Over 45			0.0000			0.0010

Notes: Data from post-intervention household survey (Winter 2008-09). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to intra-village correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1% (***) level. All figures are OLS estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is indicated in the column header. Both absence and refusal refer to malaria RDTs, but the figures for Hb are almost identical. All regressions include only observations from the 1768 households interviewed at baseline and re-contacted during the follow-up survey.

Table A.15: Results of Rapid Diagnostic Tests Validation (July 2009)

	RDT(1)	RDT(2)	RDT(3)
RDT(2)	0.7873		
RDT(3)	0.7844	0.8760	
Microscopy	0.5274	0.6131	0.5968

		Microscopy	
		-ve	+ve
Tester 1	RDT	-ve	129
	RDT	+ve	45
			1
			30

		Microscopy	
		-ve	+ve
Tester 2	RDT	-ve	148
	RDT	+ve	26
			3
			28

		Microscopy	
		-ve	+ve
Tester 3	RDT	-ve	146
	RDT	+ve	28
			3
			28

Notes: Data from July 2009. The results refer to tests of 205 blood samples collected from individuals with malaria symptoms in 3 villages in Rourkela district (Orissa). The figures in the sub-table on top are sample correlations between the results as read by the tester indicated in the column header and the one indicated in the row. The figures in the three sub-tables below indicate the details of the sample joint distributions of the test results as read by each tester vs. microscopy. Testers 1 and 2 were part of the field team that conducted blood tests during the follow-up household survey. Tester 3 was the most senior survey monitor in the team.